# getbookiq.com · LendRisk Analytics desks

> Public-filing intelligence desks on every US credit union, every FDIC-insured bank, the SEC-filing consumer lenders and the auto ABS deals, every number traceable to a formula. The pages are JavaScript applications; every tab has a text route listed below that returns the same data as markdown. One file with everything: https://getbookiq.com/llms-full.txt

Data as of: credit unions 2026-03 (NCUA 5300), banks 2026-06 (FDIC), deals 2026-09-06 (SEC ABS-EE), filers 2026-09-02 (SEC XBRL). Index built 2026-09-09.

## Credit Union Desk · https://getbookiq.com/cu/

The credit union side of the house: CU Intelligence (every federally insured credit union, 6,272 charters across 41 quarters of NCUA 5300 filings) and the Participation Desk (the loan participation market mapped from both sides' filings). For the CFO, the CLO and the buyer of paper. Search a charter here or start in a room.

- **Search credit unions** (/cu/#search): one box across every credit union, live or departed, with verdict and score. As text: https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=cu · https://getbookiq.com/read/cu/<charter>
- **Rooms**: CU Intelligence and the Participation Desk, plus the dictionary. https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/ · https://getbookiq.com/participation-desk/ · https://getbookiq.com/dictionary/

## Lending Markets · https://getbookiq.com/markets/

Banks, filers and deal tapes: the Bank Desk (every FDIC-insured bank, 7,769 certificates across 62 quarters) and Auto Credit Intelligence (26 SEC-filing consumer lenders and 44 auto ABS deals read loan by loan). For the bank analyst, the ABS investor and the warehouse lender. Search a bank, ticker or deal here or start in a room.

- **Search banks, lenders and deals** (/markets/#search): one box across every bank, SEC filer and deal on the desk. As text: https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=bank · https://getbookiq.com/read/bank/<cert> · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/<ticker> · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/<id>
- **Rooms**: the Bank Desk and Auto Credit Intelligence, plus the dictionary. https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/ · https://getbookiq.com/intel/ · https://getbookiq.com/dictionary/

## The Desk · https://getbookiq.com/desk/

The front door. Two desks under one roof: the Credit Union Desk (https://getbookiq.com/cu/: CU Intelligence and the Participation Desk) and Lending Markets (https://getbookiq.com/markets/: the Bank Desk and Auto Credit Intelligence), plus one search across every federally insured credit union (6,272), every FDIC-insured bank (7,769), 26 SEC-filing consumer lenders and 44 auto ABS deals. Public filings only, every number traceable to a formula.

- **Search everything** (/desk/#search): one box across credit unions, banks, lenders and deals; each row carries type, assets, composite score, verdict tag and status. As text: https://getbookiq.com/desk/data/index.json (every row) · https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=cu · https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=bank
- **Rooms**: the four desks below and the data dictionary. https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/ · https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/ · https://getbookiq.com/participation-desk/ · https://getbookiq.com/intel/ · https://getbookiq.com/dictionary/

## CU Intelligence · https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/

Every federally insured credit union, live or departed (6,272 charters, 4,336 filing), across 41 quarters of NCUA 5300 call reports through 2026-03: census, tape reads with a formula behind every cell, ten-year trends, loan penetration, participation posture, a ten-institution comparison with Excel export, saved screens, and validation against the 1,749 institutions that stopped filing.

- **Census** (/cu-intel/#census): every credit union, filterable by asset band, state, flag, live or departed, and by lens: business model (auto monoline, auto-heavy, indirect buyer, mortgage lender, card and signature lender, business lender, savings club, participation buyer or seller), who the members are (community, multiple common bond, single sponsor, associational, state charter, low-income designated, minority depository institution, payroll or saver base), reach (checking penetration, share of potential members, loans per 100 members), funding and liquidity, stage, signals. As text: https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=cu&sort=score&limit=50 (add band, st, flag, q, minassets, maxassets, live=0, fom=, lid=1, mdi=1, model=, reach=, funding=)
- **Tape Read** (/cu-intel/#cu): one credit union: the verdict, flags with the rule behind each, numbers against its asset band with percentiles, loan mix, funding, loan penetration, ten-year trend, warning timeline, statement view; every cell opens a drawer with the formula and 5300 account codes. As text: https://getbookiq.com/read/cu/<charter> (example https://getbookiq.com/read/cu/9003)
- **Compare** (/cu-intel/#compare): up to ten credit unions side by side with year-earlier values, ranks, band percentiles and the band median; peer presets, criteria builder, merger candidates near us; Excel and CSV export. As text: https://getbookiq.com/compare?cus=<charter>,<charter>,...&q=<quarter>
- **Screens** (/cu-intel/#screens): saved questions: red flags, deteriorating, target cohort, repo watchlist, auto monolines, the de-capped, participation buyers, postmortems. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/cu-intel/screens.md · run one: https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=cu&flag=<flag>
- **Postmortems** (/cu-intel/#post): the postmortem studio: every charter that stopped filing (which is not the same as dying: mostly voluntary mergers), cut by band, field of membership, business model and year; tiles, departures by quarter, the median path out, living institutions on the same path, the cohort list. As text: https://getbookiq.com/postmortems?desk=cu&band=&fom=&year=
- **System** (/cu-intel/#system): the system by asset band, the validation lift table, the deterioration signature into departure, score distribution. As text: https://getbookiq.com/system
- **Data** (/cu-intel/#data): the full data sheet for the credit union on the tape read. As text: https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/data/summary.json (every credit union, latest row) · https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/data/stats.json (columns, band medians, validation) · https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/data/h/<charter mod 64>.json (41-quarter history)
- **What it means** (/cu-intel/#meaning): how to read every measure: what it means, when high, when low, versus peers, our line, limits; the four credit unions you will meet; what the desk cannot tell you. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/cu-intel/meaning.md
- **News** (/cu-intel/#news): Google News headlines for the credit union on the tape read, with an events box whose arithmetic links to the filed fields. As text: https://getbookiq.com/read/cu/<charter> (headlines section)
- **Flags**: cap_low = thin capital; cap_critical = capital below 7%; cap_falling = net worth falling; earn_negative = losing money; earn_opex = expense trap; earn_nim_squeeze = margin squeeze; aq_dq_high = delinquency 2x band; aq_dq_rising = delinquency rising; aq_nco_high = charge-offs p90; aq_repo = repo signal; shrink_assets = assets shrinking; shrink_members = members leaving; shrink_loans = loan book shrinking; str_ltos = loans>95% of shares; str_borrowings = leaning on borrowings; str_thirdparty = 3rd-party paper>100% NW; str_vehicle = auto monoline. https://getbookiq.com/dictionary/#cu

## Bank Desk · https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/

Every FDIC-insured bank (7,769 certificates, 4,313 filing) across 62 quarters of call reports through 2026-06: liquidity and run risk, uninsured deposits, securities losses against equity, loans to non-depository lenders (the warehouse line), the auto book, and 201 failures autopsied with the score each carried in its last filing.

- **Market** (/bank-desk/#market): the banking system by quarter and the screens that matter now. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/bank-desk/market.md · https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=bank&sort=score&limit=50
- **Autopsy** (/bank-desk/#autopsy): every FDIC failure since 2011 with the desk's score in its last filing, and the validation lift table. As text: https://getbookiq.com/autopsy
- **Postmortems** (/bank-desk/#post): the postmortem studio: every bank that stopped filing without failing (mergers, conversions, wind-downs; failures are on Autopsy), cut by band, state and year; the median path out, living banks on the same path, the cohort list. As text: https://getbookiq.com/postmortems?desk=bank&band=&st=&year=
- **Bank Lookup** (/bank-desk/#bank): one bank: verdict, flags, ratios with band percentiles, the quarter each flag first fired, headlines. As text: https://getbookiq.com/read/bank/<FDIC certificate>
- **Screens** (/bank-desk/#screens): saved screens: buyers, sellers, warehouse lenders, auto books, stressed, run risk. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/bank-desk/screens.md
- **Method** (/bank-desk/#method): how the desk is built and what it cannot see. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/bank-desk/method.md
- **Data** (/bank-desk/#data): the data sheet for the bank on the lookup. As text: https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/data/summary.json · https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/data/stats.json · https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/data/h/<cert mod 64>.json
- **What it means** (/bank-desk/#meaning): how to read every measure on the bank desk. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/bank-desk/meaning.md
- **Flags**: liq_ltd = loans exceed deposits; liq_uninsured = uninsured deposits >50%; liq_brokered = brokered >10%; liq_wholesale = wholesale funding >15%; liq_thin = liquid assets <10%; liq_runrisk = run vulnerability; cap_low = leverage <7%; cap_critical = leverage <5%; cap_falling = capital falling; cap_aoci = AOCI drag >20% of equity; cap_secloss = securities losses >30% of equity; earn_negative = losing money; earn_efficiency = expense ratio p90; earn_nim = NIM <2.5%; aq_noncurrent = noncurrent p90; aq_nco = charge-offs p90; aq_reserve = reserve under noncurrent; conc_construction = construction >100% equity; conc_warehouse = loans-to-lenders >50% equity; conc_auto = auto book souring; shrink_deposits = deposits shrinking; shrink_assets = assets shrinking; flight_uninsured = uninsured deposits leaving. https://getbookiq.com/dictionary/#bank

## Participation Desk · https://getbookiq.com/participation-desk/

The credit union loan participation market mapped from the buyers' and sellers' own 5300 filings through 2026-03: flows by quarter and collateral, 1,940 active participants, habitual sellers, buyers with 701.22 due-diligence exposure, call sheets, and each credit union's position. No filing names a counterparty; the desk shows both sides of a market its participants cannot see.

- **Market** (/participation-desk/#market): flows by quarter, the collateral split, sellers and buyers. As text: https://getbookiq.com/participation
- **CU Lookup** (/participation-desk/#cu): one credit union's participation posture over 41 quarters. As text: https://getbookiq.com/read/cu/<charter> (participation section)
- **Call Sheets** (/participation-desk/#sheets): the sellers and buyers as call lists with the reason each is on the list. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/participation-desk/sheets.md
- **Method** (/participation-desk/#method): how the market map is built from one-sided filings. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/participation-desk/method.md
- **Data** (/participation-desk/#data): every row. As text: https://getbookiq.com/participation-desk/data/part.json
- **What it means** (/participation-desk/#meaning): how to read participation flows, 701.22, and the risks the filing cannot show. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/participation-desk/meaning.md

## Auto Credit Intelligence · https://getbookiq.com/intel/

Two censuses in one room: 26 SEC-filing consumer lenders read from XBRL (reserve bleed, coverage, non-reliance filings) and 44 auto ABS deals read loan by loan from Reg AB II tapes (907,334 loans, 14 lenders): reported against extension-adjusted delinquency, cumulative net loss against the band, vintage curves by lender, band and origination quarter, and the bonds on top with hard enhancement against two stresses.

- **Filers** (/intel/#board): every SEC-filing consumer lender with tier, score and flags. As text: https://getbookiq.com/filers
- **Filer Read** (/intel/#co): one filer: the statement read, flags, events, insights. As text: https://getbookiq.com/read/co/<ticker>
- **The Market** (/intel/#market): the below-prime index and the band series from the deal tapes. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/market.md · https://getbookiq.com/intel/data/index.json
- **Deals** (/intel/#deals): every deal on the desk with its latest tape read, flags and the rejected list. As text: https://getbookiq.com/deals
- **Deal Read** (/intel/#deal): one deal: pool snapshot, monthly tape series, extension masking, roll, mix drift, vintages, and the bonds on top. As text: https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/<id> (example https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/SDART-2023-6)
- **Curves** (/intel/#curves): ever 60+ and ever extended by month on book for any lender, band and vintage; combine or separate lenders; post composer. As text: https://getbookiq.com/curves (summary) · https://getbookiq.com/curves?lender=Exeter&band=subprime&vintage=2024
- **Perimeter** (/intel/#perim): who is on the desk, who is not, and why. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/perim.md
- **Rebuild It** (/intel/#rebuild): how to reproduce every number from EDGAR yourself. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/rebuild.md
- **System** (/intel/#system): the deal population, bands and validation. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/system.md
- **Screens** (/intel/#screens): saved screens across filers and deals. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/screens.md
- **Data** (/intel/#data): every row. As text: https://getbookiq.com/intel/data/pubco.json · https://getbookiq.com/intel/data/abs.json · https://getbookiq.com/intel/data/curves.json · https://getbookiq.com/intel/data/vintage.json · https://getbookiq.com/intel/data/tranches.json
- **What it means** (/intel/#meaning): how to read filers and deals: every measure, its limits, the masking arithmetic. As text: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/meaning.md
- **Flags, filers**: scissors = Allowance coverage falling while the loss rate rises; reserve_bleed = Provision below net charge-offs for consecutive quarters; reserve_bleed_deep = Provision below net charge-offs for four or more quarters; coverage_falling = Allowance coverage down year over year; losses_rising = Net charge-off rate up year over year; growth_thin = Book growing while reserve coverage thins; nonaccrual_rising = Nonaccrual share climbing; dq_rising = Past-due share climbing year over year; dq_vs_reserve = Past due rising while allowance coverage falls; reserve_thin = Allowance covers under three quarters of the current loss burn; equity_thin = Equity under a tenth of assets; equity_negative = Shareholders' equity is negative; equity_eroding = Equity share of assets falling sharply year over year; book_disposed = Receivables book no longer reported; nonreliance = Filed a non-reliance 8-K; late_filing = Filed a late-filing notice
- **Flags, deals**: masking_severe = Extension-adjusted 60+ delinquency exceeds reported by more than 200bps; masking = Extension-adjusted 60+ delinquency exceeds reported by more than 75bps; ext_stock_rising = Share of the pool touched by an extension rising sharply; cnl_above_band = Cumulative net loss above the peer median at the same seasoning; dq_above_band = Reported 60+ delinquency above the peer median at the same seasoning; recovery_weak = Cumulative recoveries under a third of charged-off principal

## Data dictionary · https://getbookiq.com/dictionary/

Every field on every desk, filed or derived, with its formula and the regulator's own account codes: NCUA 5300, FDIC call report, SEC XBRL tags and ABS-EE tape fields.

## Text routes, all of them

- https://getbookiq.com/guide  the route guide with parameters
- https://getbookiq.com/read/cu/<charter> · https://getbookiq.com/read/bank/<cert> · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/<ticker> · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/<id>
- https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=cu|bank&sort=&limit=&band=&st=&flag=&q=&minassets=&maxassets=&live=
- https://getbookiq.com/compare?cus=<charters>&q=<quarter>
- https://getbookiq.com/system · https://getbookiq.com/autopsy · https://getbookiq.com/participation · https://getbookiq.com/deals · https://getbookiq.com/filers · https://getbookiq.com/curves
- https://getbookiq.com/text/ (index of the prose tabs as markdown)
- https://getbookiq.com/sitemap.xml (every page and every institution's read)

## Rules for reading it
- Every number is a filed figure or arithmetic on filed figures with the formula shown. A flag is a question, never a finding; every verdict says "could be".
- Departed means stopped filing. For credit unions that is almost always a merger. Banks carry a separate FAILED status from the FDIC's own list.
- Thresholds were set by judgement from regulatory lines and band percentiles, never fitted to outcomes. Score 7+ is validated against departures, with the misses published.
- The data is a quarter old by construction: NCUA and FDIC publish six to ten weeks after quarter end. Deal tapes are monthly.
- Headlines come from Google News for the institution's name and are unfiltered; nothing in them feeds a score.
- Extension-adjusted delinquency is a modeling choice with a stated window; never quote the gap without it.
- Nothing here is a rating, a recommendation, or a statement about any named institution beyond what its own filing says.

## Sources
NCUA 5300 call report bulk files; FDIC BankFind and call reports; SEC XBRL company facts; SEC Form ABS-EE loan tapes and 10-D servicer reports. All public, no vendor data. Published by LendRisk Analytics.


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# Every prose tab, as captured from the live pages

## CU Intelligence · Compare

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/#compare · text route: https://getbookiq.com/compare?cus=<charter>,<charter>,...&q=<quarter>

COMPARE · UP TO TEN CREDIT UNIONS, SIDE BY SIDE
The board-pack table. Add your own credit union, mark it as "us", then build a peer set in one click or pick peers by hand. Every cell is the number the tape read shows for that quarter, with the year-earlier value under it; rank is among the institutions on this table, the chip is the percentile inside the institution's own asset band, and the last column is the same-quarter band median. Click a row's chart link to see the whole group over time. Export the table, the trends, the rankings and the reads as one workbook.
3 of 10
CLEAR
peer set around PREMIER ONE:
SAME ASSET BAND, NEAREST IN SIZE
SAME STATE
WITHIN 30% OF OUR SIZE
SAME BAND, AUTO-HEAVY
PEER GROUP BUILDER
show / hide
asset band
any
<$50M
$50-100M
$100-200M
$200-500M
$500M-1B
$1-10B
>$10B
state
any
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
GU
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PR
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VI
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
assets from ($M)
assets to ($M)
charter
any
federal
state
business model
any
auto-heavy (vehicles 40%+ of loans)
indirect lender
mortgage-heavy (RE 50%+)
consumer book (RE under 15%)
participation buyer
participation seller
performance
any
clean (score 0 to 2)
stressed (score 7+)
members growing 3%+
members shrinking 3%+
ROA 1%+
losing money
live only
yes
include departed
APPLY CRITERIA GROUP
4,336 match; the ten nearest our size will be applied
smart:
top
bottom
by
ROA
net worth ratio
member growth
delinquency (best = lowest)
charge-offs (best = lowest)
expense ratio (best = lowest)
loans to shares
vehicle share of loans
participations sold
participations bought
assets
in
our state
our band
our state and band
the whole country
APPLY
list:
APPLY LIST
MERGER CANDIDATES NEAR US
within 
25 miles
50 miles
100 miles
200 miles
500 miles
small, capital-rich, shrinking or thin-earning, few staff, clean credit, close to our branches; each row shows its fit reasons
SAVE THIS GROUP

Criteria groups apply the ten nearest our size that match. Saved groups live in this browser; "copy as text" gives you the charters to send to a colleague, who pastes them into the list box. Distance is between branch cities, not addresses.

US
PREMIER ONE · CA
×
MARKET USA · MD
×
CREDIT UNION OF TEXAS · TX
×
quarter 
2016-03
2016-06
2016-09
2016-12
2017-03
2017-06
2017-09
2017-12
2018-03
2018-06
2018-09
2018-12
2019-03
2019-06
2019-09
2019-12
2020-03
2020-06
2020-09
2020-12
2021-03
2021-06
2021-09
2021-12
2022-03
2022-06
2022-09
2022-12
2023-03
2023-06
2023-09
2023-12
2024-03
2024-06
2024-09
2024-12
2025-03
2025-06
2025-09
2025-12
2026-03
 year-earlier value and change
 band percentile chips
sort columns by 
selection order
Total assets
Loans
Member funds (shares and deposits)
Net worth
Members
Full-time staff
Members per full-time employee
Net worth ratio
Return on assets, annualized
Net interest margin
Operating expense / assets
Yield on loans
Total delinquency
Net charge-offs, annualized
Vehicle delinquency
Vehicle charge-offs, annualized
Repossessed % of vehicle book
Allowance for credit losses
Members, year over year
Members per full-time employee
Average share balance
Core shares % of member funds
Share and deposit accounts
Loans outstanding per 100 members
Loans granted per 100 members, annualized
Average loan balance
Loans per full-time employee
Loans granted, annualized
Loans / shares
Cash / assets
Borrowings / assets
Certificates % of member funds
Vehicles % of loans
Indirect vehicle % of vehicle (all-channel basis before 2022)
Indirect, all channels, % of loans
Third-party paper % of net worth
Real estate % of loans
Credit cards % of loans
Commercial % of loans
Participations bought / yr
Participations sold / yr
Participation charge-offs, annualized
Composite score (of 18)
Flags firing
Download Excel workbook
Download CSV
Copy link to this table
WHERE PREMIER ONE STANDS, FROM THE TABLE BELOW

PREMIER ONE ranks in the upper half on 15 of 17 measures where better is defined, against 2 peers, in 2026-03.

Best of the group on: Operating expense / assets; Total delinquency; Net charge-offs, annualized; Vehicle delinquency; Vehicle charge-offs, annualized; Repossessed % of vehicle book; Composite score (of 18); Flags firing.

Last of the group on: Members, year over year; Loans granted per 100 members, annualized.

Net worth ratio 9.7%, peers average 13.5%, band median 10.4%, up 0.2 points from a year earlier.

Return on assets 0.34%, peers average 0.42%, band median 0.62%, up 0.27 points from a year earlier.

Delinquency 0.23%, peers average 1.55%, band median 0.59%, up 0.01 points from a year earlier.

Net charge-offs 0.59%, peers average 1.58%, band median 0.42%, up 0.07 points from a year earlier.

Loans to shares 85%, peers average 86%, up 4 points from a year earlier.

Composite score 3 of 18; 2 of the 2 peers score higher (worse).

MEASURE · 2026-03	US · PREMIER ONE
SAN JOSE, CA · $500M-1B	MARKET USA
LAUREL, MD · $100-200M	CREDIT UNION OF TEXAS
ALLEN, TX · $1-10B	BAND MEDIAN
$500M-1B
SIZE AND PEOPLE
Total assetschart
assets
	$656.4M#2
$629.5M → +$26.9M
	$141.4M#3
$139.9M → +$1.6M
	$2.72B#1
$2.62B → +$94.4M
	–
Loanschart
loans
	$474.2M#2
$434.6M → +$39.6M
	$87.5M#3
$95.8M → −$8.2M
	$2.15B#1
$2.12B → +$33.9M
	–
Member funds (shares and deposits)chart
shares
	$558.1M#2
$535.9M → +$22.1M
	$113.2M#3
$112.3M → +$920K
	$2.26B#1
$2.16B → +$104.9M
	–
Net worthchart
networth
	$63.4M#2
$59.8M → +$3.6M
	$26.7M#3
$26.2M → +$546K
	$222.1M#1
$216.7M → +$5.4M
	–
Memberschart
members
	27,435#2
34,533 → -7,098
	17,055#3
19,916 → -2,861
	184,024#1
173,210 → +10,814
	–
Full-time staffchart
fte
	88#2
85 → +3
	39#3
40 → -1
	495#1
501 → -6
	–
CAPITAL AND EARNINGS
Net worth ratiochart
nwr
	9.7%#2p36
9.5% → +0.2 pts
	18.9%#1p94
18.7% → +0.2 pts
	8.2%#3p6
8.3% → -0.1 pts
	10.4%
Return on assets, annualizedchart
roa
	0.34%#2p24
0.07% → +0.27 pts
	0.80%#1p56
0.47% → +0.33 pts
	0.03%#3p5
-0.11% → +0.14 pts
	0.62%
Net interest marginchart
nim_pct
	3.31%#2p39
2.93% → +0.38 pts
	4.99%#1p96
5.43% → -0.44 pts
	3.09%#3p36
3.14% → -0.05 pts
	–
Operating expense / assetschart
opex_pct
	2.98%#1p20
3.17% → -0.19 pts
	5.45%#3p92
5.58% → -0.13 pts
	5.01%#2p99
5.33% → -0.32 pts
	–
ASSET QUALITY
Total delinquencychart
total_dq_pct
	0.23%#1p14
0.22% → +0.01 pts
	1.64%#3p89
2.62% → -0.98 pts
	1.47%#2p94
1.30% → +0.17 pts
	0.59%
Net charge-offs, annualizedchart
total_nco_pct
	0.59%#1p66
0.52% → +0.07 pts
	1.97%#3p98
2.18% → -0.21 pts
	1.20%#2p92
1.07% → +0.13 pts
	0.42%
Vehicle delinquencychart
veh_dq_pct
	0.37%#1p30
0.26% → +0.11 pts
	1.72%#3p87
2.77% → -1.05 pts
	1.39%#2p88
1.47% → -0.08 pts
	0.58%
Vehicle charge-offs, annualizedchart
veh_nco_pct
	1.85%#1p80
1.11% → +0.74 pts
	2.02%#3p91
1.83% → +0.19 pts
	1.96%#2p84
1.70% → +0.26 pts
	0.83%
Repossessed % of vehicle bookchart
repo_pct_veh
	0.04%#1p48
0.15% → -0.11 pts
	0.77%#3p97
1.34% → -0.57 pts
	0.05%#2p40
0.03% → +0.02 pts
	–
Allowance for credit losseschart
allowance_eff
	$4.2M#2
$4.0M → +$176K
	$3.4M#3
$3.7M → −$274K
	$17.5M#1
$16.3M → +$1.1M
	–
GROWTH AND MEMBERS (BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT)
Members, year over yearchart
members_yoy
	-20.6%#3p1
22.1% → -42.7 pts
	-14.4%#2p1
0.8% → -15.2 pts
	6.2%#1p85
6.1% → +0.1 pts
	1.0%
Core shares % of member fundschart
core_pct_shares
	56%#2
57% → -1 pts
	68%#1
70% → -1 pts
	44%#3
43% → +1 pts
	–
LOAN PENETRATION (LENDING)
Loans outstanding per 100 memberschart
loan_pen
	63%#2
49% → +13 pts
	65%#1
64% → +1 pts
	54%#3
56% → -3 pts
	–
Loans granted per 100 members, annualizedchart
granted_pen
	13%#3
7% → +6 pts
	18%#2
5% → +14 pts
	33%#1
36% → -3 pts
	–
Average loan balancechart
avg_loan_bal
	$28K#1
$26K → +$2K
	$8K#3
$7K → +$361
	$22K#2
$22K → +$190
	–
Loans per full-time employeechart
loans_per_fte
	195#3
200 → -5
	286#1
320 → -34
	199#2
195 → +4
	–
Loans granted, annualizedchart
granted_ann
	$149.3M#2
$219.9M → −$70.6M
	$26.6M#3
$17.5M → +$9.2M
	$1.30B#1
$1.26B → +$41.8M
	–
STRUCTURE AND FUNDING
Loans / shareschart
ltos
	85%#2p62
81% → +4 pts
	77%#3p65
85% → -8 pts
	95%#1p80
98% → -3 pts
	–
Cash / assetschart
cash_pct
	12.3%#2
11.9% → +0.5 pts
	33.2%#1
27.6% → +5.5 pts
	3.2%#3
3.5% → -0.3 pts
	–
Borrowings / assetschart
borrow_pct
	5.33%#2
7.15% → -1.82 pts
	0.00%#1
0.00% → +0.00 pts
	6.37%#3
7.44% → -1.07 pts
	–
Certificates % of member fundschart
cert_pct_shares
	20%#3
20% → +0 pts
	23%#2
22% → +1 pts
	44%#1
43% → +0 pts
	–
LOAN MIX
Vehicles % of loanschart
veh_pct_loans
	20%#3p26
17% → +3 pts
	61%#1p85
68% → -8 pts
	42%#2p81
42% → -0 pts
	–
Indirect vehicle % of vehicle (all-channel basis before 2022)chart
ind_pct_veh
	57%#2
60% → -3 pts
	69%#1
74% → -6 pts
	0%#3
0% → +0 pts
	–
Indirect, all channels, % of loanschart
ind_pct_loans
	11%#2
10% → +1 pts
	42%#1
51% → -9 pts
	2%#3
9% → -7 pts
	–
Third-party paper % of net worthchart
tp_pct_nw
	106%#2p52
72% → +33 pts
	137%#3p76
186% → -49 pts
	19%#1p17
86% → -67 pts
	–
Real estate % of loanschart
re_pct_loans
	69%#1
73% → -4 pts
	19%#3
17% → +3 pts
	37%#2
39% → -2 pts
	–
Credit cards % of loanschart
cc_pct_loans
	4%#2
4% → -0 pts
	7%#1
7% → +0 pts
	2%#3
2% → -0 pts
	–
Commercial % of loanschart
comm_pct_loans
	0%#3
0% → +0 pts
	7%#2
2% → +4 pts
	8%#1
7% → +1 pts
	–
PARTICIPATIONS
Participations bought / yrchart
part_buy_ann
	$0#2
$0 → +$0
	$3.0M#1
$0 → +$3.0M
	$0#3
$0 → +$0
	–
Participations sold / yrchart
part_sell_ann
	$0#2
$0 → +$0
	$0#3
$0 → +$0
	$159.6M#1
$88.2M → +$71.4M
	–
THE DESK'S READ
Composite score (of 18)chart
risk_score
	3#1
1 → +2
	7#2
8 → -1
	7#3
6 → +1
	–
Flags firingchart
n_flags
	0#1
0 → +0
	0#2
0 → +0
	0#3
0 → +0
	–

#1 is the best value among the institutions on this table where better is defined (higher net worth, earnings and margin; lower cost, losses, borrowings and score). Size and mix rows are ranked high to low without a claim that higher is better. Percentile chips are computed in the latest quarter only. Year-earlier values are the same quarter four cycles back. Departed institutions show their last filing and blanks after it. Source: NCUA 5300 call report, 2026-03; every measure's formula and account codes are one click away on the tape read.

---

## CU Intelligence · Screens

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/#screens · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/cu-intel/screens.md · run one: https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=cu&flag=<flag>

Each screen is a saved question. Click one and the census opens pre-filtered; refine from there.
RED FLAGS

Composite score 5+, $10M+ assets, clean data. The 5-6 bucket departs at 2x base rate; 7+ at 5x.

343 credit unions
DETERIORATING

Score 5+ AND members leaving (−3% YoY or worse). The compounding pattern the departed cohort showed.

324 credit unions
TARGET COHORT

Vehicle 50%+ of loans, $10M+ vehicle book, ≤40 FTE, under $1B. Auto-driven, no analytics staff: the structural buyer.

551 credit unions
REPO WATCHLIST

Repossessed vehicles above 0.40% of the vehicle book: the leading indicator that catches clean-delinquency books.

190 credit unions
AUTO MONOLINES

Vehicle 60%+ of the loan book. 1,100+ single-product lenders, most under $50M with 4 employees.

1,267 credit unions
THE DE-CAPPED

Third-party auto paper above 100% of net worth: over the line NCUA removed in Aug 2026.

799 credit unions
PARTICIPATION BUYERS

Purchased vehicle participations above 25% of net worth: bought paper, 701.22 due-diligence burden.

269 credit unions
POSTMORTEMS

Every credit union that stopped filing during the window. Open one for the final-18-months reconstruction.

1,936 credit unions

---

## CU Intelligence · System

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/#system · text route: https://getbookiq.com/system

THE SYSTEM AT 2026-03
Vehicle share of the loan book and dealer-sourced share invert with size: the small end writes car loans, the large end buys them. Median staffing is the capacity ceiling: below ~$500M nobody can dedicate an analyst.
BAND	CUS	ASSETS $B	VEH %LOANS	IND %VEH	MEDIAN FTE	MEDIAN DQ	MEDIAN SCORE	SCORE 5+
<$50M	1,931	33.9	52.7%	5.7%	3	0.66%	3	21.4%
$50-100M	577	41.8	42.7%	19.2%	13	0.63%	2	10.2%
$100-200M	547	78.5	37.3%	35.6%	27	0.62%	2	9%
$200-500M	523	169.4	34.2%	52.5%	60	0.6%	2	5.9%
$500M-1B	284	204.8	30.2%	61.4%	123	0.59%	2	10.2%
$1-10B	450	1303.6	28.1%	83.3%	308	0.62%	2	9.6%
>$10B	24	675.7	22.4%	62.6%	2243	0.91%	2	4.2%
VALIDATION: DEPARTURE RATE WITHIN 4 QUARTERS, BY RISK SCORE
Base rate 4.33%, 1749 departures on our watch. The claim is lift, not that every flagged institution is dying: most departures are voluntary mergers.
0-1
1.82% · 0.4x base
2
2.74% · 0.6x base
3-4
4.33% · 1.0x base
5-6
9.1% · 2.1x base
7+
22.97% · 5.3x base
THE DETERIORATION SIGNATURE · MEDIAN PATH INTO DEPARTURE
QUARTERS TO DEPARTURE	NET WORTH %	ROA %	DELINQUENCY %	MEMBERS YOY %	SCORE
t-7	11.24	0.14	0.65	-1.99	3
t-6	11.25	0.11	0.68	-2.04	3
t-5	11.17	0.1	0.74	-2.19	3
t-4	11.21	0.09	0.73	-2.17	3
t-3	11.19	0.06	0.7	-2.36	4
t-2	11.1	0.04	0.74	-2.79	4
t-1	10.95	0	0.72	-3.27	4
t-0	10.67	-0.44	0.66	-4.63	5
survivors (pooled)	11.44	0.55	0.55	0	2
CONVENTIONS & HONESTY
Source: NCUA 5300 bulk files, resolved per cycle through the account dictionary. Ratios use period-end balances and YTD annualization (Q1×4, Q2×2, Q3×4/3), so ROA and yields land within a few bp of NCUA's average-balance FPR math: screening-grade, not examiner-identical. The bulk data lags NCUA's single-CU FPR site by roughly one quarter. Indirect figures carry known self-reporting artifacts; filers tripping reclassification checks are labeled on their tape read. A flag is a question to ask management, not an accusation.

---

## CU Intelligence · What it means

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/cu-intel/#meaning · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/cu-intel/meaning.md

HOW TO READ THIS DESK
A credit union's call report answers four questions if you ask them in order: is the franchise growing or quietly dying, is it earning enough to exist, is the auto book, which is most of the loans at small institutions, telling the truth yet, and how much of that book was written by someone else. The percentile chips place the number against credit unions of similar size in the same quarter. Red means the worst fifth of the band for that measure, green the best fifth.
IS THE FRANCHISE ALIVE · GROWTH AND SCALE
Member growth, year over year
083 vs the same quarter one year earlier
MEANS
Whether the institution is gaining or losing the people it exists to serve. For a credit union this is the franchise itself; there is no other customer.
WHEN HIGH
Growth above 3% at a small credit union usually means a field-of-membership expansion or a merger absorbed. Check which.
WHEN LOW
Shrinking 3% or more a year is the quiet killer. The credit unions that stopped filing during our window were losing members at 2% a year eight quarters out and 4.25% a year at the end. Most of them had adequate capital the whole way down. Members leaving is what the capital cannot fix.
VS PEERS
System median is roughly flat to slightly negative; more than half of all credit unions with falling membership are under $50 million.
OUR LINE
< -3% = flag
LIMITS
A single-sponsor credit union tied to one employer inherits that employer's headcount. The decline can be entirely outside management's control and still fatal.
Asset and loan growth · loans / shares
010 and 025B year over year · 025B / 018
MEANS
Balance sheet direction and how fully deposits are deployed. Loans/shares is the credit union version of the bank's loans-to-deposits.
WHEN HIGH
Loans above 95% of shares leaves little deposit headroom; funding stress arrives fast if shares run. Fast loan growth at a small credit union with flat membership is usually indirect paper bought from dealers, not members walking in.
WHEN LOW
Assets shrinking 3%+ while costs stay fixed squeezes earnings mechanically. Loans/shares under 60% means members are depositing and not borrowing; the institution is a savings account with a lobby.
VS PEERS
Credit unions under $200M run loans/shares near 61% and their median loan book shrank 1.5% over the year, with the under-$50M median down 3.2%; a small CU growing loans fast is the exception and worth understanding.
OUR LINE
assets < -3% YoY = flag · loans/shares > 95% = flag
LIMITS
Mergers absorbed distort growth. Loans/shares ignores borrowings, which small credit unions rarely have and large ones sometimes hide behind.
IS IT EARNING ENOUGH TO EXIST · EARNINGS AND CAPITAL
Net worth ratio
997 / 010 · the prompt-corrective-action measure
MEANS
Capital as a share of assets. Regulatory categories attach directly: 7% well-capitalized, 6% adequately, below that a net worth restoration plan.
WHEN HIGH
Small credit unions run 13-14% on average. High net worth with negative earnings means the cushion is being spent, not built; the runway math (net worth divided by annual loss) tells you how many years remain, and it is almost always longer than the franchise will last.
WHEN LOW
Below 9% deserves attention; below 7% is the regulatory line; the departed cohort ran roughly 0.8 points below survivors the whole way down. Direction matters more than level: falling two straight quarters is the trend that precedes the rest.
VS PEERS
A credit union under 9% while its band sits at 13% is running with a third less cushion than everyone its size.
OUR LINE
< 9 = watch · < 7 = critical, double weight · falling two straight quarters = flag
LIMITS
Net worth is a book figure. It did not catch Unilever FCU (9% reported, $8.4M insurance fund loss, fraud) or Aldersgate (10% reported one quarter before negative 166%). Capital that depends on the honesty of the filing is only as good as the filing.
Return on assets
661A annualized over 010
MEANS
Whether the operation covers its own costs. It is the difference between a credit union that builds capital and one that spends it.
WHEN HIGH
Above 0.8% is strong for a credit union. Very high ROA at a small institution usually means an unusual income item; check the year-ago quarter.
WHEN LOW
Negative ROA eats net worth every quarter it persists. Small credit unions as a group earned 0.13% in early 2026 and the $50-100M band posted negative ROA. A lender with no credit losses that still loses money has a cost problem or a truth problem; that combination, not delinquency, was the visible signal at every fraud failure in 2025.
VS PEERS
The chip strips out the rate environment by comparing against the same-size cohort in the same quarter.
OUR LINE
< 0 = flag · zero-loss unprofitability (delinquency < 0.25%, charge-offs < 0.10%, ROA < 0 two quarters running) = proposed rule R-18
LIMITS
Annualized from year-to-date; first-quarter figures are noisy. One-time items swing small institutions by a full point.
Net interest margin · operating expense / assets
(115 − 350) annualized / 010 · 671 annualized / 010
MEANS
The spread engine and the cost base. When the spread cannot cover the expense line, no amount of clean credit saves the institution; this is the structural failure mode of small credit unions.
WHEN HIGH
Operating expense above the band p90 is the cost trap: the institution is too small for its overhead. A margin above 4% at a small CU usually reflects a consumer-loan-heavy book, which carries the credit risk that pays for it.
WHEN LOW
Margin under 2% cannot carry a branch and a compliance officer. Margin minus expense (plus fee income) going negative and staying there is the exact path Unilever walked for eight quarters.
VS PEERS
Compare the structural spread (margin plus fees minus expense) within the band; it is the single most reliable separator between institutions that continue and institutions that disappear, in our data and in every published study of the question.
OUR LINE
expense > band p90 = flag · NIM down 50bp+ YoY = flag
LIMITS
Ratios of flows; a shrinking balance sheet can hold the margin while dollars fall.
IS THE AUTO BOOK TELLING THE TRUTH · ASSET QUALITY
Total and vehicle delinquency
041B / 025B · (041C1 + 041C2) / (370 + 385) · 60+ days
MEANS
Loans where the borrower has already stopped paying. This is the measure everyone watches, and it has one structural weakness: it reports a promise already broken. It confirms trouble a quarter or two after the decision that caused it.
WHEN HIGH
Above twice the band median is a problem book. Above the band p90, the book is in the worst tenth of its peers regardless of absolute level.
WHEN LOW
Very low delinquency is good news only if the rest of the filing agrees. Aldersgate reported 0.00% delinquency for years while $8M of fraud ran underneath it. Zero can mean clean or can mean nobody is looking.
VS PEERS
The system sits near 0.8-1.0%; small credit unions run higher delinquency but lower charge-offs than large ones. Comparing across bands without the chip is meaningless.
OUR LINE
> 2x band median = flag · up 50%+ YoY = flag
LIMITS
Delinquency separated the credit unions that stopped filing from those that continued by only about 0.1 percentage point, in our data and in a published 13-cohort study. It points the right way and carries little distance.
Repossessed vehicle inventory / vehicle book
AS0024 / (370 + 385) · cars taken back, not yet sold
MEANS
The loss in transit. A car in the lot behind the branch will not cure; it will sell for less than was owed and the gap becomes a charge-off next quarter. This line speaks earlier than delinquency and partly independently of it.
WHEN HIGH
Above 0.40% is top-quartile territory. Across eleven consecutive annual cohorts, credit unions in the top quartile charged off at roughly twice the rate of those reporting none a year later, and the ordering held every single time. Among credit unions whose delinquency looked healthy, high repo inventory preceded 1.67 times the losses of their apparent peers.
WHEN LOW
Reporting a trivial amount is indistinguishable from reporting none; the signal begins at the second quartile. Zero can mean nothing in the lot or nothing on the line: 69% of credit unions leave it blank, and small ones with the highest delinquency report it least.
VS PEERS
Read it in the two-by-two: comfortable delinquency plus elevated inventory is the one combination the standard measure gets wrong.
OUR LINE
> 0.40% = flag
LIMITS
It does not beat delinquency or concentration as a standalone predictor; it adds to them. It is timing a loss already committed, not foreseeing an unrelated one. The value is lead time and the blind spot, not surprise.
Net charge-offs, total and vehicle
(550 − 551) annualized / 025B · (550C1 + 550C2) annualized / vehicle
MEANS
Realized losses. The rearview mirror, but the honest one: charge-offs are hard to argue with.
WHEN HIGH
Above the band p90, losses are being realized, not just brewing. Vehicle charge-offs above 1.5% at a credit union are expensive; the system runs near 1%.
WHEN LOW
Low charge-offs with rising delinquency and rising repo inventory means the losses are queued, not absent.
VS PEERS
Small credit unions post lower vehicle charge-offs than billion-dollar ones (0.48% versus 1.32%) because the large ones run the indirect books. Band context is everything.
OUR LINE
> band p90 = flag
LIMITS
First-quarter figures annualized by four are the noisiest read of the year. Direction across quarters, not a single print.
WHO WROTE THE PAPER · SOURCING AND CONCENTRATION
Vehicle share of loans
(370 + 385) / 025B
MEANS
How much of the institution is a car lender. At credit unions under $200 million, vehicles are 42% of all loans; at the smallest, more than half.
WHEN HIGH
Above 60% the credit union is a monoline: 1,309 of them exist, median $15.7 million in assets and four employees. At 80%+ delinquency runs 1.12% against a system near 0.8%. The product is the institution.
WHEN LOW
Low vehicle share at a small credit union usually means a mortgage book or a share-secured book; different risks, not fewer.
VS PEERS
A monoline with above-peer delinquency is a concentrated bet going wrong. That combination is its own flag.
OUR LINE
> 60% with vehicle delinquency at p75+ = flag
LIMITS
Concentration describes what is at stake if something goes wrong. It says little about whether something is going wrong.
Indirect share of vehicle · third-party paper / net worth
618A / vehicle · (618A + SL0036) / 997
MEANS
How much of the auto book was originated by a dealer rather than across the credit union's own desk, and how large that outside-written paper is relative to the capital behind it.
WHEN HIGH
Third-party paper above 100% of net worth is above the line NCUA capped until August 2026, when the rule was removed with delinquency at a decade high. 799 credit unions sit there. Tested fairly, concentration does predict next-year losses (it ordered correctly in all eleven cohorts), but the gradient is modest and it works about as well as the repo signal, not better.
WHEN LOW
Small credit unions are direct lenders; only 24% of their vehicle book is indirect, against 77% at billion-dollar institutions. The small end writes car loans, the large end buys them.
VS PEERS
Indirect paper carries the dealer's incentives. The credit union never met the borrower. That is the risk the line measures.
OUR LINE
> 100% of net worth = flag
LIMITS
The 5300 fields that once split indirect into point-of-sale versus outsourced-servicing arrangements are retired with zero filers. The exact category the removed cap governed is no longer measured. This line is a proxy and an upper bound.
Purchased vehicle participations
SL0036 outstanding · SL0037 purchased year-to-date
MEANS
Paper someone else wrote, sold in slices. The purest form of 'you did not underwrite this'. NCUA rule 701.22 requires documented independent due diligence and ongoing monitoring from every buyer.
WHEN HIGH
Participations above 25% of net worth is a due-diligence obligation under 701.22 that scales with the balance, not with the staff. 1,005 credit unions sit above that line, median 50 employees and $265M in assets, so this is not only a small-institution problem. System participation delinquency ran above the overall loan book in 2025.
WHEN LOW
Zero is the norm for small credit unions; most never buy.
VS PEERS
The participation market itself is invisible to its participants: no filing names a counterparty. Read the Participation Desk for the market view.
OUR LINE
no standalone flag · surfaced on the participation buyers screen
LIMITS
The filing shows the buyer's balance, not the originator, the collateral, or the servicing arrangement. Everything that matters about a participation is off the tape.
PUTTING IT TOGETHER
The composite score
one point per flag, net worth below 7% counts double · 17 flags across capital, earnings, asset quality, shrinkage, structure
MEANS
How many things are wrong at once. Credit unions rarely disappear over one number.
WHEN HIGH
Score 7 or above: 22% stopped filing within four quarters, against a 4.2% base rate, a 5.3x lift. Score 5-6: 8.8%. The lift is monotonic across every bucket.
WHEN LOW
Zero to two is ordinary life.
VS PEERS
Most component flags are band-relative, so the score compares reasonably across sizes.
OUR LINE
5-6 = elevated · 7+ = danger
LIMITS
Departure means stopped filing: mostly voluntary mergers, some liquidations, a few charter conversions that look like departures and are not. The claim is fragility, not death. Fraud failures scored 2-4 before the end; the score reads the filing, and a false filing reads as healthy.
FOUR CREDIT UNIONS YOU WILL MEET
THE AUTO MONOLINE

Under $50 million, four employees, more than 60% of loans in vehicles, direct lending to members it knows. Its risk is total concentration in one product and one local economy, and it has no analytics capacity at all. Delinquency runs above the system; charge-offs run below it. It needs a read it cannot produce.

THE INDIRECT BUYER IN THE MIDDLE

$200 million to $1 billion, 60 to 120 employees, half or more of the vehicle book bought from dealers, third-party paper above net worth. Big-institution exposure with small-institution staffing: enough people to run an indirect program, not enough to audit one. The fifteen auto-focused credit unions between $500M and $1B carry the worst delinquency and charge-offs of any cohort we measured.

THE QUIET FADE

Fortress capital, delinquency below the band, members leaving 3% a year, assets shrinking. Nothing on the credit side will ever flag it. It merges into a larger institution from a position of strength, if it moves early, or from weakness if it waits. Member growth is the only line that saw it coming.

THE BOOK THAT LOOKS TOO CLEAN

Zero delinquency, zero charge-offs, negative earnings, a stable balance sheet, and a filing that looks a lot like last year's. That was Unilever FCU and Aldersgate in 2025, and it cost the insurance fund $16 million. A lender with no credit losses that cannot make money is either mispriced, overstaffed, or misreported. All three are board emergencies, and the read does not need to know which.

WHAT THIS DESK CANNOT TELL YOU
Which dealers wrote the indirect paper, or how each is performing. Whether a participation's originator is any good. Whether a blank repossession field means an empty lot or an empty line. Anything about a filing that is false. Anything after the last cycle, which trails the FPR site by about a quarter. The numbers are the institution's own claims about itself, resolved and compared; treat every flag as the question to ask next, never as the answer.
WHERE THE MONEY SITS · LOAN MIX AND FUNDING
The tape read's Loan mix and Funding groups answer two questions the four core questions skip: what kind of lender this is, and who is lending it the money. Neither group carries a flag on its own; they tell you which of the other numbers to weigh.
Loan mix concentration · real estate vs vehicle
real estate (703 + 386) / 025B · first-lien share · credit card 396 / 025B · unsecured 397 / 025B
MEANS
What the loan book is made of. A small credit union is usually one of two things: a car lender or a mortgage lender, and the two carry opposite risks. Vehicle paper is short, loses money fast and visibly, and reprices with the book. Real estate is long, rarely defaults, and reprices almost never.
WHEN HIGH
Real estate above half of loans at a small credit union is a duration bet, not a credit bet. A 4% first mortgage written in 2021 still sits on the book while shares now cost 3-4%; the margin squeeze shows up in NIM, not in delinquency, and it lasts as long as the mortgages do. Credit cards or unsecured signature loans above 15-20% of the book is the opposite exposure: high yield, high charge-off, and the first thing a stretched member stops paying.
WHEN LOW
Real estate under 10% means a consumer book: vehicles, cards, signature loans. Faster losses, faster repricing, and every asset-quality line on this desk becomes the read that matters.
VS PEERS
Under $50 million the book is vehicles first and unsecured second; real estate share climbs with size and passes half of loans somewhere above $500 million. A mortgage-heavy $30 million credit union is unusual and usually a housing-cooperative or church-sponsored charter.
OUR LINE
no standalone flag · context only
LIMITS
The 5300 gives balances, not rates or maturities, so the duration exposure is inferred from the mix, not measured. Home equity lines are in the real estate total but behave like consumer credit.
Commercial lending · % of loans and % of net worth
commercial loans (400 series) / 025B · commercial / 997
MEANS
Member business lending: loans to businesses, farms, and investors, the one category most credit unions did not exist to make. Against net worth it is the exposure the statute cares about; against loans it is how much of the book it is.
WHEN HIGH
Commercial above 100% of net worth means a single bad year in business lending can consume the capital. The old statutory member business lending cap sat at 1.75 times net worth (roughly 12.25% of assets); most small credit unions are far below it, and one approaching it has usually hired a lender from a community bank and is growing a book the board does not fully understand. Business loans are lumpy: one $2 million credit at a $40 million institution is a concentration on its own.
WHEN LOW
Zero is the norm under $100 million. It is not a weakness, only an absence.
VS PEERS
Commercial share of loans runs near zero at the small end and 8-12% above $1 billion. A small credit union with a meaningful commercial book is the exception and belongs in its own peer set, not its band.
OUR LINE
no standalone flag · context only · above 100% of net worth is surfaced on the tape read
LIMITS
The filing does not separate owner-occupied from investor real estate, or show borrower concentration. Participations in commercial loans bought from other credit unions land here too, with all the 701.22 caveats.
Core shares vs certificates · money market
(regular shares 657 + share drafts 902) / 018 · certificates 908 / 018 · money market 911 / 018
MEANS
Who is funding the institution and why they stay. Regular shares and draft accounts are relationship money: the member banks here. Certificates are rented money: the member chose the rate. Money market shares sit between, priced like a certificate and callable like a draft account.
WHEN HIGH
Certificates above 40% of shares means the credit union is renting its deposits and will re-rent them at whatever the market says next quarter; the funding cost follows rates up with a lag of months, not years, and the members holding them leave for 25 basis points. Money market above a quarter of shares is hot money in the same sense with no maturity to slow it down. Both compress the margin exactly when a long loan book cannot reprice.
WHEN LOW
Core shares above 70% of the base is sticky, cheap funding, the structural advantage a credit union has over every other lender. It is also the profile that goes with an older membership and a shrinking one; check member growth before calling it a strength.
VS PEERS
The system moved sharply toward certificates through 2023-2025 as rates rose; a credit union whose certificate share doubled in two years bought its liquidity. Compare the mix against the band and against its own history.
OUR LINE
no standalone flag · context only · certificates above 40% of shares is surfaced on the tape read
LIMITS
Non-member and brokered deposits are reported separately and are not in this split. Certificate maturities are not in the bulk file, so we cannot say when the repricing lands, only that it will.
Average share balance
018 / 083 · total shares per member
MEANS
How much the typical member keeps at the institution, and therefore what kind of membership it is. A $2,000 average is a payroll-account membership: paychecks in, paychecks out, small balances, small loans, fee income that matters. A $15,000 average is a saver base: fewer transactions, larger certificates, members who watch rates.
WHEN HIGH
High average balances go with certificate-heavy funding and rate sensitivity. A saver base is stable in a flat rate environment and runs to whoever pays more when rates move; the balance-sheet strength is real and the loyalty is conditional.
WHEN LOW
Low average balances mean the membership is the community's working population, which is the franchise the charter was written for and a thin one to run a branch on. Fee income, overdraft, and small consumer loans carry the earnings; margin does not.
VS PEERS
The system median is a little above $6,000 per member. A small credit union well above it is a sponsor group with high earners or a savings club; well below it is a payroll shop or a community charter serving lower-income members.
OUR LINE
no standalone flag · context only
LIMITS
An average hides the distribution. Ten large depositors at a small credit union can pull the average up while most members hold a few hundred dollars, and those ten are the run risk.
Participation flows · bought and sold
purchases SL0037 and sales, year-to-date annualized · participation charge-offs 550F against outstanding
MEANS
Which side of the participation market the institution is on. A buyer has more deposits than loans and is deploying them into paper someone else wrote. A seller has more loans than deposits, or a concentration it needs to reduce, and is moving paper out. The posture tells you what the balance sheet is trying to fix.
WHEN HIGH
Buying above 25% of net worth a year is a due-diligence obligation under 701.22: independent credit analysis before purchase and ongoing monitoring after, documented, regardless of what the seller provides. A six-employee credit union cannot staff that. Participation charge-offs above 1% say the paper bought is performing worse than the book around it, which is what happened system-wide in 2025.
WHEN LOW
Zero on both sides is normal for most small credit unions. A seller with nothing bought is a liquidity-tight lender exporting its excess originations, usually vehicle paper into larger buyers.
VS PEERS
The market is roughly $19 billion a year and no filing names a counterparty. The buyer's tape shows a balance; the risk is in the originator's book. Read the Participation Desk for the market view and the flow map.
OUR LINE
no standalone flag · context only · purchased balance above 25% of net worth is surfaced on the participation buyers screen
LIMITS
Annualizing year-to-date flows makes first-quarter figures noisy. The 5300 shows amounts, not pool count, collateral, or servicer; the 701.22 file is where those live, and it is not public.

---

## Bank Desk · Market

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/#market · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/bank-desk/market.md · https://getbookiq.com/screen?desk=bank&sort=score&limit=50

INSURED BANKS
4,3137,663 in 2011 · 3,350 gone
TOTAL ASSETS
$26.75T
DEPOSITS
$20.88T42% uninsured
LOANS / DEPOSITS
66%
NONCURRENT LOANS
0.93%
UNREALIZED SEC. LOSS / EQUITY
-13.2%AFS + HTM, both books
AUTO LOANS
$551.9Bauto NCO 0.92%
LOANS TO NONBANK LENDERS
$1523.6Bfrom $60B in 2011
THE FUNDING SIDE OF THE LAST DECADE
UNINSURED SHARE OF DEPOSITS (%)
0.0
16.3
32.6
48.9
2014-06
2018-06
2022-06
2026-06
LOANS TO NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ($B)
0
559
1117
1676
2014-06
2018-06
2022-06
2026-06
UNREALIZED SECURITIES LOSS, % OF EQUITY
-34.4
-18.2
-1.9
14.3
2014-06
2018-06
2022-06
2026-06
NONCURRENT LOANS (%)
0.00
1.72
3.44
5.16
2014-06
2018-06
2022-06
2026-06
BANK AUTO LOANS ($B)
0
202
405
607
2014-06
2018-06
2022-06
2026-06
LOANS / DEPOSITS (%)
0
27
54
81
2014-06
2018-06
2022-06
2026-06
READING THE SYSTEM
Three lines carry the decade. Loans to nonbank financial institutions is the funding rail behind every warehouse facility, and it has multiplied: it is where a bank's exposure to consumer lenders lives, not on its own auto line. Uninsured deposits is the run fuel: the 2023 failures carried 74% to 92% of deposits uninsured four quarters before the end. Unrealized securities losses across both books is the hole that held-to-maturity accounting hides from equity; it is computed here from filed fair values, not from the income statement.

---

## Bank Desk · Autopsy

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/#autopsy · text route: https://getbookiq.com/autopsy

201 FDIC-INSURED BANKS FAILED FROM APRIL 2011 ON, ALL WITH FILING HISTORY IN THIS PANEL · 42 IN THE MODERN ERA (2015 ON) AND 159 IN THE CRISIS TAIL (2011 TO 2014) · CLICK ANY TO OPEN ITS FINAL FILINGS
BANK	CLOSED	ERA	ASSETS AT FAILURE	EST. COST TO FUND	SCORE AT FINAL FILING
SMALL BUSINESS BANK	2026-07-17	MODERN	$73M	$6M	11
KENTLAND FS&LA	2026-07-10	MODERN	$4M	$1M	10
COMMUNITY BANK AND TRUST - WEST GEORGIA	2026-05-01	MODERN	$306M	$97M	10
METROPOLITAN CAPITAL B&T	2026-01-30	MODERN	$261M	$20M	11
SANTA ANNA NATIONAL BANK	2025-06-27	MODERN	$77M	$10M	2
PULASKI SAVINGS BANK	2025-01-17	MODERN	$49M	$32M	3
FIRST NB OF LINDSAY	2024-10-18	MODERN	$108M	$45M	5
REPUBLIC BANK	2024-04-26	MODERN	$5.9B	$710M	13
CITIZENS BANK	2023-11-03	MODERN	$60M	$12M	8
HEARTLAND TRI-STATE BANK	2023-07-28	MODERN	$139M	$43M	2
FIRST REPUBLIC BANK	2023-05-01	MODERN	$212.6B	$15.5B	7
SIGNATURE BANK	2023-03-12	MODERN	$110.4B	$0	6
SILICON VALLEY BANK	2023-03-10	MODERN	$209.0B	$18.7B	4
ALMENA STATE BANK	2020-10-23	MODERN	$66M	$16M	16
FIRST CITY BANK OF FLORIDA	2020-10-16	MODERN	$137M	$7M	9
THE FIRST STATE BANK	2020-04-03	MODERN	$152M	$44M	11
ERICSON STATE BANK	2020-02-14	MODERN	$101M	$23M	8
CITY NATIONAL BANK OF NEW JERSEY	2019-11-01	MODERN	$121M	$1M	9
LOUISA COMMUNITY BANK	2019-10-25	MODERN	$28M	$4M	12
RESOLUTE BANK	2019-10-25	MODERN	$23M	$2M	11
ENLOE STATE BANK	2019-05-31	MODERN	$37M	$18M	1
WASHINGTON FEDERAL BANK FOR SAVINGS	2017-12-15	MODERN	$166M	$75M	0
THE FARMERS AND MERCHANTS STATE BANK OF ARGONIA	2017-10-13	MODERN	$33M	$280K	13
FAYETTE COUNTY BANK	2017-05-26	MODERN	$34M	$8M	13
GUARANTY BANK	2017-05-05	MODERN	$1.0B	$132M	8
FIRST NBC BANK	2017-04-28	MODERN	$3.3B	$722M	8
PROFICIO BANK	2017-03-03	MODERN	$68M	$10M	10
SEAWAY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY	2017-01-27	MODERN	$298M	$44M	12
HARVEST COMMUNITY BANK	2017-01-13	MODERN	$124M	$22M	12
ALLIED BANK	2016-09-23	MODERN	$66M	$6M	13
THE WOODBURY BANKING COMPANY	2016-08-19	MODERN	$21M	$3M	12
FIRST CORNERSTONE BANK	2016-05-06	MODERN	$103M	$11M	10
TRUST COMPANY BANK	2016-04-29	MODERN	$19M	$10M	10
NORTH MILWAUKEE STATE BANK	2016-03-11	MODERN	$67M	$12M	12
HOMETOWN NATIONAL BANK	2015-10-02	MODERN	$4M	$994K	9
THE BANK OF GEORGIA	2015-10-02	MODERN	$286M	$28M	10
PREMIER BANK	2015-07-10	MODERN	$27M	$1M	13
EDGEBROOK BANK	2015-05-08	MODERN	$90M	$21M	8
DORAL BANK	2015-02-27	MODERN	$5.9B	$689M	15
CAPITOL CITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY	2015-02-13	MODERN	$272M	$96M	11
HIGHLAND COMMUNITY BANK	2015-01-23	MODERN	$55M	$5M	13
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CRESTVIEW	2015-01-16	MODERN	$74M	$6M	11
NORTHERN STAR BANK	2014-12-19	CRISIS TAIL	$19M	$4M	8
FRONTIER BANK, FSB	2014-11-07	CRISIS TAIL	$81M	$3M	10
THE NATIONAL REPUBLIC BANK OF CHICAGO	2014-10-24	CRISIS TAIL	$843M	$54M	16
NBRS FINANCIAL BANK	2014-10-17	CRISIS TAIL	$155M	$20M	12
GREENCHOICE BANK, FSB	2014-07-25	CRISIS TAIL	$70M	$18M	11
EASTSIDE COMMERCIAL BANK	2014-07-18	CRISIS TAIL	$174M	$38M	12
THE FREEDOM STATE BANK	2014-06-27	CRISIS TAIL	$23M	$4M	3
VALLEY BANK	2014-06-20	CRISIS TAIL	$82M	$5M	14
VALLEY BANK	2014-06-20	CRISIS TAIL	$456M	$48M	13
SLAVIE FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK	2014-05-30	CRISIS TAIL	$140M	$11M	13
COLUMBIA SAVINGS BANK	2014-05-23	CRISIS TAIL	$36M	$7M	12
AZTECAMERICA BANK	2014-05-16	CRISIS TAIL	$66M	$22M	12
ALLENDALE COUNTY BANK	2014-04-25	CRISIS TAIL	$49M	$22M	8
MILLENNIUM BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION	2014-02-28	CRISIS TAIL	$130M	$11M	12
VANTAGE POINT BANK	2014-02-28	CRISIS TAIL	$63M	$9M	9
SYRINGA BANK	2014-01-31	CRISIS TAIL	$153M	$3M	8
THE BANK OF UNION	2014-01-24	CRISIS TAIL	$317M	$93M	13
DUPAGE NATIONAL BANK	2014-01-17	CRISIS TAIL	$54M	$2M	8
TEXAS COMMUNITY BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION	2013-12-13	CRISIS TAIL	$159M	$14M	12
BANK OF JACKSON COUNTY	2013-10-30	CRISIS TAIL	$25M	$6M	11
THE COMMUNITY'S BANK	2013-09-13	CRISIS TAIL	$26M	$9M	10
FIRST NATIONAL BANK	2013-09-13	CRISIS TAIL	$3.1B	$616M	13
COMMUNITY SOUTH BANK	2013-08-23	CRISIS TAIL	$387M	$130M	12
SUNRISE BANK OF ARIZONA	2013-08-23	CRISIS TAIL	$202M	$15M	11
BANK OF WAUSAU	2013-08-09	CRISIS TAIL	$44M	$13M	14
FIRST COMMUNITY BANK OF SOUTHWEST FLORIDA	2013-08-02	CRISIS TAIL	$247M	$25M	12
MOUNTAIN NATIONAL BANK	2013-06-07	CRISIS TAIL	$437M	$33M	12
1st COMMERCE BANK	2013-06-06	CRISIS TAIL	$20M	$5M	8
BANKS OF WISCONSIN	2013-05-31	CRISIS TAIL	$134M	$22M	12
CENTRAL ARIZONA BANK	2013-05-14	CRISIS TAIL	$32M	$5M	11
SUNRISE BANK	2013-05-10	CRISIS TAIL	$61M	$16M	11
PISGAH COMMUNITY BANK	2013-05-10	CRISIS TAIL	$22M	$8M	12
PARKWAY BANK	2013-04-26	CRISIS TAIL	$110M	$16M	8
DOUGLAS COUNTY BANK	2013-04-26	CRISIS TAIL	$317M	$90M	10
HERITAGE BANK OF NORTH FLORIDA	2013-04-19	CRISIS TAIL	$104M	$25M	12
FIRST FEDERAL BANK	2013-04-19	CRISIS TAIL	$93M	$8M	11
CHIPOLA COMMUNITY BANK	2013-04-19	CRISIS TAIL	$37M	$8M	10
GOLD CANYON BANK	2013-04-05	CRISIS TAIL	$42M	$8M	12
FRONTIER BANK	2013-03-08	CRISIS TAIL	$259M	$73M	14
COVENANT BANK	2013-02-15	CRISIS TAIL	$58M	$20M	9
1ST REGENTS BANK	2013-01-18	CRISIS TAIL	$50M	$12M	12
WESTSIDE COMMUNITY BANK	2013-01-11	CRISIS TAIL	$92M	$23M	14
COMMUNITY BANK OF THE OZARKS	2012-12-14	CRISIS TAIL	$43M	$13M	12
HOMETOWN COMMUNITYBANK	2012-11-16	CRISIS TAIL	$125M	$40M	13
HERITAGE BANK OF FLORIDA	2012-11-02	CRISIS TAIL	$225M	$74M	10
CITIZENS FIRST NATIONAL BANK	2012-11-02	CRISIS TAIL	$924M	$32M	13
NOVA BANK	2012-10-26	CRISIS TAIL	$445M	$85M	13
EXCEL BANK	2012-10-19	CRISIS TAIL	$186M	$30M	13
FIRST EAST SIDE SAVINGS BANK	2012-10-19	CRISIS TAIL	$66M	$12M	11
GULFSOUTH PRIVATE BANK	2012-10-19	CRISIS TAIL	$139M	$40M	12
FIRST UNITED BANK	2012-09-28	CRISIS TAIL	$328M	$34M	12
TRUMAN BANK	2012-09-14	CRISIS TAIL	$282M	$39M	12
FIRST COMMERCIAL BANK	2012-09-07	CRISIS TAIL	$216M	$65M	12
WAUKEGAN SAVINGS BANK	2012-08-03	CRISIS TAIL	$84M	$24M	12
JASPER BANKING COMPANY	2012-07-27	CRISIS TAIL	$207M	$49M	12
GEORGIA TRUST BANK	2012-07-20	CRISIS TAIL	$117M	$25M	13
THE ROYAL PALM BANK OF FLORIDA	2012-07-20	CRISIS TAIL	$79M	$17M	12
SECOND FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO	2012-07-20	CRISIS TAIL	$191M	$86M	11
FIRST CHEROKEE STATE BANK	2012-07-20	CRISIS TAIL	$209M	$36M	13
HEARTLAND BANK	2012-07-20	CRISIS TAIL	$96M	$362K	13
GLASGOW SAVINGS BANK	2012-07-13	CRISIS TAIL	$22M	$1M	13
MONTGOMERY BANK & TRUST	2012-07-06	CRISIS TAIL	$153M	$66M	11
THE FARMERS BANK OF LYNCHBURG	2012-06-15	CRISIS TAIL	$164M	$33M	10
PUTNAM STATE BANK	2012-06-15	CRISIS TAIL	$169M	$29M	12
SECURITY EXCHANGE BANK	2012-06-15	CRISIS TAIL	$151M	$45M	14
FIRST CAPITAL BANK	2012-06-08	CRISIS TAIL	$44M	$9M	12
FARMERS' AND TRADERS' STATE BANK	2012-06-08	CRISIS TAIL	$43M	$10M	13
WACCAMAW BANK	2012-06-08	CRISIS TAIL	$533M	$24M	16
CAROLINA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK	2012-06-08	CRISIS TAIL	$54M	$18M	7
ALABAMA TRUST BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION	2012-05-18	CRISIS TAIL	$52M	$11M	13
SECURITY BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION	2012-05-04	CRISIS TAIL	$101M	$15M	12
PLANTATION FEDERAL BANK	2012-04-27	CRISIS TAIL	$434M	$83M	13
INTER SAVINGS BANK, FSB D/B/A/ INTERBANK, FSB	2012-04-27	CRISIS TAIL	$464M	$80M	11
HARVEST BANK OF MARYLAND	2012-04-27	CRISIS TAIL	$163M	$27M	12
PALM DESERT NATIONAL BANK	2012-04-27	CRISIS TAIL	$129M	$26M	13
BANK OF THE EASTERN SHORE	2012-04-27	CRISIS TAIL	$162M	$58M	12
FORT LEE FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, FSB	2012-04-20	CRISIS TAIL	$49M	$12M	13
FIDELITY BANK	2012-03-30	CRISIS TAIL	$818M	$97M	8
PREMIER BANK	2012-03-23	CRISIS TAIL	$269M	$69M	11
CONVENANT BANK & TRUST	2012-03-23	CRISIS TAIL	$96M	$30M	10
NEW CITY BANK	2012-03-09	CRISIS TAIL	$71M	$13M	11
GLOBAL COMMERCE BANK	2012-03-02	CRISIS TAIL	$144M	$40M	12
HOME SAVINGS OF AMERICA	2012-02-24	CRISIS TAIL	$434M	$43M	8
CENTRAL BANK OF GEORGIA	2012-02-24	CRISIS TAIL	$279M	$52M	10
CHARTER NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST	2012-02-10	CRISIS TAIL	$94M	$18M	10
SCB BANK	2012-02-10	CRISIS TAIL	$183M	$38M	11
FIRST GUARANTY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF JACKSONVILLE	2012-01-27	CRISIS TAIL	$397M	$54M	10
BANKEAST	2012-01-27	CRISIS TAIL	$262M	$74M	9
PATRIOT BANK MINNESOTA	2012-01-27	CRISIS TAIL	$105M	$35M	11
TENNESSEE COMMERCE BANK	2012-01-27	CRISIS TAIL	$1.0B	$352M	11
THE FIRST STATE BANK	2012-01-20	CRISIS TAIL	$517M	$192M	11
AMERICAN EAGLE SAVINGS BANK	2012-01-20	CRISIS TAIL	$19M	$5M	6
CENTRAL FLORIDA STATE BANK	2012-01-20	CRISIS TAIL	$71M	$14M	10
PREMIER COMMUNITY BANK OF THE EMERALD COAST	2011-12-16	CRISIS TAIL	$126M	$25M	9
WESTERN NATIONAL BANK	2011-12-16	CRISIS TAIL	$163M	$42M	11
POLK COUNTY BANK	2011-11-18	CRISIS TAIL	$92M	$16M	9
CENTRAL PROGRESSIVE BANK	2011-11-18	CRISIS TAIL	$383M	$49M	10
COMMUNITY BANK OF ROCKMART	2011-11-10	CRISIS TAIL	$62M	$20M	9
MID CITY BANK, INC.	2011-11-04	CRISIS TAIL	$106M	$11M	10
SUNFIRST BANK	2011-11-04	CRISIS TAIL	$198M	$44M	10
ALL AMERICAN BANK	2011-10-28	CRISIS TAIL	$35M	$14M	10
COMMUNITY BANKS OF COLORADO	2011-10-21	CRISIS TAIL	$1.3B	$169M	10
DECATUR FIRST BANK	2011-10-21	CRISIS TAIL	$185M	$25M	10
COMMUNITY CAPITAL BANK	2011-10-21	CRISIS TAIL	$165M	$65M	10
OLD HARBOR BANK	2011-10-21	CRISIS TAIL	$209M	$26M	9
FIRST STATE BANK	2011-10-14	CRISIS TAIL	$192M	$46M	9
PIEDMONT COMMUNITY BANK	2011-10-14	CRISIS TAIL	$199M	$88M	10
BLUE RIDGE SAVINGS BANK, INC.	2011-10-14	CRISIS TAIL	$161M	$44M	10
COUNTRY BANK	2011-10-14	CRISIS TAIL	$195M	$69M	12
THE RIVERBANK	2011-10-07	CRISIS TAIL	$420M	$71M	9
SUN SECURITY BANK	2011-10-07	CRISIS TAIL	$351M	$93M	10
FIRST INTERNATIONAL BANK	2011-09-30	CRISIS TAIL	$240M	$58M	8
BANK OF THE COMMONWEALTH	2011-09-23	CRISIS TAIL	$985M	$239M	12
CITIZENS BANK OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA	2011-09-23	CRISIS TAIL	$289M	$41M	8
THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA	2011-09-09	CRISIS TAIL	$297M	$76M	10
CREEKSIDE BANK	2011-09-02	CRISIS TAIL	$102M	$34M	10
PATRIOT BANK OF GEORGIA	2011-09-02	CRISIS TAIL	$151M	$54M	9
FIRST SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK	2011-08-19	CRISIS TAIL	$165M	$22M	9
LYDIAN PRIVATE BANK	2011-08-19	CRISIS TAIL	$1.7B	$184M	9
FIRST CHOICE BANK	2011-08-19	CRISIS TAIL	$141M	$34M	9
PUBLIC SAVINGS BANK	2011-08-18	CRISIS TAIL	$47M	$16M	7
THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OLATHE	2011-08-12	CRISIS TAIL	$538M	$103M	10
BANK OF WHITMAN	2011-08-05	CRISIS TAIL	$549M	$101M	10
BANK OF SHOREWOOD	2011-08-05	CRISIS TAIL	$111M	$29M	9
INTEGRA BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION	2011-07-29	CRISIS TAIL	$2.0B	$26M	12
BANKMERIDIAN, N.A.	2011-07-29	CRISIS TAIL	$233M	$49M	10
VIRGINIA BUSINESS BANK	2011-07-29	CRISIS TAIL	$83M	$20M	9
BANK OF CHOICE	2011-07-22	CRISIS TAIL	$954M	$136M	10
LANDMARK BANK OF FLORIDA	2011-07-22	CRISIS TAIL	$266M	$37M	8
SOUTHSHORE COMMUNITY BANK	2011-07-22	CRISIS TAIL	$41M	$11M	7
ONE GEORGIA BANK	2011-07-15	CRISIS TAIL	$178M	$41M	10
SUMMIT BANK	2011-07-15	CRISIS TAIL	$73M	$15M	9
HIGH TRUST BANK	2011-07-15	CRISIS TAIL	$180M	$71M	8
FIRST PEOPLES BANK	2011-07-15	CRISIS TAIL	$225M	$13M	9
FIRST CHICAGO BANK & TRUST	2011-07-08	CRISIS TAIL	$897M	$193M	11
COLORADO CAPITAL BANK	2011-07-08	CRISIS TAIL	$666M	$255M	10
SIGNATURE BANK	2011-07-08	CRISIS TAIL	$63M	$23M	9
MOUNTAIN HERITAGE BANK	2011-06-24	CRISIS TAIL	$104M	$34M	10
MCINTOSH STATE BANK	2011-06-17	CRISIS TAIL	$340M	$75M	9
FIRST COMMERCIAL BANK OF TAMPA BAY	2011-06-17	CRISIS TAIL	$99M	$33M	10
ATLANTIC BANK AND TRUST	2011-06-03	CRISIS TAIL	$208M	$31M	10
FIRST HERITAGE BANK	2011-05-27	CRISIS TAIL	$173M	$34M	9
SUMMIT BANK	2011-05-20	CRISIS TAIL	$143M	$24M	11
ATLANTIC SOUTHERN BANK	2011-05-20	CRISIS TAIL	$742M	$281M	12
FIRST GEORGIA BANKING COMPANY	2011-05-20	CRISIS TAIL	$731M	$135M	8
COASTAL BANK	2011-05-06	CRISIS TAIL	$129M	$19M	9
THE PARK AVENUE BANK	2011-04-29	CRISIS TAIL	$849M	$212M	11
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CENTRAL FLORIDA	2011-04-29	CRISIS TAIL	$342M	$43M	9
COMMUNITY CENTRAL BANK	2011-04-29	CRISIS TAIL	$452M	$99M	11
CORTEZ COMMUNITY BANK	2011-04-29	CRISIS TAIL	$66M	$17M	9
FIRST CHOICE COMMUNITY BANK	2011-04-29	CRISIS TAIL	$291M	$105M	8
HERITAGE BANKING GROUP	2011-04-15	CRISIS TAIL	$228M	$38M	8
SUPERIOR BANK	2011-04-15	CRISIS TAIL	$3.0B	$281M	8
NEXITY BANK	2011-04-15	CRISIS TAIL	$758M	$182M	9
BARTOW COUNTY BANK	2011-04-15	CRISIS TAIL	$314M	$83M	10
ROSEMOUNT NATIONAL BANK	2011-04-15	CRISIS TAIL	$21M	$5M	8
NEW HORIZONS BANK	2011-04-15	CRISIS TAIL	$103M	$35M	8
WESTERN SPRINGS NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST	2011-04-08	CRISIS TAIL	$187M	$38M	8
NEVADA COMMERCE BANK	2011-04-08	CRISIS TAIL	$135M	$38M	8
TWO WAYS A BANK DIES
THE SLOW BLEED

Almost every failure outside 2023. Credit sours, noncurrent loans climb from 4.6% to 7.5% in the modern era and from 8.6% to 14.3% in the crisis tail, ROA is negative two full years out, leverage erodes to under 2% at the end. The composite score sees it: modern failures scored a median 8 four quarters before the end and 10 at the end, against a survivor median of 1.

THE RUN

2023. Silicon Valley Bank, Signature, First Republic scored 1 to 3 four quarters out and looked well-capitalized on paper. What they carried: 87%, 92% and 74% of deposits uninsured, and securities losses that held-to-maturity accounting kept out of equity. The desk now flags both directly, and the Run risk screen is that profile applied to every live bank.

THE FAILURE SIGNATURE · MEDIAN PATH OF FAILED BANKS INTO THEIR FINAL FILING
MODERN ERA, 2015 ON · 42 BANKS
CRISIS TAIL, 2011 TO 2014 · 159 BANKS
BOTH ERAS POOLED · 201 BANKS
QUARTERS BEFORE END	LEVERAGE %	ROA %	NONCURRENT %	UNINSURED %	LOANS/DEP %	SEC LOSS/EQ %	LIQUID %	SCORE
t-8	8.12	-0.32	4.59	9.26	76.24	-0.03	24.54	6
t-7	7.54	-0.25	3.89	10.5	75.93	-0.35	24.31	7
t-6	7.26	-0.29	6.8	10.78	75.53	-0.55	23.02	7
t-5	7.32	-0.6	6.03	10.52	78.23	-0.39	21.73	7.5
t-4	6.09	-1.4	6.95	9.55	76.48	-1.79	21.97	8
t-3	4.88	-0.73	6.6	8.08	73.48	-0.55	21.49	8.5
t-2	4.29	-1.05	7.48	7.92	69.64	-0.49	24.1	9
t-1	2.93	-1.99	6.67	8.55	69.11	-0.15	24.46	10
t-0	1.65	-3.12	7.48	5.11	68.87	-0.15	25.96	10
survivors, pooled	10.44	0.98	0.58	18.44	75.47	-0.05	30.63	1
DEPARTURE RATE WITHIN FOUR QUARTERS, BY COMPOSITE SCORE (ALL 3,456 DEPARTURES, BANKS $50M+)
0-1
3.75% · 0.8x base
2
4.46% · 1.0x base
3-4
5.1% · 1.1x base
5-6
6.24% · 1.4x base
7+
15.99% · 3.5x base
The two eras died differently. Crisis-tail banks were already insolvent on credit when the panel picks them up: noncurrent 8.6% two years out, leverage under 5%, losses running for years. Modern failures start from a more ordinary place, 4.6% noncurrent and 8.1% leverage two years out, and fall faster. Neither cohort shows the 2023 profile, because a run leaves no trail in the credit lines at all. That is the point of the second card above.
Bank departures are overwhelmingly voluntary mergers, so the lift here is flatter than the credit union version (4.56% base). The failure signature above is the sharper instrument; the score is a first pass, not a verdict.

---

## Bank Desk · Screens

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/#screens · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/bank-desk/screens.md

NATURAL BUYERS · 426
NATURAL SELLERS · 1141
LOANS TO LENDERS · 259
AUTO LENDERS · 206
STRESSED · 136
RUN RISK · 50
All states
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
FM
GA
GU
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PR
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VI
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
All bands
<$300M
$300M-1B
$1-10B
$10-100B
>$100B
Natural buyers · 400 banks · Loans under 70% of deposits, liquid assets over 25%, leverage over 9%, ROA below band median. Cash-rich, yield-starved: the institutions that need assets.
BANK	CITY	ST	BAND	ASSETS	LOANS/DEP	LIQUID %	LEVERAGE	ROA	NIM	DEP YOY	SCORE
DEPOSITORY TRUST CO	NEW YORK	NY	$10-100B	$11.0B	0.0%	98.3%	12.8%	1.2%	0.5%	–	3
EREBOR BANK N A	COLUMBUS	OH	$1-10B	$4.7B	1.9%	97.5%	38.8%	-1.0%	0.7%	–	5
LIBERTY BANK OF NEW JERSEY	VERONA	NJ	<$300M	$107M	5.1%	95.5%	50.5%	-2.5%	2.2%	–	4
FIRST STATE BANK	SOCORRO	NM	<$300M	$188M	6.5%	92.3%	14.3%	1.0%	3.2%	-2.4%	1
COLUMBUS STATE BANK	COLUMBUS	TX	$300M-1B	$326M	7.8%	92.2%	14.5%	0.9%	2.3%	12.0%	1
TEXAS EXCHANGE BANK	CROWLEY	TX	$1-10B	$4.5B	25.9%	80.3%	12.4%	0.4%	1.5%	2.1%	4
BANK OF BROOKFIELD PURDIN NA	BROOKFIELD	MO	<$300M	$117M	20.7%	80.0%	11.2%	0.5%	2.6%	5.7%	1
G W JONES EXCHANGE BANK	MARCELLUS	MI	<$300M	$123M	22.1%	78.8%	10.4%	0.9%	3.2%	12.8%	1
EL DORADO SAVINGS BANK FSB	PLACERVILLE	CA	$1-10B	$2.4B	23.3%	77.7%	13.4%	0.9%	2.7%	-2.4%	0
BATTLE BANK NATIONAL ASSN	UPSALA	MN	<$300M	$181M	11.0%	77.6%	33.3%	-8.1%	3.0%	148.4%	3
FIRST NB OF LAKE JACKSON	LAKE JACKSON	TX	<$300M	$218M	23.4%	76.1%	11.7%	0.3%	1.8%	-5.5%	5
COLONIAL SAVINGS FA	FORT WORTH	TX	$300M-1B	$502M	44.1%	73.6%	46.1%	-2.4%	3.3%	-58.1%	4
PHENIX-GIRARD BANK	PHENIX CITY	AL	$300M-1B	$342M	25.1%	72.8%	11.8%	1.0%	2.8%	4.0%	3
BERKSHIRE BANK	NEW YORK	NY	$300M-1B	$530M	33.9%	72.8%	24.2%	0.5%	3.6%	-9.7%	4
BANK OF COMMERCE&TRUST CO	CROWLEY	LA	$300M-1B	$378M	29.6%	71.3%	11.1%	0.3%	2.3%	3.1%	3
CARMINE STATE BANK	CARMINE	TX	<$300M	$149M	28.7%	71.2%	10.0%	1.0%	2.4%	8.3%	2
CONVERSE COUNTY BANK	DOUGLAS	WY	$1-10B	$1.1B	31.1%	70.9%	9.6%	1.3%	2.0%	5.9%	2
ST LANDRY BANK&TRUST CO	OPELOUSAS	LA	<$300M	$295M	29.9%	70.8%	11.2%	0.3%	2.9%	-1.6%	3
TD BANK USA NATIONAL ASSN	WILMINGTON	DE	$10-100B	$32.1B	28.9%	70.5%	11.6%	0.4%	6.4%	-2.8%	4
SEWICKLEY SAVINGS BANK	SEWICKLEY	PA	$300M-1B	$316M	29.8%	69.8%	23.8%	0.8%	2.5%	3.6%	4
CITIZENS NB OF HILLSBORO	HILLSBORO	TX	<$300M	$224M	30.2%	69.1%	12.5%	1.2%	2.5%	3.8%	1
PEOPLES NB OF KEWANEE	KEWANEE	IL	$300M-1B	$588M	31.2%	69.0%	10.9%	0.8%	2.7%	0.7%	2
FIRST NB OF HEBBRONVILLE	HEBBRONVILLE	TX	<$300M	$102M	28.7%	68.9%	16.5%	1.2%	3.3%	9.3%	0
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK	MILFORD	NE	$1-10B	$1.1B	26.2%	68.9%	10.6%	0.9%	2.3%	7.0%	5
BANK OF CROCKER	WAYNESVILLE	MO	<$300M	$143M	33.6%	68.7%	12.8%	0.8%	3.3%	-0.5%	2
FIRST BANK	KETCHIKAN	AK	$300M-1B	$890M	29.5%	68.7%	10.2%	1.2%	3.4%	2.2%	0
FIRST STATE BANK	ANADARKO	OK	<$300M	$140M	30.6%	68.5%	11.2%	1.1%	2.5%	5.7%	1
CITIZENS BANK	GREENSBORO	AL	<$300M	$129M	32.1%	67.9%	12.2%	1.1%	3.0%	0.6%	2
WARRINGTON BANK	PENSACOLA	FL	<$300M	$174M	37.5%	67.7%	16.7%	0.7%	3.1%	2.8%	0
STREATOR HOME SAVINGS BANK	STREATOR	IL	<$300M	$137M	37.3%	67.5%	22.0%	-18.9%	2.9%	-2.3%	3
COMMUNITY BANK OF THE SOUTH	MERRITT ISLAND	FL	<$300M	$266M	31.9%	67.3%	9.5%	0.8%	3.0%	1.9%	1
DU QUOIN STATE BANK	DU QUOIN	IL	<$300M	$148M	34.2%	66.5%	10.8%	0.9%	3.3%	9.4%	2
BANKMIAMI	CORAL GABLES	FL	$300M-1B	$318M	35.1%	66.5%	11.4%	-0.7%	2.5%	547.3%	4
FIRST BANK OF BOAZ	BOAZ	AL	<$300M	$240M	33.2%	66.3%	19.7%	0.8%	2.7%	1.1%	1
FIRST STATE BANK	COLUMBUS	TX	<$300M	$155M	36.0%	66.2%	16.3%	1.1%	3.2%	8.7%	0
NEW ALBIN SAVINGS BANK	NEW ALBIN	IA	$300M-1B	$351M	39.6%	65.0%	15.5%	1.0%	1.9%	5.0%	1
CITIZENS B&T OF LEBANON INC	LEBANON	KY	<$300M	$173M	34.1%	64.9%	11.3%	0.9%	3.0%	10.2%	2
FARMERS STATE BANK OF HAMEL	HAMEL	MN	<$300M	$198M	34.7%	64.8%	9.5%	0.9%	2.6%	-0.8%	1
FIRST STB OF LIVINGSTON	LIVINGSTON	TX	$300M-1B	$689M	35.9%	64.7%	15.5%	1.1%	3.3%	0.4%	2
B2 BANK NATIONAL ASSN	HOLLADAY	UT	<$300M	$115M	36.9%	64.4%	13.7%	-1.5%	3.4%	71.6%	5
FIRST BANK OF COASTAL GA	PEMBROKE	GA	<$300M	$216M	37.3%	64.2%	9.1%	0.2%	2.6%	-12.2%	6
EDISON NATIONAL BANK	FORT MYERS	FL	$300M-1B	$454M	37.0%	64.0%	9.0%	0.6%	3.0%	12.9%	1
SPRATT SAVINGS BANK	CHESTER	SC	<$300M	$154M	38.5%	63.9%	20.4%	0.2%	3.0%	5.2%	1
NEVADA BANK&TRUST CO	CALIENTE	NV	<$300M	$217M	34.1%	63.5%	13.0%	1.0%	3.9%	6.3%	1
NORTHERN STB THIEF RIVER FAL	THIEF RIVER FALL	MN	$300M-1B	$550M	38.7%	63.4%	9.9%	1.1%	2.6%	21.4%	0
ANAHUAC NATIONAL BANK	ANAHUAC	TX	<$300M	$266M	32.5%	63.4%	10.1%	1.0%	3.6%	-0.4%	1
TEXAS NATIONAL BANK	SWEETWATER	TX	<$300M	$139M	33.1%	63.3%	11.0%	0.4%	3.1%	-1.4%	2
AMERICAN HERITAGE BANK	SAPULPA	OK	$1-10B	$1.5B	42.8%	63.0%	9.6%	0.9%	2.7%	-2.1%	1
EXCHANGE BANK	SKIATOOK	OK	<$300M	$158M	36.5%	62.9%	12.1%	1.1%	3.8%	1.6%	1
PEOPLES BANK	WILLACOOCHEE	GA	<$300M	$109M	39.0%	62.7%	12.4%	0.7%	3.0%	-0.4%	1
FIRST STATE BANK OF MALTA	MALTA	MT	<$300M	$190M	40.6%	62.6%	14.4%	1.0%	2.9%	8.5%	0
PEOPLES BANK OF GRACEVILLE	GRACEVILLE	FL	<$300M	$116M	39.7%	62.5%	10.3%	1.0%	2.5%	3.3%	1
VARO BANK NATIONAL ASSN	DRAPER	UT	$300M-1B	$338M	41.6%	61.9%	18.5%	-25.7%	7.3%	30.2%	5
BANK OF WINONA	WINONA	MS	<$300M	$143M	38.9%	61.6%	13.1%	1.2%	3.3%	1.3%	0
FIRST STATE BANK&TRUST CO	CARTHAGE	TX	$300M-1B	$547M	36.5%	61.2%	14.0%	1.0%	2.7%	10.6%	3
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK	CROCKETT	TX	<$300M	$109M	38.9%	61.1%	12.8%	0.7%	4.1%	18.1%	0
BANK OF ENGLAND	ENGLAND	AR	$300M-1B	$332M	37.6%	60.8%	19.9%	0.3%	3.6%	-0.3%	3
POCAHONTAS STATE BANK	POCAHONTAS	IA	<$300M	$123M	52.7%	60.7%	26.4%	0.5%	2.6%	1.2%	1
BANK OF KAMPSVILLE	KAMPSVILLE	IL	<$300M	$134M	42.3%	60.5%	17.4%	0.9%	3.0%	6.3%	1
COMMERCIAL BANK	HONEA PATH	SC	<$300M	$284M	40.3%	60.0%	12.7%	0.8%	3.0%	5.3%	2
WOODLANDS NATIONAL BANK	HINCKLEY	MN	$300M-1B	$331M	40.1%	59.9%	11.2%	0.6%	3.1%	3.5%	2
ANNA STATE BANK	ANNA	IL	<$300M	$112M	44.6%	59.5%	12.5%	0.8%	2.8%	4.9%	0
FIRST NB OF ASPERMONT	ASPERMONT	TX	<$300M	$134M	38.5%	59.1%	9.1%	1.1%	2.9%	4.5%	1
FIRST TRUST BANK OF ILLINOIS	KANKAKEE	IL	$300M-1B	$406M	44.2%	59.0%	10.3%	1.1%	2.9%	6.6%	1
MCCURTAIN COUNTY NB	BROKEN BOW	OK	$300M-1B	$384M	43.4%	58.8%	15.7%	1.2%	3.6%	4.6%	1
CENLAR FSB	EWING	NJ	$300M-1B	$782M	45.7%	58.5%	16.6%	-1.2%	2.9%	-6.3%	7
MISSION BANK	KINGMAN	AZ	<$300M	$185M	41.1%	58.4%	9.4%	0.5%	3.3%	-3.8%	1
FIRST FEDERAL BANK	LAKE CITY	FL	$1-10B	$4.5B	41.4%	58.1%	10.8%	1.2%	3.3%	7.1%	5
PALMETTO STATE BANK	HAMPTON	SC	$300M-1B	$597M	46.5%	58.0%	14.8%	1.0%	3.2%	-1.4%	1
TANAGER BANK	JACKSON	WY	<$300M	$222M	41.8%	58.0%	14.8%	0.3%	2.7%	-8.3%	5
DEUTSCHE BANK TR CO AMERICAS	NEW YORK	NY	$10-100B	$40.5B	55.0%	57.8%	25.8%	0.9%	2.5%	-7.5%	4
FIRST STATE BANK OF UVALDE	UVALDE	TX	$1-10B	$1.7B	45.2%	57.6%	15.7%	1.2%	2.5%	-10.3%	5
PEOPLES STB OF HALLETTSVILLE	HALLETTSVILLE	TX	$300M-1B	$396M	45.0%	57.4%	10.1%	1.0%	2.3%	6.0%	1
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK OF ND	TOLNA	ND	<$300M	$120M	43.6%	57.1%	11.0%	0.9%	3.3%	1.8%	0
PLAQUEMINE BANK&TRUST CO	PLAQUEMINE	LA	<$300M	$218M	45.2%	57.1%	12.2%	0.8%	3.3%	-2.5%	1
COMMONWEALTH CMTY BANK INC	HARTFORD	KY	<$300M	$158M	40.7%	57.1%	14.7%	0.2%	2.3%	5.3%	2
THREAD BANK	ROGERSVILLE	TN	$1-10B	$1.1B	41.6%	57.0%	9.8%	0.6%	2.9%	40.2%	2
STATE BANK&TRUST OF KENMARE	KENMARE	ND	<$300M	$201M	45.8%	57.0%	9.3%	1.1%	2.7%	9.6%	0
TWIN CITY BANK	LONGVIEW	WA	<$300M	$151M	45.5%	57.0%	9.6%	0.4%	4.0%	111.9%	3
PEOPLES BANK BILOXI MS	BILOXI	MS	$300M-1B	$771M	44.9%	56.9%	15.2%	0.7%	3.1%	-5.3%	2
BANK OF LAFAYETTE GEORGIA	LA FAYETTE	GA	$300M-1B	$447M	44.3%	56.8%	9.3%	0.9%	2.6%	7.2%	2
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN AMBOY	AMBOY	IL	$300M-1B	$325M	49.6%	56.8%	10.7%	1.0%	3.4%	7.6%	0
PERENNIAL BANK	DARWIN	MN	<$300M	$158M	44.6%	56.7%	9.5%	1.0%	3.0%	5.7%	0
SLOVENIAN S&LA OF CANONSBURG	STRABANE	PA	$300M-1B	$627M	50.8%	56.6%	16.6%	0.9%	2.3%	1.5%	3
PINNACLE BANK	JASPER	AL	$300M-1B	$385M	37.8%	56.6%	11.3%	1.1%	3.5%	7.2%	2
ELKTON BANK&TRUST CO	ELKTON	KY	<$300M	$199M	48.0%	56.6%	12.6%	1.0%	3.4%	3.9%	1
LYTLE STB OF LYTLE TEXAS	LYTLE	TX	<$300M	$115M	42.4%	56.6%	14.6%	0.4%	4.0%	7.1%	2
MERCHANTS&CITIZENS BANK	MCRAE	GA	<$300M	$146M	40.5%	56.4%	13.2%	0.8%	3.5%	-2.8%	1
BANK OF BELLE GLADE	BELLE GLADE	FL	<$300M	$160M	46.8%	56.4%	10.2%	1.1%	3.4%	-6.1%	2
FIRST STATE BANK	STUART	IA	<$300M	$130M	47.5%	56.3%	11.9%	1.1%	3.9%	6.0%	0
WESTMORELAND FS&LA	LATROBE	PA	<$300M	$167M	57.2%	56.1%	26.9%	0.0%	2.2%	-0.5%	2
BALDWIN STATE BANK	BALDWIN CITY	KS	<$300M	$116M	46.1%	55.9%	10.1%	1.0%	3.0%	6.0%	1
BANK OF MOUNDVILLE	MOUNDVILLE	AL	<$300M	$145M	45.5%	55.8%	15.1%	0.4%	2.7%	6.2%	4
BANK OF WINNFIELD&TRUST CO	WINNFIELD	LA	<$300M	$156M	41.4%	55.8%	14.4%	0.7%	3.9%	-5.3%	1
CITIZENS SAVINGS BANK	ANAMOSA	IA	<$300M	$166M	45.4%	55.7%	9.5%	1.0%	3.0%	6.4%	0
TEXAS ADVANTAGE CMTY BANK NA	ALVIN	TX	<$300M	$192M	46.8%	55.5%	11.3%	0.4%	3.3%	7.7%	5
FIRST NB OF MOUNT DORA	MOUNT DORA	FL	$300M-1B	$358M	43.3%	55.4%	12.3%	0.7%	3.3%	-5.7%	2
SMBC MANUBANK	LOS ANGELES	CA	$1-10B	$6.6B	48.2%	55.4%	9.6%	-3.6%	0.9%	-0.1%	6
USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK	PHOENIX	AZ	>$100B	$106.2B	48.2%	55.3%	9.3%	0.9%	5.3%	-0.9%	2
FIRST NB OF KANSAS	BURLINGTON	KS	<$300M	$106M	44.9%	55.3%	9.1%	0.8%	3.0%	15.2%	2
BANK OF ERATH	ERATH	LA	<$300M	$105M	47.4%	55.1%	14.4%	0.2%	4.2%	-1.2%	1
GREAT SOUTHERN BANK	MERIDIAN	MS	$300M-1B	$355M	45.8%	55.0%	9.5%	0.7%	3.3%	1.4%	4
PEOPLES BANK	RIPLEY	MS	$300M-1B	$582M	45.2%	55.0%	10.3%	1.0%	2.6%	5.2%	0
RSNB BANK	ROCK SPRINGS	WY	$300M-1B	$381M	42.8%	54.5%	11.8%	1.1%	3.3%	0.1%	3
INTEGRITY BANK FOR BUSINESS	VIRGINIA BEACH	VA	<$300M	$112M	67.4%	54.5%	24.1%	0.3%	3.6%	11.8%	2
COMMUNITY BK PLEASANT HILL	PLEASANT HILL	MO	<$300M	$133M	43.1%	54.4%	10.4%	1.1%	3.3%	-19.2%	4
KARNES CNTY NB OF KARNES CTY	KARNES CITY	TX	$300M-1B	$577M	43.9%	54.3%	10.8%	0.6%	3.3%	16.1%	4
MAYNARD SAVINGS BANK	MAYNARD	IA	<$300M	$108M	53.7%	54.2%	15.1%	1.2%	2.8%	-1.7%	1
BANK OF WIGGINS	WIGGINS	MS	<$300M	$228M	44.7%	54.1%	12.9%	0.6%	2.9%	6.9%	2
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK	LAFAYETTE	AL	$300M-1B	$308M	45.6%	54.0%	11.6%	1.1%	3.2%	4.9%	1
UNITED SAVINGS BANK	PHILADELPHIA	PA	$300M-1B	$461M	52.0%	53.6%	17.4%	0.8%	3.0%	2.0%	0
UNION BANK	JAMESTOWN	TN	<$300M	$247M	44.2%	53.4%	10.7%	0.5%	3.2%	4.1%	1
BAY BANK	GREEN BAY	WI	$300M-1B	$316M	49.6%	53.3%	11.2%	1.1%	4.2%	1.8%	3
DEMOTTE STATE BANK	DEMOTTE	IN	$300M-1B	$622M	49.4%	53.2%	11.8%	1.2%	3.2%	8.8%	3
CITIZENS B&T GRAINGER CNTY	RUTLEDGE	TN	<$300M	$273M	47.1%	52.9%	14.2%	1.1%	3.5%	3.3%	1
LUMBEE GUARANTY BANK	PEMBROKE	NC	$300M-1B	$583M	49.1%	52.7%	10.7%	0.8%	3.0%	5.1%	1
GRANVILLE NATIONAL BANK	GRANVILLE	IL	<$300M	$118M	50.8%	52.7%	11.1%	1.2%	3.4%	3.4%	1
ANNA-JONESBORO NATIONAL BANK	ANNA	IL	<$300M	$234M	50.8%	52.6%	14.6%	1.2%	3.5%	-1.2%	2
FIRST SB OF HEGEWISCH	CHICAGO	IL	$300M-1B	$787M	52.8%	52.5%	14.9%	0.1%	1.8%	-1.9%	3
CITIZENS BANK OF WINFIELD	WINFIELD	AL	$300M-1B	$301M	52.2%	52.4%	17.5%	0.4%	2.8%	7.3%	3
COLFAX BANKING CO	COLFAX	LA	<$300M	$152M	49.5%	52.4%	11.1%	0.8%	3.6%	-1.2%	1
UNION BANK&TRUST CO	MINNEAPOLIS	MN	<$300M	$253M	49.2%	52.3%	10.0%	0.9%	4.0%	28.3%	3
FIRST STATE BANK	BELMOND	IA	<$300M	$142M	52.6%	52.3%	11.2%	0.7%	2.2%	15.8%	1
FIRST NB OF NEVADA MISSOURI	NEVADA	MO	<$300M	$122M	53.2%	51.9%	16.1%	0.8%	3.3%	0.8%	1
COMMUNITY BANK OF MARSHALL	MARSHALL	MO	<$300M	$250M	48.4%	51.8%	10.0%	1.1%	3.3%	4.2%	0
DLP BANK	STARKE	FL	$300M-1B	$301M	48.3%	51.8%	15.3%	0.8%	4.5%	18.8%	0
AUBURN STATE BANK	AUBURN	NE	<$300M	$251M	49.9%	51.6%	15.1%	1.2%	2.8%	-5.7%	3
CASHMERE VALLEY BANK	CASHMERE	WA	$1-10B	$2.3B	52.1%	51.6%	12.5%	1.1%	3.2%	6.7%	2
FIRSTSTATE BANK	LINEVILLE	AL	$300M-1B	$349M	46.6%	51.6%	11.1%	0.8%	3.7%	1.9%	1
CITIZENS SAVINGS BANK	SPILLVILLE	IA	<$300M	$151M	52.1%	51.5%	15.5%	0.7%	2.3%	9.9%	2
BANK OF COUSHATTA	COUSHATTA	LA	$300M-1B	$317M	58.7%	51.5%	9.2%	0.5%	2.7%	3.5%	4
FIRST FEDERAL BANK OF OHIO	GALION	OH	<$300M	$283M	52.0%	51.5%	13.7%	0.3%	3.1%	-3.2%	2
GERBER STATE BANK	ARGENTA	IL	<$300M	$101M	60.2%	51.4%	12.3%	1.1%	3.1%	3.9%	0
STILLMAN BANCCORP N A	STILLMAN VALLEY	IL	$300M-1B	$646M	52.6%	51.4%	9.2%	0.8%	2.8%	4.4%	1
FARMERS STB OF WESTERN IL	ALPHA	IL	<$300M	$167M	51.0%	51.3%	14.1%	1.2%	3.8%	2.4%	0
HIGHLANDS COMMUNITY BANK	COVINGTON	VA	<$300M	$189M	48.6%	51.2%	12.6%	0.4%	3.4%	-2.2%	1
CARVER STATE BANK	SAVANNAH	GA	<$300M	$111M	50.0%	51.1%	15.0%	1.0%	4.4%	2.5%	3
FAYETTE CNTY NB FAYETTEVILLE	FAYETTEVILLE	WV	<$300M	$158M	53.9%	50.9%	9.1%	0.8%	3.0%	-0.6%	2
FIRST NB OF SOUTH CAROLINA	HOLLY HILL	SC	$300M-1B	$310M	52.5%	50.8%	12.4%	1.2%	3.8%	-1.0%	0
NORTHERN INTERSTATE BANK N A	NORWAY	MI	<$300M	$194M	47.4%	50.8%	9.4%	0.9%	3.1%	-2.6%	1
EAGLE BANK&TRUST CO	LITTLE ROCK	AR	$300M-1B	$506M	51.6%	50.6%	16.4%	1.0%	3.7%	4.4%	2
PIBANK NATIONAL ASSN	MIAMI	FL	$1-10B	$2.4B	53.3%	50.4%	9.7%	-0.5%	1.8%	94.1%	4
CITIZENS STB OF ARLINGTON	ARLINGTON	SD	<$300M	$153M	54.1%	50.3%	11.7%	1.1%	2.9%	5.2%	0
BANK OF RICHMONDVILLE	COBLESKILL	NY	<$300M	$186M	50.1%	50.3%	11.5%	0.7%	3.4%	1.6%	1
SECURITY FEDERAL BANK	AIKEN	SC	$1-10B	$1.5B	49.8%	50.2%	10.8%	0.9%	3.3%	-1.7%	0
FIRST STATE BANK	WINCHESTER	OH	$1-10B	$1.2B	51.5%	49.9%	10.5%	1.1%	3.3%	5.0%	1
FIVE POINTS BANK OF HASTINGS	HASTINGS	NE	$300M-1B	$552M	51.4%	49.7%	10.9%	0.8%	2.4%	6.3%	2
CITIZENS B&T CO OF VIVIAN LA	VIVIAN	LA	<$300M	$160M	46.8%	49.7%	10.3%	0.5%	3.5%	5.0%	2
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK	EATONTON	GA	<$300M	$290M	54.4%	49.7%	11.2%	0.6%	2.9%	-10.8%	3
BANK OF HINDMAN	HINDMAN	KY	<$300M	$260M	55.7%	49.4%	9.2%	0.5%	2.1%	-0.8%	2
MILLVILLE SAVINGS BANK	MILLVILLE	NJ	<$300M	$170M	52.4%	49.4%	13.6%	0.3%	3.1%	4.6%	2
MADISON VALLEY BANK	ENNIS	MT	<$300M	$264M	52.8%	49.1%	9.2%	1.0%	3.7%	1.3%	0
GOLDEN VALLEY BANK	CHICO	CA	$300M-1B	$605M	52.6%	49.1%	9.3%	1.0%	3.6%	3.4%	0
BIG HORN FSB	GREYBULL	WY	$300M-1B	$400M	53.4%	49.0%	11.3%	0.9%	3.2%	6.1%	0
JIM THORPE NEIGHBORHOOD BANK	JIM THORPE	PA	<$300M	$265M	51.4%	49.0%	10.1%	1.0%	3.4%	7.0%	1
FARMERS&MERCHANTS NB FAIRVIE	FAIRVIEW	OK	<$300M	$119M	51.5%	49.0%	12.2%	1.1%	3.2%	0.5%	2
GRAND VALLEY BANK	HEBER CITY	UT	$300M-1B	$599M	52.0%	49.0%	11.5%	1.2%	3.8%	4.6%	1
SOUTHERN INDEPENDENT BANK	OPP	AL	$300M-1B	$395M	53.1%	48.9%	13.6%	1.1%	3.3%	3.4%	0
FARMERS STATE BANK OF CALHAN	CALHAN	CO	$300M-1B	$416M	56.5%	48.9%	9.2%	1.1%	3.1%	1.1%	2
NEWPORT FEDERAL BANK	NEWPORT	TN	<$300M	$277M	52.1%	48.8%	10.4%	0.8%	2.8%	-0.2%	1
BANK OF BRIDGER NA	BRIDGER	MT	$300M-1B	$803M	52.6%	48.8%	10.1%	0.9%	3.2%	-1.4%	1
FIRST STB OF THE SOUTH INC	SULLIGENT	AL	<$300M	$131M	51.8%	48.8%	16.4%	1.1%	4.0%	0.5%	0
NAVE BANK	SAN JUAN	PR	$300M-1B	$555M	63.4%	48.7%	13.8%	-0.5%	2.9%	148.9%	4
COMMUNITY PARTNERS SB	SALEM	IL	<$300M	$288M	56.9%	48.5%	11.9%	0.7%	3.5%	0.2%	1
CARROLL CNTY TR CARROLLTON M	CARROLLTON	MO	<$300M	$208M	53.5%	48.5%	9.1%	0.3%	2.5%	-0.8%	1
HOMETOWN NATIONAL BANK	LA SALLE	IL	$300M-1B	$307M	56.9%	48.5%	11.3%	1.1%	3.2%	-6.7%	1
FIRST&PEOPLES BANK&TRUST CO	RUSSELL	KY	<$300M	$207M	45.9%	48.3%	9.1%	-0.5%	3.1%	-3.0%	7
WATERTOWN SAVINGS BANK	WATERTOWN	MA	$1-10B	$1.4B	52.5%	48.1%	12.0%	0.8%	3.1%	-3.7%	0
FIRST NATIONAL BANK	ALAMOGORDO	NM	$300M-1B	$453M	50.7%	48.1%	10.3%	1.1%	4.1%	-2.6%	3
ANDOVER BANK	ANDOVER	OH	$300M-1B	$595M	50.6%	48.0%	9.6%	0.8%	3.1%	2.0%	1
BOONE BANK&TRUST CO	BOONE	IA	<$300M	$157M	54.8%	47.8%	9.7%	0.9%	2.6%	2.0%	1
INVESTMENT SAVINGS BANK	ALTOONA	PA	<$300M	$105M	58.6%	47.8%	21.7%	0.4%	2.8%	0.2%	1
FIRST STATE BANK OF PORTER	PORTER	IN	<$300M	$162M	54.2%	47.8%	16.8%	0.8%	3.5%	1.6%	0
HSBC BANK USA NATIONAL ASSN	TYSONS	VA	>$100B	$173.1B	39.0%	47.7%	10.2%	1.0%	1.6%	0.3%	7
FARMERS STATE BANK&TRUST CO	JACKSONVILLE	IL	<$300M	$210M	52.3%	47.6%	13.8%	0.7%	3.8%	-4.9%	1
FIRST FS&LA	DELTA	OH	<$300M	$246M	55.8%	47.5%	16.5%	1.1%	3.8%	2.1%	0
YAKIMA FS&LA	YAKIMA	WA	$1-10B	$2.0B	66.3%	47.5%	28.1%	0.9%	2.3%	-2.4%	1
VIDALIA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK	VIDALIA	GA	<$300M	$212M	59.1%	47.4%	12.1%	-0.8%	1.3%	-3.8%	5
PEOPLES SAVINGS&LOAN CO	BUCYRUS	OH	<$300M	$157M	57.4%	47.4%	20.3%	0.4%	2.8%	0.2%	1
MT MCKINLEY BANK	FAIRBANKS	AK	$300M-1B	$635M	54.8%	47.1%	18.9%	0.7%	3.7%	0.9%	1
DEWITT SAVINGS BANK	CLINTON	IL	<$300M	$173M	59.1%	47.0%	10.5%	0.6%	2.9%	4.0%	2
BANK OF EASTON	NORTH EASTON	MA	<$300M	$249M	55.2%	47.0%	10.3%	0.7%	2.2%	5.3%	1
BANK OF ALAPAHA	ALAPAHA	GA	<$300M	$251M	53.8%	47.0%	10.2%	0.7%	3.4%	5.1%	1
BANK OF CLOVIS	CLOVIS	NM	$300M-1B	$438M	57.1%	46.9%	10.8%	1.3%	4.5%	10.0%	0
HARRISON COUNTY BANK	LOST CREEK	WV	<$300M	$165M	54.0%	46.8%	10.2%	0.8%	3.5%	8.6%	0
SOUTHWEST CAPITAL BANK	ALBUQUERQUE	NM	$300M-1B	$483M	55.2%	46.8%	10.8%	1.2%	4.1%	-6.4%	2
FIRST NB OF FORT STOCKTON	FORT STOCKTON	TX	<$300M	$153M	52.6%	46.6%	12.2%	1.1%	5.0%	2.6%	0
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN OLNEY	OLNEY	IL	$300M-1B	$469M	54.9%	46.6%	10.8%	1.2%	3.4%	1.9%	1
SECURITY BANK	NEWBERN	TN	<$300M	$224M	54.4%	46.6%	10.5%	0.7%	3.4%	3.8%	0
CITIZENS BANK	CORVALLIS	OR	$300M-1B	$823M	54.5%	46.5%	13.9%	0.2%	3.5%	-3.0%	2
BLISSFIELD STATE BANK	BLISSFIELD	MI	<$300M	$115M	56.3%	46.5%	11.3%	1.2%	3.7%	-0.7%	2
COMMERCIAL BANK OF OZARK	OZARK	AL	<$300M	$115M	50.5%	46.4%	9.1%	0.5%	3.4%	0.0%	2
FAIRFIELD NATIONAL BANK	FAIRFIELD	IL	$300M-1B	$621M	68.9%	46.4%	11.9%	0.7%	2.4%	-5.5%	5
LIBERTY BANK MINNESOTA	SAINT CLOUD	MN	<$300M	$290M	51.7%	46.3%	12.9%	1.0%	3.2%	5.3%	2
MOULTRIE BANK&TRUST	MOULTRIE	GA	<$300M	$151M	56.6%	46.0%	14.1%	1.0%	3.9%	2.5%	1
FIRST NATIONAL BANK TEXAS	KILLEEN	TX	$1-10B	$4.6B	55.1%	46.0%	9.1%	1.2%	3.9%	7.3%	3
MERCHANTS&PLANTERS BANK	NEWPORT	AR	$300M-1B	$379M	52.8%	45.9%	10.2%	0.9%	4.0%	14.6%	1
CITIZENS STATE BANK	HUGOTON	KS	<$300M	$137M	58.8%	45.8%	13.5%	1.1%	3.6%	5.2%	0
MERCHANTS&FARMERS B&T CO	LEESVILLE	LA	$300M-1B	$541M	55.1%	45.8%	11.2%	0.9%	3.7%	1.6%	1
FARMERS STB OF HOFFMAN	HOFFMAN	IL	<$300M	$232M	67.3%	45.6%	11.9%	0.7%	3.4%	1.3%	3
CITIZENS BANK&TRUST CO	CAMPBELLSVILLE	KY	$300M-1B	$383M	60.6%	45.5%	13.1%	1.2%	3.1%	3.8%	0
NORTH SHORE TRUST&SAVINGS	WAUKEGAN	IL	<$300M	$270M	63.5%	45.5%	25.2%	0.9%	2.9%	-4.8%	1
TEXAS TRADITIONS BANK	KATY	TX	$300M-1B	$556M	59.2%	45.4%	9.4%	0.8%	4.6%	74.0%	2
CLARE BANK NATIONAL ASSN	PLATTEVILLE	WI	$300M-1B	$332M	63.9%	45.3%	11.6%	1.0%	2.4%	2.5%	3
NEW HORIZON BANK NA	POWHATAN	VA	$300M-1B	$359M	64.2%	45.0%	10.8%	-0.4%	3.9%	51.8%	4
FARMERS BLDG&SVG BANK	ROCHESTER	PA	<$300M	$123M	61.4%	45.0%	20.5%	0.5%	1.9%	3.7%	3
COMMUNITY BANK	LIBERAL	KS	<$300M	$174M	58.3%	44.9%	12.8%	1.1%	3.8%	3.3%	0
BANKPACIFIC LTD	HAGATNA	GU	<$300M	$192M	56.0%	44.9%	11.9%	0.7%	5.5%	7.2%	3
INTEGRITY BANK SSB	HOUSTON	TX	$300M-1B	$340M	62.8%	44.8%	14.5%	0.5%	4.2%	307.5%	1
HOME BANKING CO	SELMER	TN	<$300M	$124M	55.6%	44.8%	10.1%	0.4%	3.7%	-3.8%	2
FIRST NB OF WAVERLY	WAVERLY	OH	<$300M	$196M	54.4%	44.7%	9.2%	0.7%	3.2%	-7.6%	4
COMMUNITY FSB	WOODHAVEN	NY	$300M-1B	$827M	55.1%	44.7%	9.9%	-0.7%	4.2%	0.4%	4
COMMERCIAL BANK&TRUST OF PA	LATROBE	PA	$300M-1B	$357M	53.8%	44.7%	14.7%	0.6%	4.1%	2.4%	2
SOUTHERN HILLS CMTY BANK	LEESBURG	OH	<$300M	$210M	57.2%	44.7%	13.8%	0.6%	4.3%	4.2%	1
CITIZENS COMMUNITY BANK	MASCOUTAH	IL	$300M-1B	$531M	61.2%	44.7%	9.8%	-0.3%	2.5%	6.8%	7
FIRST PIONEER NATIONAL BANK	WRAY	CO	<$300M	$243M	62.8%	44.5%	12.5%	1.1%	3.2%	2.6%	2
JERSEY STATE BANK	JERSEYVILLE	IL	<$300M	$190M	57.2%	44.5%	13.3%	0.8%	3.1%	5.2%	1
SECURITY STB OF AITKIN	AITKIN	MN	<$300M	$114M	52.5%	44.5%	10.8%	0.9%	4.0%	3.2%	2
UNION STATE BANK	PELL CITY	AL	<$300M	$212M	51.2%	44.5%	9.6%	0.4%	3.6%	-7.4%	4
WELLS FARGO NB WEST	LAS VEGAS	NV	$1-10B	$8.8B	68.2%	44.4%	19.2%	1.0%	1.6%	-6.4%	5
FIRST NB IN PINCKNEYVILLE	PINCKNEYVILLE	IL	<$300M	$138M	55.6%	44.3%	11.8%	1.2%	4.0%	-1.0%	2
STATE BANK OF DOWNS	DOWNS	KS	<$300M	$148M	63.3%	44.3%	12.6%	0.8%	3.4%	5.0%	0
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK	PIEDMONT	AL	$300M-1B	$309M	56.3%	44.3%	12.7%	0.8%	4.2%	-5.5%	1
TD BANK NATIONAL ASSN	WILMINGTON	DE	>$100B	$342.8B	58.6%	44.3%	10.3%	0.8%	3.2%	-5.3%	1
SECURITY STB OF WARROAD	WARROAD	MN	<$300M	$138M	56.3%	44.3%	16.4%	0.7%	3.7%	-4.4%	3
BANK OF ABBEVILLE&TRUST CO	ABBEVILLE	LA	<$300M	$245M	59.4%	44.1%	12.9%	1.1%	3.5%	11.2%	1
OZONA BANK	OZONA	TX	$300M-1B	$346M	62.4%	44.0%	12.3%	0.7%	4.2%	4.1%	4
BARABOO STATE BANK	BARABOO	WI	$300M-1B	$570M	60.5%	44.0%	11.7%	1.2%	3.5%	5.6%	0
FIRST BANKERS TRUST CO NA	QUINCY	IL	$1-10B	$1.2B	59.8%	44.0%	10.0%	0.7%	2.9%	2.0%	2
EXCHANGE BANK OF ALABAMA	ALTOONA	AL	$300M-1B	$393M	61.0%	43.9%	15.3%	1.2%	3.9%	0.3%	0
BANK OF PENSACOLA	PENSACOLA	FL	<$300M	$147M	60.6%	43.9%	9.8%	1.0%	3.1%	-3.0%	0
LINCOLN STATE BANK	HANKINSON	ND	<$300M	$125M	58.7%	43.7%	10.0%	1.1%	3.6%	9.3%	1
VALLEY STATE BANK	BELLE PLAINE	KS	<$300M	$201M	62.1%	43.7%	12.2%	0.6%	4.2%	6.5%	2
WISDOM HERITAGE BANK	ALVA	OK	$300M-1B	$601M	59.5%	43.7%	14.2%	1.1%	3.1%	8.2%	0
NEWFIELD NATIONAL BANK	NEWFIELD	NJ	$300M-1B	$889M	58.4%	43.6%	10.1%	0.7%	3.3%	-1.5%	1
INDEPENDENCE BANK	INDEPENDENCE	OH	<$300M	$191M	62.1%	43.6%	14.5%	0.9%	3.2%	4.8%	2
KALAMAZOO COUNTY STATE BANK	SCHOOLCRAFT	MI	<$300M	$118M	57.7%	43.2%	12.1%	0.5%	4.4%	-2.6%	0
IRELAND BANK	MALAD CITY	ID	$300M-1B	$355M	59.3%	43.2%	11.5%	0.8%	4.2%	-3.1%	3
FIRST SOUTHWEST BANK	DURANGO	CO	$300M-1B	$657M	68.6%	43.1%	15.3%	0.6%	3.4%	7.0%	1
HUNTINGTON FSB	HUNTINGTON	WV	$300M-1B	$532M	68.4%	43.0%	15.1%	-0.4%	1.5%	-1.9%	3
HELM BANK USA	MIAMI	FL	$1-10B	$1.2B	61.4%	43.0%	11.2%	1.1%	4.2%	9.7%	3
NEFFS NATIONAL BANK	NEFFS	PA	$300M-1B	$471M	68.8%	43.0%	16.8%	0.5%	2.7%	3.2%	1
NELNET BANK	DRAPER	UT	$1-10B	$3.0B	64.5%	43.0%	15.9%	1.2%	3.0%	63.5%	5
CITIZENS BANK INC	ROBERTSDALE	AL	<$300M	$159M	59.1%	42.9%	11.0%	1.2%	3.8%	-0.2%	0
HOME FEDERAL BANK OF TN	KNOXVILLE	TN	$1-10B	$2.7B	69.8%	42.8%	17.2%	0.3%	2.3%	0.1%	4
LAONA STATE BANK	LAONA	WI	<$300M	$297M	58.6%	42.7%	9.6%	0.3%	3.1%	4.5%	2
DAIRY STATE BANK	RICE LAKE	WI	$300M-1B	$730M	62.4%	42.7%	12.0%	1.0%	3.0%	2.2%	0
PCSB BANK	CLARINDA	IA	$300M-1B	$326M	60.3%	42.6%	11.1%	0.9%	2.9%	1.0%	0
CLEVELAND STATE BANK	CLEVELAND	MS	$300M-1B	$340M	56.6%	42.5%	11.2%	1.0%	3.6%	3.5%	1
NORTHWOODS BANK OF MINNESOTA	PARK RAPIDS	MN	<$300M	$141M	61.3%	42.3%	11.2%	1.1%	4.0%	3.1%	0
FARMERS STB OF WESTMORELAND	WESTMORELAND	KS	<$300M	$258M	62.6%	42.0%	13.9%	1.1%	3.4%	10.6%	2
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS BANK	JOHNSTON CITY	IL	<$300M	$136M	63.6%	42.0%	17.7%	1.1%	3.8%	-11.3%	5
UNION STATE BANK	CLAY CENTER	KS	<$300M	$206M	65.1%	42.0%	10.3%	0.9%	3.3%	4.5%	1
FIRST NATIONAL BANK	CLOVERDALE	IN	$300M-1B	$419M	58.5%	41.8%	9.5%	0.4%	3.1%	-2.1%	2
UNB BANK	MOUNT CARMEL	PA	<$300M	$167M	57.2%	41.8%	9.3%	0.1%	2.7%	-2.3%	2
GREENLEAF BANK	GREENLEAF	WI	<$300M	$159M	65.6%	41.8%	9.6%	1.1%	3.2%	7.3%	0
PERU FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK	PERU	IL	<$300M	$208M	64.5%	41.8%	16.4%	0.8%	3.1%	-1.3%	0
FIRST NB&T CO OF WEATHERFORD	WEATHERFORD	TX	$300M-1B	$968M	56.6%	41.8%	10.4%	0.5%	4.3%	-4.6%	3
STATE SB OF MANISTIQUE	MANISTIQUE	MI	<$300M	$178M	59.8%	41.7%	9.6%	0.8%	3.3%	11.3%	2
CONCORDIA BANK&TRUST CO	VIDALIA	LA	$300M-1B	$667M	60.9%	41.6%	11.1%	1.1%	3.5%	5.3%	2
FIRST NB IN PORT LAVACA	PORT LAVACA	TX	$300M-1B	$361M	68.0%	41.6%	13.0%	0.4%	2.9%	-2.0%	3
VALLEY BANK OF NEVADA	NORTH LAS VEGAS	NV	<$300M	$241M	63.5%	41.5%	10.3%	0.6%	3.5%	0.6%	1
ASTRA BANK	SCANDIA	KS	$300M-1B	$423M	58.4%	41.5%	9.3%	0.6%	3.5%	-0.3%	1
CITIZENS BANK OF KY INC	PAINTSVILLE	KY	$300M-1B	$670M	59.8%	41.3%	13.5%	1.0%	3.6%	-4.6%	0
COMMUNITY STATE BANK	ROYAL CENTER	IN	<$300M	$176M	59.0%	41.3%	10.5%	0.6%	3.1%	1.0%	2
INDUSTRIAL BANK	WASHINGTON	DC	$300M-1B	$774M	66.3%	41.2%	15.2%	0.0%	3.9%	-4.6%	4
INDEPENDENCE BANK OF KY	OWENSBORO	KY	$1-10B	$3.8B	69.8%	41.1%	9.3%	1.1%	2.6%	-4.4%	1
BANK OF ANGUILLA	ANGUILLA	MS	<$300M	$192M	57.9%	41.1%	14.7%	1.1%	4.0%	-1.4%	2
TXN BANK	HONDO	TX	$300M-1B	$669M	54.0%	41.1%	9.7%	1.0%	3.5%	4.5%	1
ZENITH BANK&TRUST	SCOTTSDALE	AZ	<$300M	$133M	69.6%	41.1%	17.9%	0.1%	3.4%	27.4%	2
STATE BANK OF REESEVILLE	REESEVILLE	WI	<$300M	$170M	66.1%	41.0%	9.6%	0.8%	2.5%	12.3%	3
FAIRFAX STATE SAVINGS BANK	FAIRFAX	IA	<$300M	$287M	68.0%	41.0%	9.5%	0.7%	2.7%	-0.1%	3
FNBC BANK&TRUST	LA GRANGE	IL	$300M-1B	$582M	61.8%	40.9%	10.0%	1.2%	3.3%	1.5%	0
SHELBY STATE BANK	SHELBY	MI	$300M-1B	$397M	63.6%	40.9%	9.1%	0.9%	3.8%	3.8%	1
BANK OF WHITTIER NA	WHITTIER	CA	<$300M	$153M	67.3%	40.9%	16.4%	0.7%	2.5%	-15.4%	4
BAKER-BOYER NATIONAL BANK	WALLA WALLA	WA	$300M-1B	$693M	60.4%	40.8%	9.3%	0.6%	3.7%	5.3%	1
FIRST STATE BANK SOUTHWEST	PIPESTONE	MN	$300M-1B	$410M	63.0%	40.8%	9.7%	1.2%	3.3%	5.0%	2
CBBC BANK	MARYVILLE	TN	$300M-1B	$562M	66.1%	40.8%	14.2%	1.2%	3.7%	8.2%	1
THINK MUTUAL BANK	ROCHESTER	MN	$1-10B	$2.2B	64.8%	40.7%	16.3%	0.6%	2.9%	4.7%	1
BANK OF ESTES PARK	ESTES PARK	CO	<$300M	$172M	61.2%	40.6%	10.8%	0.8%	4.4%	11.1%	1
FIRST STATE BANK	GAINESVILLE	TX	$1-10B	$1.9B	56.8%	40.6%	9.6%	0.8%	4.1%	1.2%	0
HOME STATE BANK	LITCHFIELD	MN	<$300M	$219M	62.2%	40.6%	11.8%	1.2%	4.0%	8.7%	1
NATIONAL BANK&TRUST	LA GRANGE	TX	<$300M	$242M	65.2%	40.5%	10.8%	0.4%	2.9%	9.7%	3
ALPINE CAPITAL BANK	NEW YORK	NY	<$300M	$237M	67.5%	40.5%	13.7%	0.7%	4.4%	23.8%	2
LUSITANIA SAVINGS BANK	NEWARK	NJ	$300M-1B	$418M	64.0%	40.5%	15.0%	0.5%	2.4%	6.7%	2
MALVERN NATIONAL BANK	MALVERN	AR	$300M-1B	$728M	59.5%	40.4%	9.4%	1.0%	3.3%	6.9%	0
BRIDGE CITY STATE BANK	BRIDGE CITY	TX	<$300M	$247M	66.8%	40.3%	11.7%	1.1%	3.6%	4.3%	2
VICTORY BANK	LUBBOCK	TX	<$300M	$285M	62.9%	40.2%	12.1%	1.0%	4.4%	24.7%	0
FARMERS STATE BANK	PARKSTON	SD	<$300M	$255M	58.6%	39.9%	10.0%	0.9%	3.4%	2.5%	1
AUBURNBANK	AUBURN	AL	$1-10B	$1.1B	57.9%	39.8%	10.7%	0.9%	3.3%	5.3%	0
STATE BANK OF FARIBAULT	FARIBAULT	MN	$300M-1B	$329M	58.4%	39.8%	9.3%	1.1%	4.1%	3.8%	0
WHITESVILLE STATE BANK	WHITESVILLE	WV	<$300M	$138M	59.8%	39.8%	10.0%	0.5%	4.0%	1.4%	1
UNITED SOUTHERN BANK	UMATILLA	FL	$300M-1B	$843M	59.9%	39.8%	10.8%	1.2%	3.9%	-2.5%	1
FRAZER BANK	ALTUS	OK	$300M-1B	$354M	60.9%	39.8%	11.2%	0.5%	3.3%	1.8%	3
FIRST NB OF BELLEVUE	BELLEVUE	OH	$300M-1B	$310M	60.9%	39.7%	9.4%	0.7%	3.9%	-0.8%	1
FIRST STB SHANNON-POLO	SHANNON	IL	<$300M	$190M	64.6%	39.7%	10.3%	0.9%	3.1%	-0.8%	4
SANGER BANK	SANGER	TX	<$300M	$224M	66.0%	39.7%	16.5%	1.1%	3.9%	6.2%	0
EARLHAM SAVINGS BANK	WEST DES MOINES	IA	$300M-1B	$383M	64.1%	39.6%	9.5%	1.1%	3.8%	1.9%	0
BANK OF MARIN	NOVATO	CA	$1-10B	$3.9B	61.2%	39.5%	9.2%	1.0%	3.5%	3.6%	1
CITIZENS STATE BANK	MONTICELLO	IA	$300M-1B	$594M	60.3%	39.4%	11.5%	1.2%	2.9%	4.3%	2

---

## Bank Desk · Method

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/#method · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/bank-desk/method.md

SOURCE AND POPULATION
FDIC BankFind financials, api.fdic.gov/banks, one request per quarter for every insured institution, 62 quarters from 2011-03-31 through 2026-06. These are the FFIEC call reports as the FDIC republishes them. Failures from the FDIC failed-bank list. Dollar fields arrive in thousands and are shown in dollars.
FIELD MAP
FIGURE	FDIC FIELD(S)
Loans / deposits · liquid assets	LNLSDEPR · (CHBAL + FREPO + SC) / ASSET
Uninsured, insured, brokered, core deposits	DEPUNINS · DEPINS · BRO, BROR · COREDEP, COREDEPR
Wholesale funding	(OTHBOR + FREPP + BRO) / ASSET · OTHBFHLB
Capital	RBC1AAJ leverage · RBCT1CER CET1 · EQTOT · EQCCOMPI (AOCI)
Unrealized securities loss	(SCAF − SCAA) + (SCHF − (SC − SCAF)): AFS fair less cost, plus HTM fair less cost
Earnings	ROA · ROE · NIMY · EEFFR · ELNATR provision (YTD, annualized)
Asset quality	NCLNLSR · P3LNLS · NTLNLSCOR · LNLSRES / NCLNLS
Concentrations	LNRE · LNRECONS / EQTOT · LNCI · LNCON · LNNDEPD (loans to nondepository financial institutions) / EQTOT
Auto	LNAUTO · P3AUTO + P9AUTO + NAAUTO · NTAUTOR
CONVENTIONS AND LIMITS
Ratios published by the FDIC (ROA, NIM, efficiency, leverage, loans/deposits, charge-off rates) are used as published; the rest are quotients of filed lines. Year-to-date flows annualize by quarter. Percentiles are within asset band at the same quarter. Composite score: one point per flag, capital below 5% counts double. Departure means the bank stopped filing: mostly mergers; true failures are labeled separately from the FDIC list. Loans to nondepository financial institutions is the whole nonbank-lender line, not auto-specific; the FFIEC began sub-categorizing it in recent reporting changes and those splits are the natural next field to add. A flag is a question to ask, not a finding about any institution.
REFRESH
Bank Analysis/tools/pull_fdic.py (new quarter only) → build_bank_panel.py → bump DV in this file → deploy taperead-site

---

## Bank Desk · What it means

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/bank-desk/#meaning · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/bank-desk/meaning.md

HOW TO READ THIS DESK
A bank's filing is a set of claims about itself. The useful questions are always the same four: can it fund itself if depositors leave, is the capital real once you mark the securities, is the business earning enough to absorb mistakes, and is the loan book telling the truth yet. Every number below is placed under one of those questions. The percentile chips compare a bank against banks of similar size in the same quarter; a chip turns red when the number sits in the worst fifth of the band for that measure, green when it sits in the best fifth.
CAN IT FUND ITSELF · LIQUIDITY AND DEPOSITS
Loans / deposits
LNLSDEPR · net loans over total deposits
MEANS
How much of the deposit base is already lent out. Deposits are the cheapest, stickiest funding a bank has; everything above them must be borrowed.
WHEN HIGH
Above 100% the bank has lent more than depositors gave it and the difference is borrowed money, priced by markets and callable. Growth is outrunning the franchise. These banks need to sell assets, raise deposits, or slow.
WHEN LOW
Below 70% the bank is sitting on cash and securities it cannot deploy locally. It is liquid, safe, and yield-starved: the natural buyer of loans and participations, because its problem is finding assets, not funding them.
VS PEERS
Community banks cluster 75-90%. A bank far above its band is funding differently from its peers; ask how.
OUR LINE
> 100 = flag · < 70 with liquid > 25% and leverage > 9% = natural buyer screen
LIMITS
A wholesale-funded model can be stable if the funding is long and matched. The ratio says where the money came from, not whether it will stay.
Liquid assets / assets
(CHBAL + FREPO + SC) / ASSET · cash, fed funds, securities
MEANS
The buffer that pays depositors who leave before loans can be sold. This is what a run consumes first.
WHEN HIGH
Comfortable, provided the securities are worth their book value. Pair with the unrealized loss line below: a bank that is 60% 'liquid' in bonds trading at 80 cents is not 60% liquid.
WHEN LOW
Under 10% the bank has no cushion. Any funding shock becomes a forced sale of loans at whatever price is offered.
VS PEERS
Read together with uninsured deposits. High uninsured plus low liquid is the 2023 profile.
OUR LINE
< 10 = flag · < 20 with uninsured > 50% = run vulnerability (double weight in the score)
LIMITS
Book values, not market values. Securities count at par here and at the fair value of what they would actually fetch only in the securities-loss line.
Uninsured share of deposits
DEPUNINS / DEP · deposits above the $250K insurance limit
MEANS
How much of the deposit base has a reason to leave the moment confidence wobbles. Insured depositors rarely run; uninsured ones run in a day, by phone.
WHEN HIGH
Above 50% the bank's funding is a confidence contract. Silicon Valley Bank was 87% uninsured four quarters before it failed, Signature 92%, First Republic 74%. Their credit was fine. Their depositors were not obligated to stay.
WHEN LOW
Retail-heavy banks sit below 25% and their deposits behave like furniture. Boring is safe here.
VS PEERS
Business and wealth-focused banks run structurally high. That is a model choice, not a flaw; the question is whether liquidity and capital are sized for it.
OUR LINE
> 50 = flag · combined with liquid < 20 = run vulnerability · uninsured down 20%+ YoY = the large depositors are already leaving
LIMITS
Operating accounts of businesses are uninsured but sticky; hedge-fund and venture cash is uninsured and gone at the first headline. The filing does not distinguish them.
Brokered deposits · wholesale funding
BRO/BROR · (OTHBOR + FREPP + BRO) / ASSET · FHLB advances
MEANS
Money the bank rented rather than earned: deposits bought through brokers, Federal Home Loan Bank advances, fed funds. It is flexible, priced at market, and leaves when rates move.
WHEN HIGH
Brokered above 10% or wholesale above 15% of assets means the bank is leaning on markets to fund its book. Regulators restrict brokered deposits for banks that fall below well-capitalized, so a stressed bank loses this funding exactly when it needs it.
WHEN LOW
Low reliance is the mark of a franchise that funds itself. Core deposit ratio is the mirror image.
VS PEERS
FHLB reliance is common in mortgage-heavy banks and is not by itself a warning. Trend matters more than level.
OUR LINE
brokered > 10 · wholesale > 15 = flags
LIMITS
FHLB advances are collateralized and reliable until the bank's condition triggers collateral haircuts. The line is a funding dependence measure, not a default predictor.
Deposit growth · uninsured deposit growth
DEP and DEPUNINS vs the same quarter one year earlier
MEANS
Direction of the funding base. Balances shrinking while loans grow is the squeeze; uninsured balances shrinking faster than total is the early run.
WHEN HIGH
Fast deposit growth funded by brokered money or rate specials is bought growth and reprices. Fast growth in uninsured balances concentrates run risk.
WHEN LOW
Deposits down 5%+ year over year while loans are flat forces the bank into wholesale funding or asset sales. Uninsured down 20%+ means the depositors with options are exercising them.
VS PEERS
Compare against the band: in a year when the whole industry loses deposits, a bank at the median is not the story.
OUR LINE
deposits < -5% YoY = flag · uninsured < -20% YoY = flight flag
LIMITS
Mergers and acquisitions distort year-over-year growth; a bank that bought a competitor shows a jump that is not organic.
IS THE CAPITAL REAL · CAPITAL
Tier 1 leverage ratio
RBC1AAJ · Tier 1 capital over average assets, the prompt-corrective-action measure
MEANS
The plainest capital number: how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors and the insurance fund take it. Regulatory categories attach to it directly.
WHEN HIGH
Community banks typically carry 9-12%. High leverage capital plus low ROA can mean a bank that cannot deploy its equity profitably, which is its own problem, but not a safety one.
WHEN LOW
Below 5% the bank is no longer well-capitalized and supervisory restrictions begin. Below 4% is undercapitalized, below 2% critically so, and closure follows quickly. The median modern failure was at 6.1% four quarters before the end and 1.65% at the final filing.
VS PEERS
A bank under 7% while its band sits at 10% is running with a third less cushion than everyone its size.
OUR LINE
< 7 = watch · < 5 = critical, double weight · falling two straight quarters = trend flag
LIMITS
Book capital ignores unrealized losses on held-to-maturity securities. A bank can report 9% leverage while its bonds are underwater by more than its equity. That is the next line.
Unrealized securities loss / equity
(SCAF − SCAA) + (SCHF − (SC − SCAF)), over EQTOT · both AFS and HTM books
MEANS
What the bond portfolio would lose if sold today, across both accounting books, measured against the equity on the books. Held-to-maturity losses never touch reported capital, so this is computed from filed fair values rather than read off the balance sheet.
WHEN HIGH
Above 30% of equity, a meaningful share of the capital exists only if the bank is never forced to sell. Republic Bank carried 337% of equity in unrealized losses a year before failing; Metropolitan Capital 505%; Citizens Bank Sac City 141%. Silicon Valley Bank's final filing showed 114%.
WHEN LOW
Near zero means the portfolio is short or the rate environment is kind. Low is not a virtue; it simply removes one way to die.
VS PEERS
The whole system carried losses equal to 13% of equity at mid-2026. A bank at 40% is three times more exposed than average to the one shock that turns liquidity into insolvency.
OUR LINE
< -15 = watch · < -30 = danger
LIMITS
Unrealized losses only become real when liquidity forces a sale. A bank with sticky insured deposits can hold to maturity and the loss evaporates. Read this line together with uninsured deposits and liquid assets, never alone.
CET1 · equity / assets · AOCI
RBCT1CER · EQTOT / ASSET · EQCCOMPI / EQTOT
MEANS
Three complements to leverage. CET1 is risk-weighted, so a bank full of mortgages looks stronger than one full of construction loans at the same leverage. Equity/assets is the raw book. AOCI is the part of the securities loss that already flows through equity (the available-for-sale book).
WHEN HIGH
A gap between high CET1 and modest leverage means low-risk-weighted assets, usually mortgages or Treasuries. Large negative AOCI means the AFS book is underwater and it is already visible in reported equity.
WHEN LOW
AOCI near zero with a large total securities loss means the losses are parked in held-to-maturity, where they are invisible to book capital. That gap is the SVB structure.
VS PEERS
Compare AOCI against the total securities-loss line: the difference is what the bank chose to hide in HTM.
OUR LINE
AOCI < -20% of equity = flag
LIMITS
Risk weights are regulatory conventions, not market judgments. CET1 rewarded holding long Treasuries right up until 2022.
IS IT EARNING ENOUGH · EARNINGS
Return on assets
ROA · annualized net income over average assets, as published by the FDIC
MEANS
The single best summary of whether the business works. It is what builds capital when things go right and what drains it when they do not.
WHEN HIGH
Above 1% is the classic healthy community bank. Very high ROA at a small bank deserves a look at where the income comes from; fee-driven or one-time gains do not repeat.
WHEN LOW
Negative ROA eats capital every quarter it persists. The median modern failure was already losing money eight quarters before the end and never recovered. Chronic low-positive ROA (under 0.3%) means no cushion is being built for the next bad year.
VS PEERS
The chip compares against banks the same size in the same quarter, which strips out the rate environment. A bank at p10 in a good year has a business problem, not a cycle problem.
OUR LINE
< 0 = flag
LIMITS
Annualized from year-to-date, so first-quarter figures are the noisiest. One-time items (securities gains, tax events, sale of a business line) can swing a small bank's ROA by a full point.
Net interest margin
NIMY · interest income less interest expense, over earning assets
MEANS
The spread the bank earns for turning deposits into loans. It is the engine; everything else is cost and credit.
WHEN HIGH
Wide margins come from cheap deposits, higher-yielding loans, or both. Wide margins with rising delinquency mean the bank is being paid for risk it is taking.
WHEN LOW
Under 2.5% is thin. A margin compressing while cost of funds rises is the squeeze that turns adequate banks into marginal ones without a single bad loan.
VS PEERS
Band context matters: large banks run structurally thinner margins on fee income. A small bank at 2.3% is in trouble; a money-center bank at 2.3% is normal.
OUR LINE
< 2.5 = flag
LIMITS
NIM measures spread, not volume. A shrinking balance sheet can hold NIM while net income falls.
Efficiency ratio
EEFFR · noninterest expense over net revenue, as published
MEANS
How many cents it costs to earn a dollar of revenue. It is the cost-structure measure, and it is the widest single separator between banks that survive and banks that disappear.
WHEN HIGH
Above 85% the cost base is eating almost all the margin. Above 100% the year cost more than it earned. Small banks die of this more often than they die of bad loans.
WHEN LOW
Below 60% is efficient. Very low ratios at small banks can mean underinvestment in systems and compliance, which shows up later as findings.
VS PEERS
The chip is band-relative because scale drives cost. A $200M bank at 75% may be fine; a $5B bank at 75% has a problem.
OUR LINE
> band p90 = flag
LIMITS
Ratio of two flows; a bank shrinking revenue faster than expense looks worse without any new spending.
Provision / assets
ELNATR annualized over ASSET · what the bank set aside for expected losses this period
MEANS
Management's own forecast of credit losses, in dollars. It is the one number on the income statement that is a prediction rather than a record.
WHEN HIGH
A spike means management sees losses coming or an examiner made them see it. Provisions rising ahead of charge-offs is the honest sequence.
WHEN LOW
Provision persistently below net charge-offs is reserve bleed: the allowance is paying for today's losses instead of funding tomorrow's. It flatters earnings until it cannot.
VS PEERS
Compare provision against the bank's own charge-off line, not against peers. The question is internal consistency.
OUR LINE
no standalone flag · used in the reserve-coverage read below
LIMITS
CECL changed the accounting in 2020-2023; year-over-year comparisons across the transition are not clean.
IS THE LOAN BOOK TELLING THE TRUTH · ASSET QUALITY
Noncurrent loans / loans
NCLNLSR · loans 90+ days past due plus nonaccrual, over gross loans
MEANS
Loans that have stopped performing and are on their way to loss. This is the lagging measure: by the time a loan is here the decision that made it bad happened a year ago.
WHEN HIGH
Above 2% is elevated for a community bank. The modern failure signature runs from 4.59% eight quarters before the end to 7.48% at the final filing. In the 2011 to 2014 crisis tail it ran 8.58% to 14.31%: those banks were already broken when the panel picks them up.
WHEN LOW
Under 0.5% is clean. Very low noncurrent alongside negative earnings is an anomaly worth asking about: a lender with no credit problems that cannot make money has a cost problem or a reporting problem.
VS PEERS
The chip is band-relative; the system sits near 0.9%. A bank at p90 of its band has a problem book regardless of the absolute level.
OUR LINE
> band p90 = flag
LIMITS
Noncurrent is a promise already broken. It confirms trouble; it does not predict it. Pair with the 30-89 day line for the pipeline.
30-89 days past due · net charge-offs · reserve coverage
P3LNLS / LNLSGR · NTLNLSCOR · LNLSRES / NCLNLS
MEANS
Three views of the loss pipeline: what is entering it (early delinquency), what is leaving it as realized loss (charge-offs), and whether the allowance covers what is already identified (reserve coverage).
WHEN HIGH
Rising 30-89 with flat noncurrent means the wave is arriving. Charge-offs above the band p90 mean losses are being realized, not just brewing. Reserve coverage well above 100% means management is ahead of the problem.
WHEN LOW
Reserve coverage under 100% means the allowance does not even cover loans already identified as nonperforming. Every additional dollar of noncurrent comes straight from earnings or capital.
VS PEERS
Charge-off comparisons only mean something within a band and a loan mix; a credit-card bank and a mortgage bank are not comparable on this line.
OUR LINE
charge-offs > band p90 = flag · reserve coverage < 100% with noncurrent > 0 = flag
LIMITS
Charge-off timing is a management choice within limits; a bank can look clean by holding losses in nonaccrual, then recognize them all at once.
WHAT IS IT CONCENTRATED IN · EXPOSURES
Loans to nonbank financial institutions
LNNDEPD · Schedule RC-C item 9.a · shown in dollars and as % of equity
MEANS
Lending to other lenders: warehouse lines to mortgage companies, auto finance companies, consumer lenders, private credit funds. This is the funding rail behind nonbank credit, and it lives here, not on the bank's own auto or mortgage lines.
WHEN HIGH
Above 50% of equity the bank has a second-order credit exposure larger than half its capital: it is exposed to the underwriting of institutions it does not control. Above 100%, a single borrower's failure can be existential. Origin Bank carried 84% when its auto-lender borrower failed. System-wide the line grew from $238B to $1.5 trillion in eleven years.
WHEN LOW
Zero means the bank does not play in this market. Most community banks do not.
VS PEERS
The chip compares exposure-to-equity within the band. Fast year-over-year growth in this line is worth as much attention as the level.
OUR LINE
> 50% of equity = flag · > 100% = high
LIMITS
The line is all nonbank financial institutions, not auto-specific. The FFIEC began sub-categorizing it in recent reporting changes; those splits are the natural next field. Exposure here is only as good as the bank's collateral monitoring, which the filing cannot show.
Construction / equity · real estate · C&I · consumer mix
LNRECONS / EQTOT · LNRE, LNCI, LNCON over gross loans
MEANS
What the book is made of. Concentration is not a flaw; it is a bet, and the filing shows which bet.
WHEN HIGH
Construction above 100% of equity crosses the supervisory concentration threshold that examiners have used since 2006; construction is the loan type that fails fastest in a downturn. Very high real estate share means the bank's fate is the local property market's.
WHEN LOW
Diversified books absorb shocks. But a small bank that is diversified into things it does not understand is not safer than one concentrated in what it knows.
VS PEERS
Compare against band and, ideally, against the bank's own history: a construction share that doubled in two years is a strategy change.
OUR LINE
construction > 100% of equity = flag
LIMITS
Loan categories are regulatory buckets. A 'C&I' loan to a car dealer secured by inventory is auto exposure that the auto line will never show.
The auto book
LNAUTO · P3AUTO + P9AUTO + NAAUTO · NTAUTOR
MEANS
Direct auto lending: size, share of loans, delinquency, and net charge-offs. Bank auto is mostly prime indirect paper bought from dealers.
WHEN HIGH
Auto above 20% of loans with charge-offs above the band p90 is a concentrated book that is souring. The system auto charge-off rate runs near 0.9%; a bank at 2% is losing money on the product.
WHEN LOW
Small or zero auto book is the norm at community banks. The indirect exposure, if any, is usually on the nonbank-lender line above.
VS PEERS
Auto charge-offs are only comparable across banks with similar credit tiers; the filing does not show tier.
OUR LINE
auto > 20% of loans and auto charge-offs > band p90 = flag
LIMITS
No repossessed-vehicle inventory line exists for banks the way it does for credit unions, so the leading indicator used on the credit union desk does not port here.
PUTTING IT TOGETHER
The composite score
one point per flag, capital below 5% counts double · 25 flags across the dimensions above
MEANS
A count of how many things are wrong at once. Banks rarely fail from one number; they fail when liquidity, capital, earnings and credit go wrong together.
WHEN HIGH
Banks scoring 7 or more stopped filing within four quarters at 16.0%, against a 4.6% base rate, a 3.5x lift. The 42 modern failures scored a median 8 four quarters before the end and 10 at the final filing, against a survivor median of 1.
WHEN LOW
Zero to two is ordinary banking life. Most banks live here.
VS PEERS
The score is not band-adjusted itself, but most flags feeding it are, so it compares reasonably across sizes.
OUR LINE
5-6 = elevated · 7+ = danger
LIMITS
Bank departures are overwhelmingly voluntary mergers, so the departure lift is flat compared with the failure signature. The 2023 run failures scored only 1-3 four quarters out: a low score with high uninsured deposits and large securities losses is not a clean bill. Read the run-risk flags separately.
FOUR BANKS YOU WILL MEET
THE LIQUIDITY-RICH BUYER

Loans under 70% of deposits, a quarter or more of assets in cash and securities, leverage above 9%, ROA below its band. It cannot find enough loans locally and its excess sits in bonds earning less than it should. It buys participations and pools because that is the only way to deploy. Natural buyer screen.

THE FUNDING-STRETCHED SELLER

Loans above deposits, wholesale funding above 15%, deposits shrinking. Growth got ahead of the franchise. It sells loans, participations, or branches to get back inside its deposit base, and it does so on a timetable set by its funding, not its preference. Natural seller screen.

THE SLOW BLEED

Noncurrent loans rising quarter after quarter, provision chasing charge-offs, ROA turning negative, leverage eroding. This is almost every failure outside 2023. It is visible eight quarters out to anyone reading the filings in sequence, and the composite score sees it.

THE RUN CANDIDATE

Uninsured deposits above half, a bond book underwater by a large share of equity, liquid assets thin. Credit is fine, earnings are fine, capital is fine on paper, and it can be gone in seventy-two hours. This is 2023. The score alone misses it; the run-risk and securities-loss flags exist for it.

WHAT THIS DESK CANNOT TELL YOU
Whether uninsured deposits are sticky operating accounts or hot money. What the collateral behind a nonbank-lender line actually looks like. Whether management knows what it is doing. Anything about credit tier inside the auto book. Anything that happened after the last filing date. A filing is a quarterly photograph taken by the subject. Read it as evidence, argue with it, and never mistake a flag for a finding.

---

## Participation Desk · Market

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/participation-desk/#market · text route: https://getbookiq.com/participation

PURCHASED, ANNUALIZED
$19.2Bfrom $10.1B at 2016-03
SOLD, ANNUALIZED
$16.3B
OUTSTANDING PURCHASED
$68.2B
ACTIVE BUYERS / SELLERS
747 / 2632.8:1 imbalance
PARTICIPATION NCO (ANN.)
0.56%
CUS WITH ANY ACTIVITY
1,940
FLOW, 2016-03 TO 2026-03 · PURCHASED (AMBER) VS SOLD (BLUE), $B ANNUALIZED
0B
14B
29B
43B
16-03
17-03
18-03
19-03
20-03
21-03
22-03
23-03
24-03
25-03
26-03
COLLATERAL SPLIT OF 2026-03 FLOW, ANNUALIZED
TYPE	BOUGHT $B	SOLD $B
Vehicle	6.73	5.75
1-4 family RE	5.60	5.12
Commercial C&D	3.90	3.31
Commercial excl C&D	0.80	0.44
Student	0.10	0.11
All other	2.09	1.58
WHY THIS MATTERS
Every number on this desk comes from filings each institution makes about itself. No filing names a counterparty, so no participant sees this market whole: a seller cannot see the 747 institutions that bought last quarter, and a buyer cannot see who is about to need liquidity. The call sheets tab turns that asymmetry into two ranked lists. Participation delinquency system-wide runs above the overall loan book, which makes independent surveillance on traded pools the second product this data supports.

---

## Participation Desk · Call Sheets

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/participation-desk/#sheets · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/participation-desk/sheets.md

LIKELY SELLERS
LIKELY BUYERS
STRESSED BOOKS
All states
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
GU
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PR
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
394 credit unions on the sellers sheet
CREDIT UNION	CITY	ST	BAND	ASSETS	SIGNAL	SOLD /YR	SOLD-RETAINED	LOANS/SHARES	SHARES YOY	SCORE
LIBERTY	Evansville	IN	$1-10B	$4.77B	habitual seller	$1.32B	$372.5M	101.0%	11.5%	3
IDAHO CENTRAL	Chubbuck	ID	>$10B	$14.95B	sold this quarter	$916.9M	$53.6M	98.0%	16.5%	3
ALLIANT	CHICAGO	IL	>$10B	$19.66B	habitual seller	$755.0M	$513.7M	96.0%	1.2%	3
QUORUM	Purchase	NY	$1-10B	$1.31B	habitual seller	$664.8M	$168.1M	83.0%	11.0%	3
DORT FINANCIAL	GRAND BLANC	MI	$1-10B	$2.46B	habitual seller	$648.5M	$75.1M	83.0%	6.0%	3
VYSTAR	Jacksonville	FL	>$10B	$13.80B	habitual seller	$646.1M	$38.8M	92.0%	2.1%	5
CANYON VIEW	Salt Lake City	UT	$1-10B	$2.14B	habitual seller	$593.0M	$68.9M	95.0%	4.8%	3
MERITRUST	Broomfield	CO	$1-10B	$4.19B	habitual seller	$571.1M	$120.3M	87.0%	135.1%	4
GEORGIA'S OWN	Atlanta	GA	$1-10B	$4.33B	habitual seller	$421.3M	$177.0M	87.0%	2.9%	6
LAKE MICHIGAN	Grand Rapids	MI	>$10B	$16.86B	habitual seller	$374.6M	$183.0M	93.0%	14.9%	1
VIBRANT	Moline	IL	$1-10B	$1.17B	habitual seller	$371.7M	$45.7M	96.0%	9.0%	5
CREDIT UNION 1	Lombard	IL	$1-10B	$2.64B	habitual seller	$346.0M	$93.2M	86.0%	40.5%	3
TEACHERS	Smithtown	NY	$1-10B	$9.94B	habitual seller	$315.6M	$63.6M	69.0%	-0.7%	2
EMPOWER	Syracuse	NY	$1-10B	$4.27B	habitual seller	$312.5M	$22.1M	89.0%	5.7%	3
OREGON COMMUNITY	Eugene	OR	$1-10B	$3.57B	habitual seller	$284.1M	$121.1M	110.0%	-1.5%	5
VERIDIAN	Waterloo	IA	$1-10B	$8.90B	habitual seller	$277.7M	$89.7M	102.0%	10.7%	2
CREDIT HUMAN	San Antonio	TX	$1-10B	$4.38B	sold this quarter	$210.6M	$17.3M	109.0%	-1.8%	4
WESTERRA	Denver	CO	$1-10B	$2.05B	habitual seller	$201.0M	$43.9M	83.0%	0.6%	5
USALLIANCE	Rye	NY	$1-10B	$3.37B	habitual seller	$193.3M	$93.5M	117.0%	5.1%	4
CHARTWAY	Virginia Beach	VA	$1-10B	$3.29B	habitual seller	$192.9M	$25.5M	92.0%	2.7%	4
GROW FINANCIAL	Tampa	FL	$1-10B	$3.94B	habitual seller	$181.9M	$44.5M	91.0%	1.7%	3
RALLY	Corpus Christi	TX	$1-10B	$4.77B	sold this quarter	$175.9M	$8.9M	103.0%	3.8%	2
CREDIT UNION OF TEXAS	Allen	TX	$1-10B	$2.72B	habitual seller	$159.6M	$4.4M	95.0%	4.9%	7
CREDIT UNION 1	Anchorage	AK	$1-10B	$1.53B	sold this quarter	$156.9M	$3.5M	95.0%	4.2%	3
GENISYS	AUBURN HILLS	MI	$1-10B	$6.44B	habitual seller	$145.2M	$293.5M	93.0%	16.4%	1
OCEANAIR	Oxnard	CA	$500M-1B	$870.8M	habitual seller	$136.0M	$46.7M	109.0%	-2.0%	4
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY	East Lansing	MI	$1-10B	$8.51B	habitual seller	$135.9M	$84.0M	92.0%	3.8%	4
TRULIANT	Winston Salem	NC	$1-10B	$5.45B	habitual seller	$134.7M	$127.5M	94.0%	2.3%	2
PATHWAYS FINANCIAL	Columbus	OH	$500M-1B	$776.4M	habitual seller	$129.4M	$41.5M	75.0%	10.6%	1
MOUNTAIN AMERICA	SANDY	UT	>$10B	$22.66B	habitual seller	$127.8M	$155.4M	92.0%	6.3%	1
GESA	RICHLAND	WA	$1-10B	$6.72B	habitual seller	$126.5M	$34.5M	94.0%	16.3%	4
AMPLIFY	Austin	TX	$1-10B	$1.27B	habitual seller	$126.0M	$173.3M	95.0%	-0.9%	5
GTE	TAMPA	FL	$1-10B	$3.13B	habitual seller	$124.1M	$43.1M	95.0%	5.8%	2
UNITED	St Joseph	MI	$1-10B	$4.40B	habitual seller	$123.9M	$37.7M	87.0%	3.8%	2
FOURLEAF	Bethpage	NY	>$10B	$14.37B	habitual seller	$123.4M	$537.7M	87.0%	8.4%	3
WESTMARK	Idaho Falls	ID	$1-10B	$1.62B	sold this quarter	$116.6M	$5.2M	103.0%	7.0%	3
KEYPOINT	San Jose	CA	$1-10B	$1.70B	habitual seller	$113.5M	$45.5M	92.0%	1.3%	5
COMMUNITY FIRST	Appleton	WI	$1-10B	$6.66B	habitual seller	$112.0M	$54.2M	85.0%	7.8%	0
DESERET FIRST	West Valley Cit	UT	$1-10B	$1.26B	habitual seller	$111.1M	$21.2M	89.0%	5.9%	2
SAN FRANCISCO	San Francisco	CA	$1-10B	$1.58B	sold this quarter	$106.8M	$4.1M	65.0%	6.3%	1
PENTAGON	MCLEAN	VA	>$10B	$29.40B	habitual seller	$103.6M	$840.8M	89.0%	-6.7%	2
VANTAGE WEST	TUCSON	AZ	$1-10B	$3.30B	habitual seller	$103.1M	$26.0M	87.0%	6.4%	2
EVERWISE	South Bend	IN	$1-10B	$5.70B	habitual seller	$101.8M	$160.6M	89.0%	4.3%	2
AFFINITY	Basking Ridge	NJ	$1-10B	$4.40B	sold this quarter	$100.4M	$9.3M	101.0%	6.3%	3
SALAL	Seattle	WA	$1-10B	$1.16B	habitual seller	$99.1M	$45.6M	93.0%	-2.6%	3
ONPATH	Metairie	LA	$1-10B	$1.26B	habitual seller	$97.0M	$18.4M	97.0%	15.8%	5
RANDOLPH-BROOKS	UNIVERSAL CITY	TX	>$10B	$19.19B	sold this quarter	$91.6M	$28.2M	82.0%	5.2%	2
COVANTAGE	Antigo	WI	$1-10B	$4.19B	habitual seller	$90.5M	$44.3M	97.0%	9.1%	4
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE	Washington	DC	$500M-1B	$762.4M	habitual seller	$90.0M	$65.8M	96.0%	-9.2%	9
NYMEO	FREDERICK	MD	$200-500M	$408.5M	habitual seller	$78.2M	$6.9M	75.0%	7.6%	0
FIRST FINANCIAL OF MARYLAND	Sparks	MD	$1-10B	$1.42B	habitual seller	$76.4M	$1.6M	75.0%	8.0%	2
ORION	Memphis	TN	$1-10B	$1.30B	sold this quarter	$75.3M	$19.5M	105.0%	4.1%	4
CENTER PARC	Atlanta	GA	$1-10B	$2.51B	habitual seller	$74.4M	$19.0M	90.0%	3.3%	1
MICHIGAN SCHOOLS AND GOVERNMENT	Clinton Townshi	MI	$1-10B	$4.37B	habitual seller	$72.9M	$148.8M	101.0%	9.8%	3
ENT	Colorado Spring	CO	>$10B	$19.48B	habitual seller	$72.3M	$272.6M	97.0%	85.1%	3
ELEMENTS FINANCIAL	INDIANAPOLIS	IN	$1-10B	$2.50B	sold this quarter	$72.3M	$61.8M	78.0%	0.2%	0
RIZE	EL MONTE	CA	$1-10B	$1.31B	sold this quarter	$70.7M	$2.9M	94.0%	2.9%	3
COMMUNITY CHOICE	Farmington Hill	MI	$1-10B	$2.07B	habitual seller	$65.4M	$174.6M	87.0%	13.5%	3
PIMA	Tucson	AZ	$1-10B	$1.68B	sold this quarter	$54.9M	$4.2M	76.0%	34.6%	1
SUFFOLK	Medford	NY	$1-10B	$2.07B	habitual seller	$53.7M	$29.2M	76.0%	4.7%	3
SOARION	SAN ANTONIO	TX	$500M-1B	$560.7M	habitual seller	$53.2M	$106.2M	83.0%	-11.0%	7
UNITUS COMMUNITY	Tigard	OR	$1-10B	$1.81B	sold this quarter	$52.1M	$5.6M	84.0%	4.1%	2
FINANCIAL PARTNERS	DOWNEY	CA	$1-10B	$2.25B	habitual seller	$51.9M	$66.4M	92.0%	-5.4%	2
FIRST HARVEST	DEPTFORD	NJ	$200-500M	$472.6M	habitual seller	$50.5M	$6.7M	80.0%	7.7%	3
FIRST TECHNOLOGY	SAN JOSE	CA	>$10B	$28.58B	habitual seller	$49.2M	$470.9M	90.0%	114.4%	1
VERVE, A CREDIT UNION	Oshkosh	WI	$1-10B	$1.59B	habitual seller	$48.6M	$81.2M	84.0%	2.6%	0
METRO	Chelsea	MA	$1-10B	$3.30B	habitual seller	$48.0M	$142.4M	101.0%	0.5%	4
BRIGHTBRIDGE	LAWRENCE	MA	$1-10B	$2.39B	sold this quarter	$47.3M	$14.4M	83.0%	8.1%	0
RESOUND	Nashville	TN	$500M-1B	$700.1M	habitual seller	$47.1M	$4.6M	93.0%	10.6%	3
MISSION	San Diego	CA	$1-10B	$7.23B	habitual seller	$43.5M	$55.2M	80.0%	5.6%	0
FINANCIAL RESOURCES	Branchburg	NJ	$500M-1B	$634.2M	habitual seller	$43.0M	$30.6M	85.0%	4.3%	3
AMERICAN HERITAGE	Philadelphia	PA	$1-10B	$5.32B	habitual seller	$40.6M	$303.3M	85.0%	9.9%	3
ITHINK FINANCIAL	Boca Raton	FL	$1-10B	$2.36B	habitual seller	$40.4M	$34.7M	94.0%	5.6%	1
AVADIAN	Birmingham	AL	$1-10B	$1.43B	sold this quarter	$39.6M	$12.5M	88.0%	0.1%	2
FEDCHOICE	Lanham	MD	$500M-1B	$503.4M	habitual seller	$37.0M	$646K	80.0%	5.5%	4
RED ROCKS	Littleton	CO	$200-500M	$354.4M	sold this quarter	$37.0M	$1.0M	90.0%	5.5%	2
PURDUE	WEST LAFAYETTE	IN	$1-10B	$2.15B	sold this quarter	$36.0M	$3.9M	82.0%	3.0%	1
STANFORD	Palo Alto	CA	$1-10B	$4.80B	habitual seller	$35.6M	$31.5M	93.0%	9.6%	2
INTOUCH	PLANO	TX	$500M-1B	$824.2M	sold this quarter	$35.3M	$13.3M	89.0%	-2.2%	4
TEAM ONE	SAGINAW	MI	$500M-1B	$767.4M	habitual seller	$34.7M	$68.8M	74.0%	-1.3%	1
UNITED NATIONS	LONG ISLAND CIT	NY	>$10B	$10.48B	habitual seller	$32.8M	$16.7M	66.0%	5.2%	0
HERCULES FIRST	SALT LAKE CITY	UT	$100-200M	$164.4M	sold this quarter	$32.3M	$914K	99.0%	2.2%	3
EASTRISE	Williston	VT	$1-10B	$3.17B	habitual seller	$32.1M	$26.5M	99.0%	4.0%	1
LAKE TRUST	Brighton	MI	$1-10B	$2.87B	habitual seller	$32.0M	$155.0M	84.0%	7.0%	2
GLOBAL	Anchorage	AK	>$10B	$12.86B	habitual seller	$31.7M	$111.6M	92.0%	12.1%	1
TRIANGLE	Nashua	NH	$500M-1B	$872.0M	habitual seller	$31.3M	$7.5M	78.0%	2.3%	5
CALIFORNIA	GLENDALE	CA	$1-10B	$5.41B	sold this quarter	$30.7M	$53.6M	71.0%	–	0
OC	GARFIELD HTS	OH	$200-500M	$310.8M	habitual seller	$30.4M	$10.7M	87.0%	9.9%	2
SUN EAST	Aston	PA	$500M-1B	$915.6M	habitual seller	$28.9M	$28.7M	87.0%	6.8%	4
OREGON STATE	Corvallis	OR	$1-10B	$2.73B	habitual seller	$28.0M	$11.7M	81.0%	14.1%	1
MEMBERS 1ST	Enola	PA	$1-10B	$8.61B	habitual seller	$28.0M	$117.5M	94.0%	1.5%	1
1ST ADVANTAGE	Newport News	VA	$1-10B	$1.08B	habitual seller	$26.5M	$31.8M	86.0%	3.6%	0
BLUESTONE	Sioux Falls	SD	$200-500M	$212.6M	habitual seller	$26.3M	$730K	66.0%	2.7%	2
LAFCU	LANSING	MI	$1-10B	$1.14B	habitual seller	$26.2M	$13.8M	87.0%	-2.7%	2
CHRISTIAN FINANCIAL	Sterling Height	MI	$1-10B	$1.11B	habitual seller	$26.1M	$34.8M	81.0%	21.5%	2
SHAREFAX	CINCINNATI	OH	$500M-1B	$726.4M	habitual seller	$24.3M	$2.7M	77.0%	38.4%	2
CLEARPATH	Burbank	CA	$200-500M	$224.4M	habitual seller	$23.9M	$13.3M	91.0%	1.2%	5
AMERICAN FIRST	BREA	CA	$1-10B	$1.31B	habitual seller	$23.7M	$64.3M	97.0%	34.3%	2
TOWN AND COUNTRY	MINOT	ND	$500M-1B	$781.6M	habitual seller	$22.8M	$10.5M	94.0%	6.3%	0
INSPIRE	Newtown	PA	$200-500M	$397.1M	habitual seller	$21.9M	$3.5M	98.0%	1.3%	4
CARTER	SPRINGHILL	LA	$500M-1B	$751.9M	habitual seller	$21.4M	$37.3M	96.0%	-4.4%	8
ASSEMBLIES OF GOD	Springfield	MO	$200-500M	$446.7M	habitual seller	$21.1M	$10.0M	91.0%	3.8%	3
SRI	MENLO PARK	CA	$200-500M	$242.1M	habitual seller	$20.7M	$5.3M	95.0%	1.5%	1
ALL IN	DALEVILLE	AL	$1-10B	$3.72B	habitual seller	$20.5M	$21.0M	87.0%	7.4%	3
REV	CHARLESTON	SC	$1-10B	$1.21B	sold this quarter	$20.0M	$14.6M	103.0%	4.0%	4
AIR ACADEMY	Colorado Spring	CO	$500M-1B	$825.4M	habitual seller	$19.5M	$20.4M	87.0%	-2.2%	2
KEMBA	West Chester	OH	$1-10B	$1.78B	habitual seller	$19.3M	$6.7M	92.0%	1.5%	2
CREDIT UNION OF NEW JERSEY, A	Ewing	NJ	$500M-1B	$504.0M	habitual seller	$19.2M	$4.1M	89.0%	2.1%	1
PARISHIONERS	Torrance	CA	$50-100M	$67.2M	habitual seller	$18.8M	$523K	87.0%	-5.4%	5
EAGLE COMMUNITY	Lake Forest	CA	$200-500M	$411.4M	habitual seller	$18.3M	$10.0M	91.0%	13.8%	3
PEACH STATE	Lawrenceville	GA	$1-10B	$1.11B	habitual seller	$18.3M	$80.0M	74.0%	2.1%	1
ARCHER COOPERATIVE	Archer	NE	$100-200M	$102.1M	habitual seller	$18.1M	$7.2M	95.0%	7.0%	1
ARIZONA CENTRAL	Phoenix	AZ	$500M-1B	$733.7M	habitual seller	$16.8M	$0	93.0%	1.4%	4
TUSCALOOSA V A	Tuscaloosa	AL	$50-100M	$51.6M	sold this quarter	$16.5M	$1.2M	71.0%	6.2%	1
ASCEND	TULLAHOMA	TN	$1-10B	$4.75B	habitual seller	$16.3M	$7.3M	91.0%	4.4%	2
WEOKIE	Oklahoma City	OK	$1-10B	$1.49B	sold this quarter	$16.0M	$10.3M	98.0%	8.3%	3
MAGNIFI FINANCIAL	MELROSE	MN	$1-10B	$2.67B	habitual seller	$15.8M	$198.3M	97.0%	7.0%	3
DFCU FINANCIAL	Dearborn	MI	$1-10B	$8.03B	habitual seller	$15.7M	$78.6M	42.0%	15.3%	2
NAVIGANT	Smithfield	RI	$1-10B	$4.18B	habitual seller	$15.6M	$28.7M	100.0%	5.1%	2
ARDENT	Phila	PA	$500M-1B	$931.3M	sold this quarter	$15.4M	$428K	74.0%	5.1%	2
HARBORSTONE	TACOMA	WA	$1-10B	$3.05B	sold this quarter	$14.7M	$77.2M	89.0%	39.2%	1
AGRICULTURE	MERRIFIELD	VA	$200-500M	$353.1M	habitual seller	$14.6M	$14.1M	66.0%	-3.7%	2
GREENWOOD	Warwick	RI	$500M-1B	$924.8M	habitual seller	$14.6M	$24.3M	99.0%	7.3%	2
BHCU	RIDLEY PARK	PA	$200-500M	$273.0M	habitual seller	$14.2M	$14.9M	82.0%	4.4%	2
EECU	Fort Worth	TX	$1-10B	$4.76B	habitual seller	$13.6M	$101.9M	91.0%	11.1%	2
CASCADE	Kent	WA	$200-500M	$380.2M	habitual seller	$13.5M	$5.4M	51.0%	7.4%	2
ALABAMA	TUSCALOOSA	AL	$1-10B	$2.06B	habitual seller	$13.4M	$122.6M	86.0%	4.4%	2
SUPERIOR CREDIT UNION, INC	LIMA	OH	$1-10B	$1.93B	sold this quarter	$13.2M	$12.7M	76.0%	8.5%	0
COREPLUS	Norwich	CT	$500M-1B	$671.3M	habitual seller	$13.0M	$6.7M	88.0%	81.0%	1
SPERO FINANCIAL	Greenville	SC	$500M-1B	$712.1M	habitual seller	$12.7M	$58.1M	91.0%	-1.4%	4
COLLINS COMMUNITY	Cedar Rapids	IA	$1-10B	$1.54B	habitual seller	$12.5M	$130.1M	81.0%	-0.1%	5
HOMEFIELD	NORTH GRAFTON	MA	$100-200M	$170.6M	sold this quarter	$12.2M	$2.1M	92.0%	3.9%	2
INNOVATIONS FINANCIAL	PANAMA CITY	FL	$500M-1B	$674.0M	sold this quarter	$12.0M	$13.9M	88.0%	11.1%	1
U.S. EAGLE	Albuquerque	NM	$1-10B	$1.48B	habitual seller	$12.0M	$73.9M	79.0%	0.5%	7
LAFAYETTE	ROCKVILLE	MD	$1-10B	$2.14B	habitual seller	$12.0M	$142.4M	50.0%	6.4%	5
COASTAL	Raleigh	NC	$1-10B	$6.21B	habitual seller	$11.8M	$70.7M	79.0%	9.0%	2
CALCOM	LONG BEACH	CA	$50-100M	$82.6M	habitual seller	$11.6M	$322K	89.0%	-3.8%	1
SKYLA	Charlotte	NC	$1-10B	$1.66B	habitual seller	$11.4M	$3.2M	92.0%	2.6%	3
FOX COMMUNITIES	Appleton	WI	$1-10B	$3.35B	habitual seller	$11.2M	$73.9M	100.0%	9.3%	2
PENN SOUTH COOPERATIVE	New York	NY	<$50M	$8.1M	habitual seller	$10.5M	$308K	103.0%	2.6%	3
RIVER WORKS	Lynn	MA	$100-200M	$189.8M	habitual seller	$10.3M	$8.5M	86.0%	13.8%	0
JSC	Houston	TX	$1-10B	$2.65B	sold this quarter	$10.2M	$282K	77.0%	-1.9%	3
MILLBURY	Millbury	MA	$200-500M	$478.3M	habitual seller	$10.0M	$2.3M	81.0%	-1.4%	1
PENN EAST	SCRANTON	PA	$200-500M	$277.6M	habitual seller	$9.5M	$1.6M	47.0%	0.7%	2
MEMBERS TRUST OF THE SOUTHWEST	Houston	TX	$200-500M	$267.5M	habitual seller	$9.1M	$9.4M	87.0%	6.7%	2
EVERGREEN	Portland	ME	$500M-1B	$641.4M	habitual seller	$8.5M	$7.8M	80.0%	8.3%	1
FREEDOM FIRST	Roanoke	VA	$1-10B	$1.22B	habitual seller	$8.0M	$37.2M	104.0%	1.5%	3
GREENVILLE	Greenville	SC	$500M-1B	$510.6M	habitual seller	$8.0M	$21.4M	79.0%	6.7%	0
WEBSTER FIRST	Worcester	MA	$1-10B	$1.50B	habitual seller	$8.0M	$9.5M	124.0%	2.5%	3
HANCOCK	Findlay	OH	$100-200M	$118.0M	habitual seller	$7.9M	$747K	79.0%	5.5%	3
PLATINUM	Duluth	GA	$200-500M	$389.9M	habitual seller	$7.8M	$12.1M	74.0%	17.9%	0
FIRST SERVICE	Houston	TX	$1-10B	$1.48B	habitual seller	$7.8M	$6.9M	89.0%	4.5%	3
4FRONT	Traverse City	MI	$1-10B	$1.02B	habitual seller	$7.6M	$20.2M	79.0%	1.7%	4
ANECA	Shreveport	LA	$200-500M	$267.7M	habitual seller	$7.6M	$5.9M	113.0%	15.7%	3
CHROME	Canonsburg	PA	$200-500M	$224.1M	habitual seller	$7.6M	$11.7M	78.0%	16.6%	2
LAMOURE	LAMOURE	ND	<$50M	$40.6M	sold this quarter	$7.5M	$521K	51.0%	5.9%	0
LOOKOUT	Pocatello	ID	$200-500M	$309.2M	habitual seller	$7.4M	$2.1M	78.0%	3.3%	4
HANSCOM	Hanscom AFB	MA	$1-10B	$2.19B	sold this quarter	$7.2M	$4.9M	86.0%	20.9%	1
FIRST COMMUNITY	Houston	TX	$1-10B	$2.96B	habitual seller	$7.2M	$1.8M	109.0%	3.0%	4
JOVIA FINANCIAL	WESTBURY	NY	$1-10B	$4.54B	habitual seller	$7.0M	$89.2M	88.0%	1.8%	2
LANCO	Lancaster	PA	$100-200M	$126.5M	habitual seller	$6.9M	$3.1M	78.0%	-3.7%	1
ASSOCIATED SCHOOL EMPLOYEES	Youngstown	OH	$200-500M	$220.2M	sold this quarter	$6.5M	$180K	96.0%	10.0%	3
CARO	COLUMBIA	SC	$100-200M	$156.1M	sold this quarter	$6.5M	$6.4M	67.0%	30.5%	3
TAUNTON	Taunton	MA	$200-500M	$433.5M	habitual seller	$6.4M	$1.5M	83.0%	7.0%	0
CASE	Lansing	MI	$200-500M	$405.2M	habitual seller	$6.1M	$6.3M	87.0%	2.3%	3
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL	Milwaukee	WI	$200-500M	$292.3M	habitual seller	$5.9M	$3.7M	49.0%	9.3%	2
ALLIANCE CATHOLIC	Farmington Hill	MI	$500M-1B	$707.4M	habitual seller	$5.8M	$35.4M	72.0%	10.0%	2
KAIPERM	Walnut Creek	CA	$100-200M	$109.0M	habitual seller	$5.6M	$3.3M	83.0%	-5.5%	2
TEXANS	Richardson	TX	$1-10B	$2.61B	sold this quarter	$5.4M	$0	77.0%	10.5%	4
GFA	Gardner	MA	$500M-1B	$760.6M	sold this quarter	$5.4M	$3.3M	84.0%	12.3%	3
NORTH STAR COMMUNITY	Maddock	ND	$200-500M	$470.6M	habitual seller	$4.1M	$2.2M	79.0%	1.2%	1
BLUE	Cheyenne	WY	$1-10B	$2.24B	habitual seller	$4.0M	$26.8M	101.0%	4.2%	7
TEXAS DOW EMPLOYEES	Houston	TX	$1-10B	$5.10B	habitual seller	$3.9M	$31.6M	106.0%	2.7%	6
COMMODORE PERRY	OAK HARBOR	OH	$100-200M	$103.0M	habitual seller	$3.7M	$2.2M	79.0%	6.9%	2
FREEDOM	WARMINSTER	PA	$1-10B	$1.49B	habitual seller	$3.7M	$49.8M	60.0%	4.3%	2
TRI COUNTY AREA	POTTSTOWN	PA	$200-500M	$210.4M	habitual seller	$3.6M	$99K	59.0%	4.7%	1
JERSEY SHORE	Northfield	NJ	$200-500M	$247.1M	sold this quarter	$3.5M	$1.5M	56.0%	-0.3%	0
MONROE COMMUNITY	Monroe	MI	$200-500M	$404.4M	habitual seller	$3.4M	$4.4M	74.0%	3.7%	1
SENTINEL	BOX ELDER	SD	$100-200M	$197.0M	habitual seller	$3.1M	$5.8M	72.0%	1.6%	0
IRCO COMMUNITY	Phillipsburg	NJ	$50-100M	$94.6M	sold this quarter	$2.9M	$140K	60.0%	0.7%	1
MICHIGAN FIRST	Lathrup Village	MI	$1-10B	$1.50B	habitual seller	$2.8M	$17.9M	96.0%	-0.2%	6
GREAT LAKES	BANNOCKBURN	IL	$1-10B	$1.44B	habitual seller	$2.8M	$20.5M	87.0%	-3.8%	6
ORANGE COUNTY'S	Santa Ana	CA	$1-10B	$3.07B	sold this quarter	$2.7M	$8.3M	93.0%	–	2
VUE COMMUNITY	BISMARCK	ND	$100-200M	$105.3M	sold this quarter	$2.7M	$677K	61.0%	2.7%	1
COMMUNITY SOUTH	Chipley	FL	$200-500M	$239.1M	habitual seller	$2.7M	$1.4M	87.0%	-1.4%	1
MAINE SAVINGS	Hampden	ME	$500M-1B	$852.0M	habitual seller	$2.6M	$57.8M	86.0%	6.7%	2
MAINSTREET	Lenexa	KS	$500M-1B	$693.6M	habitual seller	$2.6M	$2.0M	63.0%	3.3%	1
UMASSFIVE COLLEGE	Hadley	MA	$500M-1B	$712.5M	sold this quarter	$2.5M	$607K	85.0%	3.2%	0
COLORADO	Littleton	CO	$200-500M	$439.5M	habitual seller	$2.4M	$8.7M	85.0%	5.0%	1
HUDSON VALLEY	Poughkeepsie	NY	$1-10B	$8.11B	sold this quarter	$2.3M	$25.4M	68.0%	–	1
OMNI COMMUNITY	Battle Creek	MI	$500M-1B	$652.6M	habitual seller	$2.2M	$12.2M	66.0%	7.6%	2
UNITED TELETECH FINANCIAL	TINTON FALLS	NJ	$200-500M	$329.8M	habitual seller	$2.2M	$6.6M	88.0%	-1.4%	1
TOPLINE FINANCIAL	Maple Grove	MN	$1-10B	$1.15B	habitual seller	$2.1M	$896K	90.0%	3.5%	1
FIRST COMMUNITY	Jamestown	ND	$1-10B	$1.53B	habitual seller	$2.1M	$37.4M	95.0%	3.5%	2
CHOICE ONE COMMUNITY	Plains Township	PA	$100-200M	$131.4M	sold this quarter	$2.0M	$348K	64.0%	1.1%	3
DANNEMORA	PLATTSBURGH	NY	$200-500M	$319.7M	sold this quarter	$2.0M	$499K	76.0%	5.9%	1
FOOTHILLS	Wheat Ridge	CO	$100-200M	$163.3M	habitual seller	$2.0M	$4.1M	80.0%	1.6%	1
MAINE HIGHLANDS	Dexter	ME	$200-500M	$226.6M	habitual seller	$2.0M	$2.9M	69.0%	6.1%	1
AMERICA'S FIRST NETWORK	East Hartford	CT	$100-200M	$105.8M	sold this quarter	$1.8M	$460K	67.0%	17.6%	0
SHORELINE	Two Rivers	WI	$100-200M	$153.1M	sold this quarter	$1.8M	$1.0M	94.0%	8.7%	3
UTILITIES EMPLOYEES	READING	PA	$1-10B	$1.51B	habitual seller	$1.8M	$28.4M	63.0%	0.1%	1
BRIDGE	Powell	OH	$200-500M	$256.2M	habitual seller	$1.8M	$49K	73.0%	8.9%	2
CAPITAL	Green Bay	WI	$1-10B	$2.84B	habitual seller	$1.7M	$13.3M	99.0%	8.1%	3
HAWAII COMMUNITY	Kailua Kona	HI	$500M-1B	$805.0M	habitual seller	$1.6M	$646K	56.0%	3.6%	1
EAST COUNTY SCHOOLS	EL CAJON	CA	$100-200M	$147.5M	habitual seller	$1.4M	$179K	58.0%	3.2%	1
AMERICAN PARTNERS	Reidsville	NC	$100-200M	$106.6M	habitual seller	$1.4M	$1.3M	84.0%	-3.8%	1
CYPRUS	West Jordan	UT	$1-10B	$2.07B	habitual seller	$1.3M	$3.9M	103.0%	12.3%	3
GRASSLANDS	CIRCLE	MT	$100-200M	$139.5M	habitual seller	$1.3M	$2.1M	60.0%	16.9%	1
UNITED	Mexico	MO	$200-500M	$303.7M	habitual seller	$1.2M	$34K	71.0%	0.8%	2
FAMILY TRUST	Rock Hill	SC	$500M-1B	$804.3M	habitual seller	$1.2M	$15.2M	93.0%	3.7%	1
ANCORUM	Bath	ME	$200-500M	$405.7M	habitual seller	$1.1M	$30.2M	79.0%	1.2%	2
CORNER POST	Wilkes Barre	PA	$50-100M	$98.5M	habitual seller	$1.1M	$30K	32.0%	-1.1%	1
SUN	Maumee	OH	$500M-1B	$671.0M	habitual seller	$1.0M	$10.4M	87.0%	3.2%	1
ILLINOIS EDUCATORS	Springfield	IL	$100-200M	$121.4M	sold this quarter	$1.0M	$912K	93.0%	10.7%	5
LEVO	Sioux Falls	SD	$500M-1B	$526.6M	habitual seller	$947K	$503K	70.0%	3.5%	3
ZEAL	Livonia	MI	$1-10B	$1.05B	habitual seller	$932K	$3.6M	85.0%	22.4%	2
DUBOIS-PIKE	JASPER	IN	<$50M	$48.3M	habitual seller	$800K	$22K	79.0%	2.8%	2
HOPE	JACKSON	MS	$500M-1B	$867.3M	habitual seller	$768K	$19.7M	89.0%	39.6%	5
GAS AND ELECTRIC	ROCK ISLAND	IL	$100-200M	$132.0M	habitual seller	$690K	$19K	72.0%	4.3%	1
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY	Camp Hill	PA	$50-100M	$86.5M	habitual seller	$633K	$233K	60.0%	-0.2%	2
ALLIANCE	Fenton	MO	$200-500M	$422.0M	habitual seller	$614K	$254K	103.0%	12.6%	5
EXPLORERS	YANKTON	SD	$100-200M	$112.6M	habitual seller	$582K	$239K	66.0%	3.4%	0
OXFORD	MEXICO	ME	$200-500M	$370.2M	habitual seller	$564K	$8.2M	72.0%	4.8%	0
LEADING EDGE	Worthington	MN	$100-200M	$146.0M	habitual seller	$538K	$1.5M	81.0%	1.2%	1
EATON FAMILY	Euclid	OH	$50-100M	$78.4M	habitual seller	$520K	$4.9M	77.0%	3.2%	4
ST. PAUL	Saint Paul	MN	$200-500M	$261.6M	habitual seller	$475K	$89K	86.0%	0.7%	1
PENINSULA	Escanaba	MI	$200-500M	$358.8M	habitual seller	$425K	$1.4M	87.0%	6.8%	2
CENTURY HERITAGE	PITTSBURGH	PA	$200-500M	$288.0M	habitual seller	$400K	$3.7M	73.0%	0.2%	2
MEMBERSOURCE	Houston	TX	$200-500M	$205.4M	habitual seller	$382K	$164K	79.0%	10.7%	3
CAPITAL	Bismarck	ND	$500M-1B	$907.8M	habitual seller	$341K	$55.0M	89.0%	7.8%	2
CREDIT UNION OF DENVER	LAKEWOOD	CO	$1-10B	$1.19B	habitual seller	$320K	$6.8M	72.0%	-1.5%	1
CODE	Dayton	OH	$100-200M	$176.7M	habitual seller	$302K	$8K	65.0%	2.7%	1
FAMILY FIRST OF NY	ROCHESTER	NY	$200-500M	$340.2M	habitual seller	$280K	$16.6M	110.0%	6.8%	2
ADVANCED FINANCIAL	NEW PROVIDENCE	NJ	$100-200M	$108.5M	habitual seller	$231K	$28K	57.0%	-0.8%	2
DAKOTALAND	Huron	SD	$500M-1B	$739.6M	habitual seller	$223K	$234K	75.0%	3.4%	1
FIRELANDS	Bellevue	OH	$500M-1B	$569.5M	habitual seller	$218K	$3.4M	66.0%	9.3%	1
UNITED POLES	PERTH AMBOY	NJ	$50-100M	$72.7M	habitual seller	$217K	$86K	89.0%	8.0%	5
VALLEY ISLE COMMUNITY	Kahului	HI	$100-200M	$173.1M	habitual seller	$200K	$6.4M	38.0%	6.7%	1
COMMUNITY RESOURCE	Latham	NY	$100-200M	$119.8M	habitual seller	$190K	$233K	87.0%	4.3%	1
EXPEDITION	Mendota Heights	MN	$200-500M	$225.6M	habitual seller	$163K	$201K	57.0%	-3.1%	3
CAMPBELL	Maple Shade	NJ	$100-200M	$140.7M	habitual seller	$155K	$112K	48.0%	-4.5%	2
PARK VIEW	Harrisonburg	VA	$200-500M	$406.5M	habitual seller	$122K	$11.7M	92.0%	1.8%	1
MISSOURI BAPTIST	Jefferson City	MO	<$50M	$10.5M	habitual seller	$107K	$3K	75.0%	13.7%	5
LOWER EAST SIDE PEOPLE'S	NEW YORK	NY	$50-100M	$90.3M	sold this quarter	$96K	$465K	84.0%	0.2%	5
RIEGEL	Milford	NJ	$100-200M	$169.2M	habitual seller	$86K	$65K	30.0%	2.5%	3
GARDEN SAVINGS	PARSIPPANY	NJ	$200-500M	$494.8M	habitual seller	$83K	$883K	83.0%	-3.9%	5
SOMERVILLE MUNICIPAL	Somerville	MA	$50-100M	$50.8M	habitual seller	$77K	$23K	58.0%	-3.0%	2
MIAMI POSTAL SERVICE	Miami	FL	$100-200M	$192.9M	habitual seller	$74K	$15K	66.0%	0.8%	3
FASNY	ALBANY	NY	<$50M	$17.4M	habitual seller	$66K	$0	57.0%	4.5%	1
MEMBERS 1ST	Saint Louis	MO	$50-100M	$75.0M	habitual seller	$60K	$277K	73.0%	8.4%	1
CLASS ACT	Louisville	KY	$200-500M	$352.3M	habitual seller	$50K	$388K	76.0%	5.5%	0
HOPEWELL	Heath	OH	$100-200M	$168.6M	habitual seller	$38K	$445K	72.0%	8.1%	3
AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN	Glendora	CA	$500M-1B	$818.4M	habitual seller	$26K	$66.6M	86.0%	17.0%	3
ELIZABETH (N.J.) FIREMEN'S	Elizabeth	NJ	<$50M	$7.2M	sold this quarter	$24K	$0	33.0%	-1.9%	3
HEARTLAND	Springfield	IL	$500M-1B	$574.6M	habitual seller	$22K	$13K	77.0%	9.4%	3
SOUTHBRIDGE	Southbridge	MA	$200-500M	$242.3M	habitual seller	$22K	$2.4M	83.0%	4.9%	3
GATEWAY METRO	Saint Louis	MO	$100-200M	$177.1M	habitual seller	$15K	$23K	59.0%	1.5%	8
EAST RIVER	Madison	SD	<$50M	$41.6M	habitual seller	$14K	$387	43.0%	3.6%	4
LIMESTONE FINANCIAL	Manistique	MI	$50-100M	$81.1M	habitual seller	$13K	$356	88.0%	3.7%	1
CITY	Independence	MO	$50-100M	$64.4M	habitual seller	$12K	$650K	69.0%	7.3%	4
BAPTIST HEALTH SOUTH FLORIDA	Miami	FL	$100-200M	$135.8M	habitual seller	$8K	$90K	82.0%	6.2%	2
CRANBERRY	West Wareham	MA	$50-100M	$62.7M	sold this quarter	$7K	$2K	73.0%	-2.7%	2
CREDIT UNION OF AMERICA	Wichita	KS	$1-10B	$1.83B	habitual seller	$5K	$130	100.0%	7.7%	3
SUPERIOR CHOICE	Superior	WI	$500M-1B	$725.8M	pressure	$0	$19.9M	83.0%	-0.3%	5
UNITY CATHOLIC	Parma	OH	$50-100M	$98.7M	pressure	$0	$7K	70.0%	3.4%	3
CALHOUN LIBERTY	Blountstown	FL	$100-200M	$172.6M	habitual seller	$0	$786K	87.0%	2.2%	0
INOVA	Elkhart	IN	$500M-1B	$658.1M	loans exceed shares	$0	$1.1M	114.0%	-7.5%	4
CSE	Lake Charles	LA	$200-500M	$455.9M	pressure	$0	$1.5M	67.0%	-1.6%	1
JEANNE D'ARC	Lowell	MA	$1-10B	$2.19B	loans exceed shares	$0	$0	102.0%	-4.1%	2
ADVENTHEALTH	Altamonte Sprin	FL	$100-200M	$126.8M	habitual seller	$0	$478K	89.0%	6.4%	1
BRIGHTSTAR	Fort Lauderdale	FL	$1-10B	$1.01B	habitual seller	$0	$54.6M	104.0%	3.4%	3
VALLEYSTAR	Martinsville	VA	$500M-1B	$518.0M	deposits shrinking	$0	$700K	86.0%	-10.6%	7
1ST UNIVERSITY	Waco	TX	<$50M	$17.8M	habitual seller	$0	$1.5M	82.0%	1.1%	3
SPACE COAST	Melbourne	FL	$1-10B	$9.29B	habitual seller	$0	$10.1M	94.0%	6.4%	2
COMMUNITY FIRST CREDIT UNION OF FLO	JACKSONVILLE	FL	$1-10B	$3.17B	habitual seller	$0	$19.2M	82.0%	12.8%	2
COASTAL1	Pawtucket	RI	$1-10B	$3.47B	loans exceed shares	$0	$10.7M	107.0%	4.4%	3
WESTERLY COMMUNITY	Wakefield	RI	$500M-1B	$511.4M	pressure	$0	$974K	92.0%	2.4%	3
DESERT VALLEYS	Ridgecrest	CA	$50-100M	$89.4M	pressure	$0	$750K	54.0%	8.6%	2
ACCESS COMMUNITY	Amarillo	TX	$200-500M	$206.5M	loans exceed shares	$0	$4.7M	110.0%	1.1%	2
SARATOGA'S COMMUNITY	Saratoga Spring	NY	$50-100M	$59.2M	pressure	$0	$532K	90.0%	4.3%	2
EDUCATION	Amarillo	TX	$200-500M	$474.0M	pressure	$0	$1.3M	92.0%	3.3%	4
STAR OF TEXAS	austin	TX	$50-100M	$68.3M	loans exceed shares	$0	$0	100.0%	1.2%	2
ATLANTIC REGIONAL	South Portland	ME	$1-10B	$1.08B	habitual seller	$0	$28.3M	76.0%	0.9%	0
OMEGA	Wexford	PA	$100-200M	$182.2M	pressure	$0	$3.4M	77.0%	3.1%	2
NAVEO	SOMERVILLE	MA	$100-200M	$174.6M	habitual seller	$0	$5.7M	72.0%	-0.7%	4
MASS. INSTITUTE OF TECH.	Lexington	MA	$500M-1B	$743.0M	habitual seller	$0	$612K	80.0%	2.5%	1
GULF COAST	CORPUS CHRISTI	TX	$200-500M	$264.9M	deposits shrinking	$0	$32K	96.0%	-14.9%	9
CHIEF FINANCIAL	Rochester Hills	MI	$200-500M	$255.5M	habitual seller	$0	$5.0M	79.0%	7.6%	3
SMART FINANCIAL	Houston	TX	$500M-1B	$805.8M	pressure	$0	$17.8M	83.0%	0.1%	0
LONG BEACH FIREMEN S	Long Beach	CA	$200-500M	$204.3M	deposits shrinking	$0	$0	94.0%	-2.9%	1
WORKMEN'S CIRCLE INCORPORATED	Savannah	GA	$100-200M	$135.9M	habitual seller	$0	$588K	99.0%	9.3%	1
HOLYOKE	Holyoke	MA	$200-500M	$299.4M	pressure	$0	$1.6M	81.0%	4.3%	2
CHAMPIONS FIRST	Tallahassee	FL	$500M-1B	$535.8M	habitual seller	$0	$10.5M	87.0%	5.7%	2
CITY OF BOSTON	South Boston	MA	$500M-1B	$546.2M	deposits shrinking	$0	$82K	80.0%	-3.4%	5
DOWNRIVER COMMUNITY	Ecorse	MI	$100-200M	$193.5M	pressure	$0	$0	39.0%	0.1%	1
LIBERTY BAY	Braintree	MA	$500M-1B	$839.9M	loans exceed shares	$0	$8.3M	109.0%	5.3%	2
FREMONT	Fremont	OH	$200-500M	$385.6M	habitual seller	$0	$2.4M	76.0%	9.3%	1
KAUAI	Lihue	HI	$100-200M	$197.7M	loans exceed shares	$0	$2.7M	107.0%	2.0%	7
CITY	AMARILLO	TX	$50-100M	$84.8M	deposits shrinking	$0	$3.7M	95.0%	-20.6%	7
Y-12	Oak Ridge	TN	$1-10B	$2.77B	loans exceed shares	$0	$22.3M	100.0%	24.8%	4

---

## Participation Desk · Method

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/participation-desk/#method · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/participation-desk/method.md

FIELD MAP
FIGURE	NCUA ACCOUNT CODES
Purchased / sold year-to-date, all types	690 / 691 (FS220C)
Outstanding purchased / sold-retained	691L / 691N (FS220G)
By collateral type, flows	SL0037-SL0059 (FS220Q)
Participation charge-offs / recoveries	550F / 551F (FS220C)
Context ratios	025B/018 loans-to-shares · 997 net worth · risk score from the cu-intel panel
HONESTY NOTES

Counterparties are never disclosed. This desk shows each institution's own filed activity. It cannot and does not say who traded with whom.

Flows are annualized from year-to-date figures (Q1 x4, Q2 x2, Q3 x4/3, Q4 x1). First-quarter run rates are the noisiest.

Reconciliation. Outstanding purchased (691L) totals $68.2B at 2026-03 for federally insured filers. NCUA's chart pack shows $84.9B for all participation categories; the difference sits in commercial construction-and-development and related fields outside 691L's type splits. Our figure is the conservative floor.

A screen is a question. "Likely seller" means the filings show pressure or habit, not intent. Population: federally insured credit unions only (4,250 at 2026-03); privately insured filers are excluded.

Refresh: run NCUA Analysis/tools/build_participation.py after each new quarterly zip lands, bump DV in this file, redeploy.

---

## Participation Desk · What it means

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/participation-desk/#meaning · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/participation-desk/meaning.md

READING THE DESK

Every figure here is something an institution filed about itself on the 5300. The desk lines those filings up so a market with no tape starts to look like one. This tab says what each figure means, where our thresholds sit, and where the data stops.

Purchased vs sold flow, annualized
Accounts 690 and 691, year-to-date, scaled to a full year by cycle.
MEANS
How much participation paper the institution bought and how much it sold, expressed as a yearly run rate.
WHEN HIGH
A large buy figure is a balance-sheet strategy: the CU cannot originate enough and is renting other lenders' production. A large sell figure is a funding or concentration strategy: it originates more than it can hold.
WHEN LOW
Zero on both sides is the norm. Roughly 2,300 of 4,250 insured filers show no participation activity at all.
VS PEERS
Compare inside the asset band. A $500M CU buying $50M a year is at 10% of assets, which is aggressive; the same figure at a $5B CU is routine.
OUR LINE
Q1 figures are x4
The 2026-03 run rate is a first quarter multiplied by four. One large trade in January reads as four. Treat Q1 rates as direction, not size, until the Q2 filing halves the multiplier.
LIMITS
Year-to-date resets every January, so a CU that sold heavily in Q4 and paused in Q1 appears to have stopped. The 8-quarter activity count (bq, sq) on each CU page is the steadier habit signal.
Outstanding purchased as % of net worth
Account 691L divided by net worth (997).
MEANS
How much of the institution's capital is exposed to loans it did not originate and does not service.
WHEN HIGH
Above 100% of net worth, the purchased book alone could consume all capital in a severe loss scenario. Above 25% at a small CU, the 701.22 due-diligence obligation (independent credit review of every pool, ongoing monitoring of the originator) exceeds what a two- or three-person lending staff can actually perform.
WHEN LOW
Small or zero: the CU is either a seller, inactive, or has let purchased pools run off.
VS PEERS
The median active buyer carries roughly 57% of net worth in purchased paper. The stressed-books sheet is the tail above that, weighted by loss rate and the cu-intel score.
OUR LINE
25% of NW at a small CU is a flag; 100% anywhere is hot
The cell turns hot at 100%. The stressed sheet weights % of NW alongside participation NCO and the cu-intel score.
LIMITS
691L excludes some commercial construction-and-development categories, so the true purchased exposure can be higher than shown. It is a floor.
Sold, retained servicing
Account 691N: participations sold where the CU still services the loan.
MEANS
The stock of loans the institution originated, sold pieces of, and continues to collect on. It is the footprint of a seller's program.
WHEN HIGH
A large retained-servicing balance means selling is a program, not an event. The CU has counterparty relationships, a pool-assembly routine, and probably a standing appetite for buyers.
WHEN LOW
Near zero with a nonzero sell figure means the CU sold servicing-released or sold once. The habit is unproven.
VS PEERS
Retained servicing at 5% to 10% of assets marks a committed seller in most bands.
OUR LINE
Retained servicing plus sold in 6+ of last 8 quarters = habitual seller
This pairing is the core of the likely-sellers sheet. Pressure signals (loans/shares, share decline) rank sellers within it.
LIMITS
The field does not say what collateral was sold or to how many buyers. A single-counterparty program and a ten-buyer program look identical.
Participation NCO, annualized
Accounts 550F less 551F, over the purchased balance.
MEANS
Net charge-offs on purchased participations as a yearly rate on the purchased book.
WHEN HIGH
Above 2% the cell turns red. The system rate is 0.56% at 2026-03, and participation losses have run above the overall loan book through 2025. A buyer well above system is holding pools whose originator underwrote worse than the buyer's own members.
WHEN LOW
Zero or negative (recoveries exceed charge-offs) on a large book is a clean read, or a book too young to have seasoned.
VS PEERS
System 0.56% is the yardstick. Indirect auto and unsecured consumer pools carry most of the excess.
OUR LINE
Above 2% is bad; above system on a book over 50% of NW is the surveillance pitch
Independent pool-level surveillance is the second product this data supports, and this cell is where the conversation starts.
LIMITS
Small purchased books produce noisy rates: one charged-off pool on a $2M balance reads as a catastrophe. Read the dollar figure alongside the rate.
Loans / shares
Account 025B over 018, the standard liquidity ratio.
MEANS
How fully member deposits are already lent out. It is the seller pressure line on this desk.
WHEN HIGH
Above 90% the CU has little room to fund new loans from deposits. Above 100% it is borrowing or selling to fund production. Paired with a share decline, it is the profile of an institution that needs to sell paper soon.
WHEN LOW
Below 70% the CU is deposit-rich and loan-poor, which is the buyer profile: it has liquidity to deploy and nowhere internal to put it.
VS PEERS
The median participation-active CU runs about 76%. A CU 15 points above its band median is under pressure; 15 below is a natural buyer.
OUR LINE
Loans/shares above 90% plus shares falling YoY = seller pressure
Habitual sellers under pressure rank highest on the sellers sheet. Buyers below 70% rank highest on the buyers sheet.
LIMITS
A high ratio can be deliberate at a well-capitalized CU with wholesale funding. The ratio says pressure exists, not that management feels it.
Buyer : seller imbalance
Count of institutions filing any purchase vs any sale in the cycle.
MEANS
How many active buyers there are for each active seller. At 2026-03: 747 buyers, 263 sellers, 2.8 to 1.
WHEN HIGH
A wide ratio means supply is the scarce side. Sellers set terms; buyers compete for pools and accept thinner due diligence to win them. That is the condition that produces the stressed-books tail.
WHEN LOW
A ratio near 1:1 would mean a balanced market. It has not been near 1:1 in the filings we hold.
VS PEERS
The Q1 count is smaller on both sides than the Q4 count (1079 vs 435 at 2025-12) because a quarter of activity is a shorter window; the ratio is the stable read.
OUR LINE
2.8:1 means the seller is the call to make
Anyone with access to sellers has the scarce product. That is why the likely-sellers sheet leads.
LIMITS
Counts, not dollars. A CU buying $1M once counts the same as VyStar. The dollar flows above give the size.
THREE CALL-SHEET ROWS YOU WILL MEET
THE HABITUAL SELLER

Sells every quarter, retains servicing, buys nothing. Liberty (Evansville, IN) sold at a $1.32B annualized rate at 2026-03, in 8 of the last 8 quarters, with $373M of sold-retained servicing and loans/shares at 101%. This could be a production engine that funds itself through the participation market.

What the row supports: a buyer introduction, or pool surveillance for the buyers already taking its paper.

THE TWO-SIDED INSTITUTION

Buys and sells in size in the same year. VyStar (Jacksonville, FL) bought $876M and sold $646M annualized, and carries $1.15B of purchased paper outstanding, 93.7% of net worth. It is reshaping its book by collateral type, not raising liquidity.

What the row supports: the outstanding-to-net-worth figure is where the surveillance conversation starts, and the two-sided flow means it knows the market from both chairs.

THE HEAVY SMALL HOLDER

Under $250M in assets, no sales, a purchased book above 25% of net worth, bought in bursts rather than every quarter. The 701.22 obligation to review and monitor every pool sits on a lending staff of two or three. The participation NCO on these books is usually zero, which means unseasoned rather than clean.

What the row supports: this is the stressed-books sheet, and the pitch is outsourced pool review rather than more paper.

WHAT THE DESK CANNOT SAY

Counterparties are never disclosed. No 5300 field names who bought from whom. A seller and a buyer in the same state with matching collateral and matching quarter is a coincidence until someone confirms it. The desk never draws that line and neither should a call script.

Intent is not observable. A "likely seller" is an institution whose filings show habit or pressure. Whether management wants to sell next quarter, at what price, or to whom, is not in the data. The sheets rank the probability that a call is worth making, nothing more.

Timing is coarse. Quarterly filings arrive roughly two months after quarter end. A pool sold in April appears in the Q2 filing in late August. Anything the desk shows is at least one trade cycle old.

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · Filers

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#board · text route: https://getbookiq.com/filers

All models
auto-bank
auto-bhph
auto-captive
auto-indirect
auto-retail
bnpl
card-bank
card-retail
consumer-secured
fintech-bank
fintech-marketplace
lease-to-own
personal-installment
retail-credit
All credit tiers
Prime
Near-prime
Subprime
Mixed
Live + departed
Live only
Departed only
Any score
Score ≥ 2
Score ≥ 4
Score ≥ 6
THE SCISSORS
RESERVE BLEED
SOLVENCY STRAIN
PAST DUE RISING
RESTATED
AUTO ONLY
26 of 26 filers · 3 departed on this tape
TICKER	COMPANY	TIER	MODEL	LATEST	BOOK	ALLOW %	PAST DUE %	NCO % ANN	PROV/NCO	EQUITY %	BOOK YOY	SCORE ▼	
CRMT	America's Car-Mart, Inc.	SUBPRIME	auto-bhph	2026-04-30	$1.82B	18.11%	–	30.21%	0.66x	31.4%	-6.4%	10	LIVE
CURO	CURO Group Holdings Corp.	SUBPRIME	personal-installment	2023-09-30	$1.25B	15.92%	–	–	–	-22.4%	-33.8%	6	DEPARTED
ATLC	Atlanticus Holdings Corp.	SUBPRIME	card-retail	2026-06-30	$99.6M	3.71%	1.81%	–	–	9.3%	-6.6%	4	LIVE
PRG	PROG Holdings, Inc.	SUBPRIME	lease-to-own	2026-06-30	–	–	–	–	1.07x	39.3%	–	4	LIVE
WRLD	World Acceptance Corp.	SUBPRIME	personal-installment	2026-06-30	$1.29B	8.70%	–	13.46%	1.01x	33.6%	2.3%	4	LIVE
SYF	Synchrony Financial	NEAR-PRIME	card-bank	2026-06-30	$102.21B	10.09%	1.98%	5.39%	0.88x	13.9%	2.4%	3	LIVE
COF	Capital One Financial Corp.	MIXED	card-bank	2026-03-31	$447.75B	5.28%	1.11%	4.83%	0.75x	16.4%	38.4%	2	LIVE
CONN	Conn's, Inc.	SUBPRIME	retail-credit	2024-01-31	$992.3M	18.07%	8.23%	–	–	17.8%	-3.2%	2	DEPARTED
HAPN	Happen Inc. (formerly LendingClub)	PRIME	fintech-bank	2026-06-30	$3.19B	6.05%	–	1.45%	-0.87x	12.5%	-27.4%	2	LIVE
ALLY	Ally Financial Inc.	PRIME	auto-bank	2026-06-30	$143.67B	2.49%	–	1.11%	1.09x	7.8%	7.8%	1	LIVE
BFH	Bread Financial Holdings, Inc.	NEAR-PRIME	card-retail	2026-06-30	$18.06B	11.49%	–	5.17%	1.35x	15.0%	4.6%	1	LIVE
CPSS	Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc.	SUBPRIME	auto-indirect	2026-06-30	–	–	–	–	–	7.2%	–	1	LIVE
AFRM	Affirm Holdings, Inc.	MIXED	bnpl	2026-06-30	$9.58B	5.88%	0.67%	7.49%	1.31x	34.7%	35.8%	0	LIVE
CACC	Credit Acceptance Corp.	SUBPRIME	auto-indirect	2026-06-30	$11.61B	31.44%	–	–	–	18.4%	0.4%	0	LIVE
CVNA	Carvana Co.	MIXED	auto-retail	2026-06-30	–	–	–	–	–	27.7%	–	0	LIVE
ENVA	Enova International, Inc.	SUBPRIME	personal-installment	2026-06-30	–	–	–	–	–	20.7%	–	0	LIVE
KMX	CarMax, Inc.	PRIME	auto-captive	2026-05-31	$16.10B	2.95%	–	1.82%	1.30x	23.0%	-6.2%	0	LIVE
MFIN	Medallion Financial Corp.	SUBPRIME	consumer-secured	2026-06-30	$100.9M	–	0.00%	–	1.37x	15.8%	-95.9%	0	LIVE
NICK	Nicholas Financial / Old Market Capital	SUBPRIME	auto-indirect	2025-09-30	–	–	–	–	–	66.3%	–	0	DEPARTED
OMF	OneMain Holdings, Inc.	NEAR-PRIME	personal-installment	2026-03-31	$24.45B	11.53%	–	8.30%	0.91x	12.5%	4.8%	0	LIVE
OPFI	OppFi Inc.	SUBPRIME	personal-installment	2026-06-30	–	–	–	–	–	53.8%	–	0	LIVE
OPRT	Oportun Financial Corp.	NEAR-PRIME	personal-installment	2026-06-30	–	–	–	–	–	13.0%	–	0	LIVE
RM	Regional Management Corp.	SUBPRIME	personal-installment	2026-06-30	$2.15B	10.43%	–	12.14%	1.07x	17.8%	9.6%	0	LIVE
SOFI	SoFi Technologies, Inc.	PRIME	fintech-bank	2026-06-30	$1.33B	4.24%	–	–	–	18.2%	-8.8%	0	LIVE
UPBD	Upbound Group, Inc.	SUBPRIME	lease-to-own	2026-06-30	–	–	–	–	–	23.6%	–	0	LIVE
UPST	Upstart Holdings, Inc.	NEAR-PRIME	fintech-marketplace	2026-06-30	$1.06B	–	–	–	–	25.1%	–	0	LIVE

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · The Market

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#market · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/market.md · https://getbookiq.com/intel/data/index.json

One picture of what is actually moving, built from every loan on every tape in this room and aggregated the way the public segment trackers do it: prime against subprime, balance-weighted, by calendar month. The difference is that these lines decompose. Every aggregate here can be opened to the deal, the month, and the bucket migration underneath it. Coverage right now: 10 subprime and 19 prime deal(s) on tape in the latest month; the lines describe the deals on tape, not the whole market, and they will thicken as shelves are added.
THE LATEST MONTH, SIDE BY SIDE
SUBPRIME 60+, REPORTED
8.10%
SUBPRIME 60+, EXT-ADJUSTED
24.93%
PRIME 60+, REPORTED
0.73%
PRIME 60+, EXT-ADJUSTED
1.46%
SUBPRIME EXTENSION STOCK
18.95%
PRIME EXTENSION STOCK
0.75%
SUBPRIME CO, 3M ANN.
9.49%
PRIME CO, 3M ANN.
1.06%
SUBPRIME CURRENT-TO-30+ ROLL
7.68%
PRIME CURRENT-TO-30+ ROLL
1.04%
THE SPREAD THAT TELLS THE STORY
60+ DELINQUENCY, REPORTED: SUBPRIME (AMBER) VS PRIME (BLUE)
0.0
3.1
6.1
9.2
21-01
22-04
23-07
24-10
25-11
26-07
SUBPRIME 60+: REPORTED (AMBER) VS EXTENSION-ADJUSTED (RED)
0.0
9.7
19.5
29.2
21-01
22-03
23-05
24-07
25-09
26-07
EXTENSION STOCK, TRAILING 6M SHARE OF POOL
0.0
7.8
15.6
23.4
21-01
22-04
23-07
24-10
25-11
26-07
NET CHARGE-OFFS, 3-MONTH ROLLING ANNUALIZED %
0.0
3.6
7.2
10.9
21-01
22-04
23-07
24-10
25-11
26-07
CURRENT-TO-30+ MONTHLY ROLL, MEDIAN DEAL %
0.0
3.1
6.2
9.2
21-02
22-05
23-08
24-11
25-11
26-07
BALANCE IN REPOSSESSION, % OF POOL
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
21-01
22-04
23-07
24-10
25-11
26-07
UNDERWRITING DRIFT: FIRST VS LATEST ORIGINATION COHORT PER DEAL
Weighted average original term, share of origination balance over 72 months, score and loan size, each loan counted once at first appearance. A securitized pool is a selected slice, so this is drift in what was securitized; it usually tracks what was originated but is not identical to it.
DEAL	TIER	COHORTS	WA TERM, MO	OVER 72MO	WA SCORE	WA LOAN SIZE
ALLYA-2022-1	prime	2015 → 2022	85.3 → 70.1	100% → 72%	726 → 713	$40K → $27K
ALLYA-2023-1	prime	2017 → 2023	76.8 → 70.3	100% → 73%	709 → 734	$32K → $26K
ALLYA-2024-1	prime	2017 → 2023	83.1 → 71.1	100% → 76%	717 → 738	$39K → $27K
ALLYA-2025-1	prime	2018 → 2025	83.6 → 71.4	100% → 80%	701 → 746	$40K → $27K
AMCAR-2021-1	subprime	2015 → 2020	73.3 → 72.8	98% → 92%	576 → 589	$23K → $24K
AMCAR-2023-1	subprime	2019 → 2022	84.2 → 74.6	100% → 93%	575 → 592	$30K → $29K
AMCAR-2024-1	subprime	2018 → 2024	74.2 → 75.9	100% → 93%	584 → 589	$24K → $28K
BLAST-2025-1	subprime	2019 → 2024	69.6 → 70.8	0% → 0%	554 → 551	$19K → $23K
CARMX-2021-1	prime	2015 → 2020	72.7 → 67.7	91% → 49%	657 → 712	$22K → $20K
CARMX-2022-1	prime	2016 → 2021	71.1 → 67.0	38% → 23%	684 → 708	$21K → $25K
CARMX-2023-1	prime	2017 → 2022	71.6 → 66.6	42% → 21%	691 → 716	$21K → $27K
CARMX-2024-1	prime	2018 → 2023	71.4 → 65.4	41% → 17%	701 → 722	$21K → $25K
CARMX-2025-1	prime	2019 → 2024	71.4 → 66.5	45% → 22%	737 → 760	$22K → $24K
CRVNA-2021-P1	prime	2020 → 2021	69.6 → 69.7	8% → 9%	709 → 707	$20K → $20K
CRVNA-2022-P1	prime	2021 → 2022	70.9 → 70.8	11% → 12%	694 → 706	$25K → $26K
CRVNA-2024-P2	prime	2022 → 2024	71.9 → 72.3	30% → 45%	725 → 702	$25K → $25K
CRVNA-2025-P1	prime	2024 → 2025	72.1 → 72.6	36% → 49%	698 → 703	$22K → $25K
EART-2022-1	subprime	2016 → 2022	72.9 → 73.6	95% → 91%	517 → 554	$19K → $23K
EART-2023-1	subprime	2017 → 2023	73.0 → 74.1	95% → 86%	500 → 588	$19K → $20K
EART-2024-1	subprime	2018 → 2023	72.5 → 74.7	91% → 91%	514 → 591	$19K → $21K
EART-2025-1	subprime	2019 → 2025	72.8 → 75.1	93% → 88%	488 → 610	$19K → $22K
FORDO-2022-A	prime	2016 → 2021	73.4 → 65.4	97% → 51%	726 → 634	$34K → $42K
FORDO-2025-A	prime	2019 → 2025	73.8 → 66.1	100% → 51%	725 → 573	$42K → $53K
GMCAR-2021-1	prime	2015 → 2020	73.9 → 71.7	99% → 81%	725 → 770	$44K → $34K
GMCAR-2024-1	prime	2020 → 2023	84.2 → 68.3	98% → 62%	776 → 780	$44K → $41K
GMCAR-2025-1	prime	2020 → 2024	83.8 → 69.3	98% → 71%	782 → 776	$42K → $39K
HAROT-2022-1	prime	2016 → 2021	73.4 → 62.6	99% → 21%	709 → 778	$28K → $28K
HAROT-2025-1	prime	2019 → 2024	73.5 → 60.8	100% → 36%	731 → 774	$30K → $31K
HART-2022-A	prime	2017 → 2021	73.4 → 67.1	92% → 49%	718 → 757	$28K → $28K
HART-2025-A	prime	2020 → 2024	79.9 → 72.2	99% → 91%	748 → 760	$30K → $35K
NAROT-2022-A	prime	2016 → 2021	72.9 → 65.7	61% → 29%	802 → 782	$30K → $29K
NAROT-2025-A	prime	2019 → 2024	72.5 → 61.9	42% → 21%	774 → 795	$32K → $32K
SDART-2021-1	subprime	2015 → 2020	72.5 → 71.0	19% → 15%	541 → 567	$23K → $24K
SDART-2022-1	subprime	2016 → 2021	72.4 → 71.1	15% → 16%	581 → 570	$23K → $27K
SDART-2023-6	subprime	2018 → 2023	72.6 → 71.7	20% → 18%	634 → 536	$25K → $28K
SDART-2024-1	subprime	2017 → 2023	74.0 → 71.6	67% → 20%	698 → 540	$40K → $28K
SDART-2025-1	subprime	2019 → 2024	72.7 → 71.5	23% → 21%	629 → 522	$31K → $27K
TAOT-2022-A	prime	2016 → 2021	73.4 → 67.0	98% → 51%	767 → 764	$28K → $30K
TAOT-2025-A	prime	2019 → 2024	73.4 → 66.1	98% → 52%	760 → 774	$32K → $37K
VALET-2025-1	prime	2019 → 2024	70.1 → 65.0	0% → 3%	772 → 776	$33K → $36K
WOART-2021-A	prime	2015 → 2020	74.6 → 71.2	97% → 73%	704 → 747	$29K → $32K
WOART-2022-A	prime	2017 → 2021	73.3 → 70.2	87% → 72%	752 → 741	$29K → $33K
WOART-2024-A	prime	2019 → 2023	74.3 → 68.6	91% → 70%	730 → 754	$36K → $36K
WOART-2025-A	prime	2019 → 2024	74.9 → 69.2	97% → 74%	744 → 750	$31K → $38K
Reading order for the charts: the first shows the level gap between tiers. The second shows that in subprime the reported line and the extension-adjusted line are different curves, which is the masking finding. The third shows the tool doing the masking. The fourth shows losses catching up on a lag. The fifth is the earliest signal in the set: the monthly roll out of current, which extensions cannot flatter for long because re-rolled loans come straight back through it.

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · Deals

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#deals · text route: https://getbookiq.com/deals

DEAL	SHELF	AGE	INITIAL POOL	POOL FACTOR	CNL	BAND CNL	60+ REP	60+ ADJ	GAP BPS	EXT STOCK	RECOVERY	SCORE
EART-2023-1	Exeter Finance	42mo	$603.9M	22.9%	22.36%	1.48%	12.28%	38.45%	2617	32.0%	31.8%	7
AMCAR-2023-1	AmeriCredit / GM Financial	42mo	$1.38B	22.8%	7.27%	1.48%	4.05%	22.76%	1872	19.8%	43.5%	6
AMCAR-2024-1	AmeriCredit / GM Financial	27mo	$1.69B	40.1%	6.01%	1.48%	3.86%	28.69%	2483	26.5%	44.7%	6
EART-2022-1	Exeter Finance	54mo	$1.19B	8.3%	17.11%	4.70%	14.64%	39.26%	2462	30.5%	34.3%	6
EART-2024-1	Exeter Finance	31mo	$705.4M	38.5%	17.13%	1.52%	10.78%	38.06%	2728	32.9%	34.2%	6
EART-2025-1	Exeter Finance	19mo	$1.38B	61.2%	7.82%	0.82%	7.67%	32.79%	2512	29.0%	41.3%	6
SDART-2021-1	Santander Drive (DRIVE)	58mo	$2.24B	4.9%	4.77%	3.27%	12.10%	21.77%	967	10.7%	60.1%	6
SDART-2022-1	Santander Drive (DRIVE)	44mo	$2.50B	10.6%	7.34%	1.19%	10.67%	19.92%	924	10.3%	46.6%	6
SDART-2023-6	Santander Drive (DRIVE)	33mo	$1.11B	28.3%	9.35%	1.40%	9.96%	21.32%	1136	12.6%	45.3%	6
SDART-2024-1	Santander Drive (DRIVE)	31mo	$1.62B	29.9%	9.39%	1.52%	9.70%	20.75%	1105	12.1%	43.6%	6
SDART-2025-1	Santander Drive (DRIVE)	19mo	$2.27B	48.9%	5.70%	0.82%	7.99%	19.14%	1116	12.3%	42.8%	6
BLAST-2025-1	Bridgecrest (DriveTime)	19mo	$729.4M	57.7%	13.36%	0.82%	11.23%	11.25%	2	0.0%	32.1%	4
CARMX-2022-1	CarMax	50mo	$1.63B	9.8%	4.61%	2.02%	4.72%	4.73%	1	0.0%	30.4%	4
CARMX-2023-1	CarMax	41mo	$1.49B	16.2%	5.90%	1.72%	3.69%	3.69%	0	0.0%	27.8%	4
CARMX-2024-1	CarMax	31mo	$1.59B	29.0%	4.21%	1.52%	3.00%	3.00%	0	0.0%	27.2%	4
AMCAR-2021-1	AmeriCredit / GM Financial	52mo	$1.62B	9.7%	2.42%	2.71%	3.56%	18.62%	1506	15.8%	62.9%	3
CARMX-2021-1	CarMax	48mo	$1.51B	10.7%	2.70%	1.97%	3.09%	3.11%	2	0.0%	34.8%	3
CRVNA-2025-P1	Carvana	17mo	$608.3M	54.1%	0.94%	0.72%	1.44%	1.44%	0	0.0%	36.5%	3
GMCAR-2021-1	GM Financial prime	46mo	$1.61B	10.0%	0.22%	0.86%	0.55%	4.16%	361	3.8%	73.8%	3
GMCAR-2024-1	GM Financial prime	32mo	$1.69B	23.9%	0.57%	1.13%	0.55%	4.64%	409	4.3%	56.0%	3
GMCAR-2025-1	GM Financial prime	20mo	$1.68B	42.1%	0.43%	0.88%	0.40%	3.72%	332	3.5%	58.5%	3
HART-2022-A	Hyundai Capital America	50mo	$1.61B	6.4%	0.86%	2.02%	0.95%	5.58%	463	4.8%	54.9%	3
HART-2025-A	Hyundai Capital America	18mo	$2.23B	48.9%	0.76%	0.76%	0.43%	3.94%	351	3.6%	42.2%	3
ALLYA-2025-1	Ally Bank	11mo	$1.15B	60.4%	0.34%	0.41%	0.65%	0.65%	0	0.0%	4.8%	2
CRVNA-2024-P2	Carvana	27mo	$302.5M	67.7%	2.62%	1.48%	1.52%	1.53%	1	0.0%	41.1%	2
VALET-2025-1	VW Credit	17mo	$1.45B	48.6%	1.08%	0.72%	0.32%	0.33%	1	0.0%	56.4%	2
ALLYA-2022-1	Ally Bank	46mo	$1.11B	8.8%	0.58%	0.86%	1.40%	1.40%	1	0.0%	17.7%	1
ALLYA-2023-1	Ally Bank	38mo	$1.62B	13.6%	0.85%	1.31%	1.65%	1.65%	0	0.0%	7.9%	1
ALLYA-2024-1	Ally Bank	30mo	$1.14B	23.9%	0.99%	1.22%	1.24%	1.27%	3	0.0%	8.6%	1
CARMX-2025-1	CarMax	19mo	$1.55B	47.8%	0.69%	0.82%	0.46%	0.46%	0	0.0%	32.8%	1
FORDO-2022-A	Ford Credit	47mo	$1.07B	10.4%	0.43%	1.62%	0.76%	0.83%	8	0.1%	29.8%	1
FORDO-2025-A	Ford Credit	17mo	$3.03B	28.9%	0.20%	0.72%	0.28%	0.29%	2	0.0%	8.3%	1
CRVNA-2021-P1	Carvana	60mo	$303.1M	6.5%	1.79%	–	4.20%	4.20%	0	0.0%	55.1%	0
CRVNA-2022-P1	Carvana	53mo	$940.7M	12.7%	3.02%	3.85%	3.71%	3.72%	1	0.0%	38.9%	0
HAROT-2022-1	American Honda Finance	43mo	$1.66B	8.7%	0.13%	0.87%	0.35%	0.35%	0	0.0%	71.6%	0
HAROT-2025-1	American Honda Finance	18mo	$2.49B	43.5%	0.23%	0.76%	0.33%	0.33%	0	0.0%	60.4%	0
NAROT-2022-A	Nissan Motor Acceptance	52mo	$2.62B	1.8%	0.07%	2.71%	0.40%	0.40%	0	0.0%	75.3%	0
NAROT-2025-A	Nissan Motor Acceptance	15mo	$4.26B	21.5%	0.10%	0.63%	0.09%	0.09%	0	0.0%	56.4%	0
TAOT-2022-A	Toyota Motor Credit	51mo	$1.78B	4.3%	0.35%	2.40%	1.08%	1.10%	2	0.0%	65.9%	0
TAOT-2025-A	Toyota Motor Credit	19mo	$1.98B	43.6%	0.42%	0.82%	0.41%	0.41%	0	0.0%	53.6%	0
WOART-2021-A	World Omni (Toyota SET)	48mo	$1.15B	9.9%	0.37%	1.97%	1.01%	1.01%	0	0.0%	77.6%	0
WOART-2022-A	World Omni (Toyota SET)	50mo	$984.0M	9.8%	0.64%	2.02%	1.35%	1.37%	1	0.0%	71.9%	0
WOART-2024-A	World Omni (Toyota SET)	31mo	$1.37B	26.4%	0.80%	1.52%	0.85%	0.85%	0	0.0%	68.5%	0
WOART-2025-A	World Omni (Toyota SET)	19mo	$1.33B	44.4%	0.76%	0.82%	0.70%	0.70%	0	0.0%	65.6%	0
Every deal here has each monthly loan tape parsed since its first filing. Adding a shelf is one pipeline run against a registered CIK; what cannot be added, and why, is under The Perimeter.
SCREENS
EXTENSION MASKING

Reported 60+ delinquency understates the extension-adjusted figure by more than 75bps.

17 / 44 deals
AMCAR-2021-1, AMCAR-2023-1, AMCAR-2024-1, EART-2022-1, EART-2023-1, EART-2024-1, EART-2025-1, GMCAR-2021-1, GMCAR-2024-1, GMCAR-2025-1, HART-2022-A, HART-2025-A, SDART-2021-1, SDART-2022-1, SDART-2023-6, SDART-2024-1, SDART-2025-1
SEVERE MASKING

The gap exceeds 200bps: a materially different delinquency picture than the remittance summary shows.

17 / 44 deals
AMCAR-2021-1, AMCAR-2023-1, AMCAR-2024-1, EART-2022-1, EART-2023-1, EART-2024-1, EART-2025-1, GMCAR-2021-1, GMCAR-2024-1, GMCAR-2025-1, HART-2022-A, HART-2025-A, SDART-2021-1, SDART-2022-1, SDART-2023-6, SDART-2024-1, SDART-2025-1
LOSS ABOVE THE BAND

Cumulative net loss more than 10% above the median of deals at the same seasoning.

19 / 44 deals
AMCAR-2023-1, AMCAR-2024-1, BLAST-2025-1, CARMX-2021-1, CARMX-2022-1, CARMX-2023-1, CARMX-2024-1, CRVNA-2024-P2, CRVNA-2025-P1, EART-2022-1, EART-2023-1, EART-2024-1, EART-2025-1, SDART-2021-1, SDART-2022-1, SDART-2023-6, SDART-2024-1, SDART-2025-1, VALET-2025-1
EXTENSION STOCK CLIMBING

The share of the pool touched by an extension is growing sharply.

0 / 44 deals
none
WEAK RECOVERIES

Cumulative recoveries under a third of charged-off principal.

12 / 44 deals
ALLYA-2022-1, ALLYA-2023-1, ALLYA-2024-1, ALLYA-2025-1, BLAST-2025-1, CARMX-2022-1, CARMX-2023-1, CARMX-2024-1, CARMX-2025-1, EART-2023-1, FORDO-2022-A, FORDO-2025-A

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · Curves

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#curves · text route: https://getbookiq.com/curves (summary) · https://getbookiq.com/curves?lender=Exeter&band=subprime&vintage=2024

CURVES: ANY LENDER, ANY BAND, ANY VINTAGE, ONE CHART
Pick who you want to see and what you want to see. Every line is counted from individual loans in the 48 trusts on this desk and divided at the last moment, so lenders can be combined or drawn side by side, score bands stacked or isolated, and vintages compared at the same age. Nothing on this screen is precomputed; the cells underneath are downloadable.
LENDERS
all
ALLY
BRIDGECREST
CARMAX
CARVANA
EXETER
FORD
GM FINANCIAL
GM FINANCIAL (AMERICREDIT)
HONDA
HYUNDAI
NISSAN
SANTANDER
VOLKSWAGEN
WORLD OMNI
 combine into one line
 one line per lender
SCORE BAND AT ORIGINATION
all
DEEP SUBPRIME 300 TO 540
SUBPRIME 541 TO 600
NEAR PRIME 601 TO 660
PRIME 661 TO 780
SUPER PRIME 781 TO 900
NO SCORE ON TAPE
WHAT TO DRAW
 by month on book (vintages)
 by calendar month (the index)
EVER 60+ DAYS PAST DUE, % OF LOANS
EVER EXTENDED, % OF LOANS
CHARGED OFF AFTER FIRST 60+, % OF THOSE LOANS
CHARGED OFF AFTER FIRST EXTENSION, % OF THOSE LOANS
VINTAGES
all
 
none
twelve months to June
calendar year
origination quarter
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
months on book up to 36 
min loans at risk  200
2024 (to Jun) · 115,183 loans · 9 trusts
2025 (to Jun) · 129,486 loans · 11 trusts
Sourced from 244,669 individual loans from 14 lenders, Ally, Bridgecrest, CarMax, Carvana, Exeter, Ford, GM Financial, GM Financial (AmeriCredit), Honda, Hyundai, Nissan, Santander, Volkswagen, World Omni, below prime (300 to 660). Each lender's trusts file a loan-level Form ABS-EE on SEC EDGAR every month; this page reads those filings directly.
EVER 60+ DAYS PAST DUE, % OF LOANS
0.0%
10.4%
20.9%
31.3%
41.8%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
MONTHS ON BOOK SINCE ORIGINATION
WHAT THE LINES SAY, FROM THE POINTS ABOVE

At 21 months on book, the highest is 2025 (to Jun) at 28.1% and the lowest is 2024 (to Jun) at 26.5% (ever 60+ days past due, % of loans).

2025 (to Jun) is 1.6 points above 2024 (to Jun) at that point, on 60,122 and 97,735 loans still observed.

They first separate by a full point at 18 months on book.

The latest vintage, 2025 (to Jun), is above 2024 (to Jun) by 1.6 points at 21 months on book.

SERIES	LOANS	M6	M12	M13	M18	M24	M36	LAST POINT	TRUSTS
2024 (to Jun)	115,183	4.7%	14.6%	16.0%	22.5%	29.6%	–	m32: 38.7%	9
2025 (to Jun)	129,486	3.9%	14.4%	16.1%	23.7%	–	–	m21: 28.1%	11
Compose a post from these numbers
Download these lines as CSV
Download every cell
How each point is made. ever 60+ days past due by month on book; at risk = loans observed to at least that month. Counts of loans, never balances. only loans first observed within 3 months of origination enter the month-on-book cells. A point is drawn only while at least 40% of the cohort and 200 loans are still observed, which is why younger vintages stop earlier. Charge-off is first month with charge-off principal reported or zero-balance code 4.

What a tape cannot show. loans that paid off or charged off before a pool's cutoff never appear on any tape, and a tape ends at the clean-up call. The published versions of these charts carry the same limits and do not say so. Built 2026-09-06.

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · Perimeter

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#perim · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/perim.md

Reg AB II forces the loan tape into the open only for SEC-registered deals. A shelf that issues 144A files nothing, and the lenders most likely to fail choose 144A for exactly that reason. Tricolor, DriveTime, and American Car Center were all 144A. Verified against EDGAR full-text search for form ABS-EE on 2026-08-30; counts are total ABS-EE filings ever made under that shelf name.
TAPES PUBLIC: SHELVES THIS ROOM CAN INGEST
SHELF	SPONSOR	TIER	STATUS	ABS-EE FILINGS
Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust (DRIVE)	Santander Consumer USA	subprime	TAPES PUBLIC	2,780
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust (AMCAR)	GM Financial	subprime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,115
Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust (EART)	Exeter Finance	deep subprime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,009
Carvana Auto Receivables Trust (CRVNA)	Carvana	mixed prime-subprime	TAPES PUBLIC	853
World Omni Select Auto Trust	World Omni	near prime	TAPES PUBLIC	237
CarMax Auto Owner Trust (CARMX)	CarMax	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,581
World Omni Auto Receivables Trust (WOART)	World Omni (Toyota SET)	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,602
Toyota Auto Receivables Owner Trust (TAOT)	Toyota Motor Credit	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,563
GM Financial Consumer Automobile Receivables Trust (GMCAR)	GM Financial	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,355

Same sponsor as the AMCAR subprime shelf. Running both is the cleanest controlled prime-versus-subprime read one underwriter can provide.

Honda Auto Receivables Owner Trust (HAROT)	American Honda Finance	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,295
Hyundai Auto Receivables Trust (HART)	Hyundai Capital America	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,065
Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust (FORDO)	Ford Motor Credit	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	1,047
Nissan Auto Receivables Owner Trust (NAROT)	Nissan Motor Acceptance	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	907
Ally Auto Receivables Trust (ALLYA)	Ally Bank	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	812
Capital One Prime Auto Receivables Trust (COPAR)	Capital One	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	409
Bridgecrest Lending Auto Securitization Trust (BLAST) / DT Auto	DriveTime	deep subprime	TAPES PUBLIC	21

The DT Auto Owner Trust deals were 144A. BLAST 2025-1 (CIK 2050168) files ABS-EE loan tapes, so Bridgecrest entered the registered perimeter in 2025; verified Sep 2026.

Volkswagen Auto Loan Enhanced Trust (VALET)	VW Credit	prime	TAPES PUBLIC	19
THE DARK LIST: SHELVES YOU CANNOT SEE, BY DESIGN
SHELF	SPONSOR	TIER	STATUS	ABS-EE FILINGS
CPS Auto Receivables Trust	Consumer Portfolio Services	subprime	144A · DARK	0

The sponsor files 10-Ks and appears on the public scoreboard, but its deals issue 144A: the company is visible and its collateral is not.

Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust	Westlake Financial	subprime	144A · DARK	0
GLS Auto Receivables Trust	Global Lending Services	deep subprime	144A · DARK	0
Flagship Credit Auto Trust	Flagship Credit Acceptance	subprime	144A · DARK	0
Tricolor Auto Securitization Trust	Tricolor (failed September 2025)	deep subprime	144A · DARK	0

Every Tricolor deal issued 144A. The loan tapes behind the September 2025 collapse were never public and never will be. This row is the argument for the whole perimeter view.

First Investors Auto Owner Trust	First Investors Financial Services	subprime	144A · DARK	0

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · Rebuild It

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#rebuild · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/rebuild.md

Every number on this desk can be rebuilt from public filings with no paid data. This page walks the full chain, filing to pixel, with the exact field names and formulas, so any figure here can be audited or reproduced independently.
THE DEAL TAPES (DEALS, THE MARKET, COHORTS)
1
FIND THE DEAL ON EDGAR
Every SEC-registered auto ABS files form ABS-EE monthly. Search the shelf name at efts.sec.gov or browse the trust's CIK. Each filing's EX-102 exhibit is an XML file with one record per loan, per Schedule AL of Regulation AB (17 CFR 229.1125). A subprime deal's tape runs 100-250MB per month. 144A deals file nothing, which is why the Perimeter tab's dark list exists.
2
PARSE THE LOAN RECORDS
Stream-parse the XML keeping the Schedule AL fields used here: reportingPeriodBeginningLoanBalanceAmount, reportingPeriodActualEndBalanceAmount, currentDelinquencyStatus (days past due), paymentExtendedNumber (cumulative extensions per loan), chargedoffPrincipalAmount, recoveredAmount, zeroBalanceCode, originationDate, originalLoanAmount, originalLoanTerm, obligorCreditScore, repossessedIndicator, state, new/used. One month becomes one panel slice; all months stack into a loan-by-month panel.
3
INTEGRITY GATES BEFORE ANY MATH
De-duplicate on (loan id, period): servicers re-file amended tapes and both copies land on EDGAR; without this gate one month double-counts (it moved a measured CNL from 3.4% to 6.0%). Backfill the earliest months a date-filtered download missed. Reject any deal with a calendar gap in its tape: a missing month understates losses in a way that looks like good performance.
4
INITIAL POOL
init_balance = sum of every loan's beginning balance on the deal's FIRST monthly tape. That figure is the denominator for the pool factor and cumulative net loss, which is why step 3's backfill matters: start the tape three months late and every loss number reads better than reality.
5
THE MONTHLY DEAL ROW
Pool factor = active balance ÷ initial pool. Monthly net loss = charged-off principal minus recoveries, summed over loans that month. CNL = running sum of net losses ÷ initial pool. Recovery rate = cumulative recoveries ÷ cumulative charge-offs. Repo share = balance of loans flagged repossessed ÷ active balance.
6
EXTENSION-ADJUSTED DELINQUENCY
The flagship number. Reported 60+ = balance with currentDelinquencyStatus ≥ 60 ÷ active balance, straight off the tape. The adjusted series adds back loans that are CURRENT today but were extended within the trailing 6 months, detected as a period-over-period increase in the loan's cumulative paymentExtendedNumber. Logic: an extension moved the loan to current without a payment catching up, so for six months it is counted as if still delinquent. The gap between the two lines, in bps, is the masking metric. Extension stock = share of pool balance touched by an extension in the trailing 6 months.
7
ROLL RATES
Join month t to month t+1 on loan id. Bucket by DPD (current / 30-59 / 60-89 / 90+), weight by balance at t. Current→30+ = share of current balances at t that are 30+ (or charged off) at t+1. Same construction for worsening, cures, and 60+→charge-off. An extension can pull a loan back to current, but it re-enters this roll the next month, which is why the roll is the hardest series here to flatter.
8
VINTAGE COHORTS (THE COHORTS TAB)
Group loans by origination year (each loan counted once, at first appearance; cohorts under 300 loans dropped). Months on book = calendar months since originationDate. Cumulative gross charge-off = running charged-off principal within the cohort ÷ the cohort's summed originalLoanAmount. The 60+ curve divides by the cohort's still-active balance at each month. Ever-extended = share of the cohort's observed loans with paymentExtendedNumber > 0 by that month. First-60+ outcomes take each loan's first month at 60+ DPD, then classify its end state: charged off, paid (zero-balance code 1), removed (codes 2/3), or still active.
9
BANDS AND TIERS
Deal-vs-peer comparisons are computed at equal SEASONING (months since first tape), never by calendar date. The Market tab aggregates deals into prime and subprime, balance-weighted by calendar month, the same segmentation the public trackers publish, with the number of deals behind every point shown.
THE FILER STATEMENTS (FILERS, FILER READ)
10
COMPANY DATA
SEC companyfacts API: one JSON per company with every XBRL fact ever filed. Each normalized field resolves to ONE tagged concept per filer, ranked by recent coverage; the resolved tag, plus the accounting taxonomy's own label and definition, is shown at the bottom of every Filer Read. Quarterly flows are derived by differencing fiscal year-to-date spans, which survives filers mis-tagging YTD values on quarterly spans.
11
OUTCOME EVENTS
Hand-curated and document-verified. EDGAR's 8-K item metadata is not trustworthy (a solvent lender's filing is mis-tagged Item 1.03, Bankruptcy); every event was confirmed by reading the filed document, and a Form 25/15 counts as a company exit only when no periodic report follows it.
REBUILD COMMANDS
cd "Edgar Research /files"
python3 run.py --trusts trusts.csv --since 2024-01-01
python3 run.py --trusts trusts_prime.csv --since 2023-11-01
cd "../../Subprime Intel"
python3 tools/backfill_early.py  # opening tapes --since cut off
python3 tools/recompute_ext.py   # extension metrics, ALL panels, every time
python3 tools/fetch_facts.py && python3 tools/build_panel.py  # filer side
python3 tools/build_abs.py       # deal side + market + cohorts
cp data/*.json ../taperead-site/intel/data/  # bump DV, deploy
Full method docs: Subprime Intel/RUNBOOK.md and the pipeline's METHOD.md. Sources are exclusively SEC EDGAR: ABS-EE asset data files and companyfacts XBRL. No licensed data anywhere in the chain, which is the point: anyone can check the work.

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · System

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#system · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/system.md

What this is. The statement-view sibling of the credit union tape room, applied to the SEC filers that hold a consumer credit book. NCUA hands every credit union one account dictionary. The SEC does not, so the dictionary here is a versioned mapping of normalized fields to the concepts each filer actually tags, and the mapping is the product. Where the CU build paraphrases definitions, this one carries the taxonomy's own label and description for whichever concept resolved, so the bottom of every statement read shows you exactly what you are looking at and under which tag.
Choosing the concept. A field resolves to one concept and one only, ranked by coverage in the recent window, then lifetime coverage, then preference order. Two failures forced that rule. Filling gaps from a second concept spliced Conn's total allowance onto a current-portion-only tag and manufactured a collapse from 35% coverage to 0.08% and back, which is indistinguishable from a credit event. Ranking on lifetime coverage alone picked concepts World Acceptance and Credit Acceptance abandoned years ago and left the current tape empty.
Provenance, and why item codes are not scored. Outcome events are hand-curated and every one was confirmed by fetching and reading the filed document. EDGAR's submissions metadata is not reliable for this: Regional Management's 2024-06-20 filing is tagged with Item 1.03, Bankruptcy or Receivership, but the document is a ninth amendment to a revolving credit facility. Scoring the metadata would have called a solvent lender bankrupt. Form types are trusted, with one test attached: a Form 25 or Form 15 counts as a company exit only when no 10-K or 10-Q follows it, which correctly rejects the single-class delistings at Carvana, Medallion, and OppFi.
DOES THE SCORE SEPARATE THE FAILURES?
Partly, and the honest answer matters more than a flattering one. The 3 filers that departed carry a median peak score of 6 in their final eight reported quarters, against 2 for the 23 still filing. But CRMT scores above every departed filer while still operating, and Nicholas Financial departed with a peak of 2 because it sold its loan book rather than deteriorating through it. Three departures cannot support a lift table, a survival curve, or a probability. What follows is case anatomy: what the tape showed on the way out, published as anatomy and nothing more.
CONN
peak 8 · departed
CURO
peak 6 · departed
NICK
peak 2 · departed
CRMT
peak 10 · live
WRLD
peak 7 · live
ATLC
peak 6 · live
HAPN
peak 6 · live
PRG
peak 4 · live
SYF
peak 4 · live
THE FLAG SET
FLAG	FIRES WHEN	WEIGHT	FILERS NOW
equity_negative	Shareholders' equity is negative	4	1
scissors	Allowance coverage falling while the loss rate rises	3	0
reserve_bleed_deep	Provision below net charge-offs for four or more quarters	3	1
dq_vs_reserve	Past due rising while allowance coverage falls	3	0
nonreliance	Filed a non-reliance 8-K	3	1
reserve_bleed	Provision below net charge-offs for consecutive quarters	2	3
growth_thin	Book growing while reserve coverage thins	2	0
dq_rising	Past-due share climbing year over year	2	0
reserve_thin	Allowance covers under three quarters of the current loss burn	2	3
equity_eroding	Equity share of assets falling sharply year over year	2	6
coverage_falling	Allowance coverage down year over year	1	3
losses_rising	Net charge-off rate up year over year	1	1
nonaccrual_rising	Nonaccrual share climbing	1	0
equity_thin	Equity under a tenth of assets	1	3
late_filing	Filed a late-filing notice	1	0
book_disposed	Receivables book no longer reported	0	0
The composite score is the sum of active flag weights, capped at 10. It ranks deterioration signatures. It is not a probability of failure and nothing here should be read as one.
WHAT IS DELIBERATELY MISSING
Delinquency bucket tables live in dimensioned XBRL that the companyfacts feed does not carry. Where a filer tags an undimensioned past-due aggregate it is shown and charted; where none exists the column is blank rather than approximated. Lease-to-own filers and Carvana hold no comparable loan book, so their credit ratios stay empty on purpose rather than being invented from trade or lease receivables. The loan-level view of what servicers actually do to a delinquent account lives next door in the ABS surveillance room.
THE DEAL ROOM'S SYSTEM
What this is. The true sibling of the credit union tape room. NCUA's census unit is the institution; here it is the securitization, because that is the unit the disclosure regime standardizes. Each monthly EX-102 asset file carries every loan's balance, days past due, extension count, charge-off and recovery, which is richer than anything NCUA publishes, for the deals the regime covers.
The band is seasoning, not calendar. A deal six months old and a deal thirty months old share nothing useful in the same calendar month, so every median here is computed across deals at the same age in months since first tape. That is the honest analogue of the credit union band median. Where only one deal has reached a given age, no band is drawn and the read says so instead of implying a comparison.
The flagship analytic. Servicers grant payment extensions that return delinquent loans to current status. Reported delinquency falls; nothing about the borrower has changed. This room rebuilds the delinquency series with recently extended loans added back over a six-month lookback, and tracks how many extended loans return to 60+ within six months. The method and its limits are documented in the pipeline's METHOD.md.
What a pool is not. A securitized pool is a selected slice of the sponsor's originations, subject to eligibility criteria and survivorship. Deal metrics describe the deal, and say something about the sponsor only in trend and only carefully. Reg AB II carries no dealer identifier either, so source-level attribution is impossible here by design.
No presale bands loaded. A cumulative net loss number means most against the rating agencies' presale expected-loss range. Those are hand-entered per deal from the presale report and none is loaded yet, so CNL is compared only against the peer seasoning band and every read says which comparison it is using.
THE FLAG SET
FLAG	FIRES WHEN	WEIGHT	DEALS NOW
masking_severe	Extension-adjusted 60+ delinquency exceeds reported by more than 200bps	3	17
masking	Extension-adjusted 60+ delinquency exceeds reported by more than 75bps	2	0
ext_stock_rising	Share of the pool touched by an extension rising sharply	2	0
cnl_above_band	Cumulative net loss above the peer median at the same seasoning	2	19
dq_above_band	Reported 60+ delinquency above the peer median at the same seasoning	1	18
recovery_weak	Cumulative recoveries under a third of charged-off principal	1	12
DEALS REJECTED BEFORE PUBLICATION
A tape assembled while the disk was full silently loses months, and a deal missing months understates cumulative loss and pool factor in ways that look like good performance. Any calendar gap between the first and last tape disqualifies a deal from this room.
DEAL	MONTHS PARSED	GAPS
AMCAR-2022-1	49	2024-02-29 -> 2024-04-30; 2024-06-30 -> 2024-08-31; 2024-11-30 -> 2025-02-28
EART-2021-1	55	2021-11-30 -> 2022-01-31; 2022-12-31 -> 2023-02-28
GMCAR-2022-1	49	2022-10-31 -> 2022-12-31; 2023-01-31 -> 2023-03-31
WOSAT-2023-A	40	2024-02-29 -> 2024-04-30; 2025-12-31 -> 2026-03-31
REDEFAULT COHORTS: EXTENDED LOANS BACK TO 60+ WITHIN SIX MONTHS
EXTENSION MONTH	DEAL	LOANS EXTENDED	REDEFAULT 6M	MONTHS OBSERVED
2026-03-31	WOSAT-2023-A	1	0.0%	4
2025-01-31	WOSAT-2023-A	1	0.0%	6
2024-11-30	WOSAT-2023-A	1	0.0%	6
2024-06-30	WOSAT-2023-A	1	0.0%	6
2024-04-30	WOSAT-2023-A	4	0.0%	6
2023-10-31	WOSAT-2023-A	2	0.0%	6
2023-07-31	WOSAT-2023-A	4	0.0%	6
2023-03-31	WOSAT-2023-A	2	0.0%	6
2023-02-28	WOSAT-2023-A	1	0.0%	6
2026-03-31	WOART-2025-A	1	0.0%	4
2026-01-31	WOART-2025-A	1	0.0%	6
2025-10-31	WOART-2025-A	1	0.0%	6

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · Screens

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#screens · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/screens.md

Each screen is a saved question. Click one and the scoreboard opens pre-filtered.
THE SCISSORS

Allowance coverage falling while the loss rate climbs. The pattern that preceded the Car-Mart restatement.

0 / 26 filers
RESERVE BLEED

Provision running below net charge-offs for two or more consecutive quarters: the allowance is absorbing losses it is not being refilled for.

4 / 26 filers
SOLVENCY STRAIN

Negative equity, or an equity cushion eroding four points or more year over year. Both Chapter 11 filings on this tape ran through here.

6 / 26 filers
PAST DUE INTO A THINNING RESERVE

Delinquency climbing while coverage falls, for the filers that tag an undimensioned past-due aggregate.

0 / 26 filers
GROWING ON A THINNER CUSHION

Book up more than 10% year over year while allowance coverage falls.

0 / 26 filers
TOLD YOU THEMSELVES

Filed a non-reliance 8-K, verified by reading the document, not by trusting the item code.

3 / 26 filers
DEPARTED

Stopped filing periodic reports: bankruptcy, deregistration, or delisting with no 10-K or 10-Q after it.

3 / 26 filers
RATIOS SUPPRESSED

At least one data-quality screen fired, so some ratios are deliberately blank. Worth knowing before quoting a number.

12 / 26 filers

---

## Auto Credit Intelligence · What it means

Live page: https://getbookiq.com/intel/#meaning · text route: https://getbookiq.com/text/intel/meaning.md

How to read this desk. Two censuses share the room. The Filers side reads 26 SEC filers that hold a consumer credit book, one quarter at a time, from the XBRL facts they tag themselves; every ratio is that filer's own definition, and the bottom of every Filer Read shows which concept resolved. The Deals side reads 44 registered auto securitizations one month at a time from the raw loan tape (form ABS-EE, exhibit EX-102), so the numbers are computed from every loan rather than reported by the servicer. A statement tells you what management concluded; a tape tells you what the borrowers did. Each page opens with a verdict, which is rule-based: the archetype is chosen from the flags in a fixed priority order and the numbers are interpolated from the latest row. Below the verdict, the read is the flag list with its evidence, the numbers are the latest row with a peer percentile, and the charts put the filer or deal against its median. A flag is a question, not an accusation. The composite score is the sum of active flag weights, capped at 10, and it is not a probability.
Filers, question one: is the allowance keeping up?
ALLOWANCE / GROSS
hist alw_ratio = allowance / receivables_gross x 100, quarter end
MEANS
The share of the gross book already written down against expected loss. Under CECL it is the lifetime expected loss on today's loans; under the older incurred model it was losses already probable.
WHEN HIGH
Deep-subprime paper, or a fresh true-up after an under-reserved stretch. Car-Mart's restated allowance of $436.1M was 28.9% of receivables. Credit Acceptance runs above 30% because its book is dealer-holdback paper by design.
WHEN LOW
A prime book, or an under-reserved one. The ratio alone cannot tell you which; provision against charge-offs can.
VS PEERS
Percentile against the filer's basis (its own model where enough filers tag the ratio, otherwise all filers). Low percentile is flagged hot because a thin allowance is the risk.
OUR LINE
coverage_falling fires when alw_chg_yoy is at or below -0.25 points (weight 1, 3 filers now). It has no standalone read line; it is the ingredient in scissors and growth_thin.
LIMITS
Fair-value books carry no allowance at all, so the ratio is blank where the fair_value_book screen fires. A filer that changes its allowance concept mid-history can show a step that is not a credit event; the one-concept rule exists to stop that.
PROVISION / NCO
hist prov_nco = provision / nco, both quarterly flows differenced from fiscal year-to-date spans
MEANS
Whether the quarter's expense refilled what losses consumed. Above 1.00x the allowance is being built; below it the allowance is being spent.
WHEN HIGH
Reserve building, usually ahead of expected deterioration or a growing book. A sudden spike is often a catch-up for prior under-reserving.
WHEN LOW
The allowance is absorbing losses it is not being refilled for. A shrinking book can legitimately run below 1.00x for a while; a growing one cannot.
VS PEERS
Percentile against basis; low is hot.
OUR LINE
reserve_bleed fires at 2 or 3 consecutive quarters under 1.00x (weight 2); reserve_bleed_deep replaces it at 4 or more (weight 3, 1 now). Car-Mart ran 13 consecutive quarters below before restating (latest 2026-04-30: $91.9M provision against $139.9M NCO).
LIMITS
Quarterly differencing amplifies tagging errors; where NCO comes out negative or implausible the screens blank the ratio rather than publish it.
RESERVE COVER, QUARTERS
hist reserve_qtrs = allowance / nco (one quarter's net charge-offs)
MEANS
How many quarters of the current loss run-rate the allowance could absorb with no further provision.
WHEN HIGH
A deep cushion, or a very low current loss quarter flattering the denominator.
WHEN LOW
The allowance is thin against what is actually being lost right now.
VS PEERS
Not percentiled; read against the flag line.
OUR LINE
reserve_thin fires under 3.0 quarters (weight 2, 3 now).
LIMITS
One quarter's NCO is noisy; a seasonal loss quarter can move this a full quarter of cover.
THE SCISSORS
alw_chg_yoy at or below -0.25 points AND nco_chg_yoy at or above +0.50 points, year over year
MEANS
Coverage falling while the loss rate rises: losing more, reserving less, at the same time.
WHEN HIGH
Not a level; a pattern. When it fires the book is in the geometry that preceded the Car-Mart restatement.
WHEN LOW
Not applicable.
VS PEERS
Year-over-year comparisons use the prior observation nearest 365 days back within a 300 to 430 day window, so fiscal-year filers compare like with like.
OUR LINE
scissors weight 3, read severity DANGER, 0 filers now.
LIMITS
Requires both ratios to be tagged in both years; filers with suppressed NCO cannot fire it.
Question two: are losses moving?
NCO, ANNUALIZED
hist nco_rate = (writeoffs minus recoveries) x 4 / receivables_gross x 100
MEANS
The realized loss rate on the book, net of what came back.
WHEN HIGH
Subprime paper: the highest annualized rate on this tape is 30.21%. SGC's BHPH benchmarks put bad debt at 21% in 2022, 24% in 2023 and 28% in 2024, the worst year since 1999.
WHEN LOW
Prime paper, or a filer whose write-off policy is slow (losses arrive later as bigger charge-offs).
VS PEERS
Percentile against basis; high is hot.
OUR LINE
losses_rising fires when nco_chg_yoy is at or above +0.50 points (weight 1, 1 now).
LIMITS
Each filer's write-off timing is its own. Where the concept resolves to gross write-offs only or the flow comes out negative, the screens blank it.
PAST DUE
hist dq_total_r = dq_total / receivables_gross x 100; dq90_r for 90+ only; the board shows dq_total_r with dq90_r as fallback
MEANS
The share of the book behind on payment, as the filer itself aggregates it.
WHEN HIGH
Stress arriving that has not yet become a charge-off. Delinquency leads loss by one to two quarters.
WHEN LOW
A clean book, or a servicer that extends, re-ages or writes off fast enough to keep the number down. The tape side of this desk exists to test that.
VS PEERS
Percentile against basis; high is hot.
OUR LINE
dq_rising fires when the past-due share is up 0.50 points or more year over year (dqtot_chg_yoy, falling back to dq90_chg_yoy), weight 2. dq_vs_reserve fires in addition when coverage also fell 0.25 points, weight 3.
LIMITS
Delinquency bucket tables live in dimensioned XBRL the companyfacts feed does not carry; only filers tagging an undimensioned aggregate show a number here. Where the ratio exceeds 100% the past_due_ratio_impossible screen blanks it.
NONACCRUAL SHARE
hist nonacc_ratio = nonaccrual / receivables_gross x 100
MEANS
Loans the filer has stopped accruing interest on: management's own admission the loan is impaired.
WHEN HIGH
Recognized impairment building. Bank-style filers tag this; most finance companies do not.
WHEN LOW
Either a clean book or a filer that does not use the concept.
VS PEERS
Not percentiled.
OUR LINE
nonaccrual_rising fires when nonacc_chg_yoy is at or above +0.50 points (weight 1, read severity WATCH).
LIMITS
Sparse coverage across this tape.
Question three: is growth outrunning reserves?
BOOK GROWTH
hist growth_yoy = receivables_gross vs the observation one year back, percent
MEANS
How fast the gross book is growing. New loans have not yet had time to default, so fast growth dilutes every delinquency and loss ratio for 12 to 24 months.
WHEN HIGH
Either real demand or an origination push into weaker borrowers. The Fed's May 2026 FEDS note put the average subprime auto loan at $15,402 over 55 months at 25.39% APR.
WHEN LOW
Run-off, a tightened credit box, or a book being sold.
VS PEERS
Percentile against basis; high is hot because growth hides loss.
OUR LINE
growth_thin fires when growth exceeds 10% AND alw_chg_yoy is at or below -0.25 points (weight 2, 0 now).
LIMITS
Acquisitions and consolidation changes show up as growth.
Question four: can the balance sheet take it?
EQUITY / ASSETS
hist equity_ratio = equity / assets x 100; leverage = debt / equity
MEANS
The cushion between the creditors and the losses. For a warehouse-funded lender this is the number the guarantor and the bank both watch.
WHEN HIGH
A thickly capitalized book, or one whose assets were just written down.
WHEN LOW
Creditors own the outcome. Both Chapter 11 filings on this tape ran through here.
VS PEERS
Percentile against basis; low is hot.
OUR LINE
equity_thin fires between 0 and 10% (weight 1); equity_negative below zero (weight 4, 1 now); equity_eroding when eq_chg_yoy is at or below -4 points (weight 2, 6 now).
LIMITS
Buybacks and fair-value marks move equity without moving credit. The Fed survey found 81% of subprime auto lenders warehouse-funded with guarantors and 65% asset-based; the warehouse covenant, not this ratio, is where the line is actually enforced. Cross-reference: loans to nonbank financial institutions across all FDIC banks reached $1.52T at 2026-06, up from $238B in 2015.
Events: what each one legally means
NON-RELIANCE 8-K (ITEM 4.02)
events[].kind = nonreliance; flag nonreliance fires when the event is dated on or before the quarter end and within 400 days of it, weight 3
MEANS
The company or its auditor has concluded that previously issued financial statements should no longer be relied upon. It is the filer telling you its own history was wrong.
WHEN HIGH
Not a level. Every event here was verified by reading the filed document, because EDGAR item codes are wrong often enough to matter.
WHEN LOW
Not applicable.
VS PEERS
Not percentiled.
OUR LINE
Fires from the event, not from any ratio.
LIMITS
The 400-day window means a two-year-old restatement no longer scores; the banner on the Filer Read stays.
LATE FILING (NT 10-K / NT 10-Q)
events[].kind = late_filing; flag late_filing weight 1
MEANS
A Form 12b-25 notice that the periodic report will miss its deadline. It buys 15 calendar days on a 10-K and 5 on a 10-Q.
WHEN HIGH
Usually the allowance, a covenant calculation or a going-concern question is being argued with the auditor.
WHEN LOW
Not applicable.
VS PEERS
Not percentiled.
OUR LINE
Fires from the event.
LIMITS
A missed deadline is itself a default under most credit facilities; the notice tells you the clock is running, not why.
BANKRUPTCY, DELISTING, DEREGISTRATION
events[].kind = bankruptcy (Item 1.03), delisting (Form 25), deregistration (Form 15); status = departed when no 10-K or 10-Q follows
MEANS
Bankruptcy is a court filing under Chapter 7 or 11. A Form 25 removes the securities from an exchange; a Form 15 ends the reporting obligation. Only the last two, with no periodic report after them, make a filer departed here.
WHEN HIGH
Not a level.
WHEN LOW
Not applicable.
VS PEERS
The System tab compares the peak score of departed filers in their final eight quarters against live filers.
OUR LINE
Departed is a status, not a flag; it carries no weight. A Form 25 or 15 with a later 10-K or 10-Q is a single-class delisting and is ignored.
LIMITS
Regional Management's 2024 filing tagged Item 1.03 is a credit-facility amendment, which is why item codes are never scored unread.
The data-quality screens
WHY SOME CELLS ARE BLANK
dq[] on each company: fair_value_book, nco_negative, nco_rate_implausible, past_due_ratio_impossible, alw_ratio_implausible, writeoffs_tagged_zero
MEANS
Each screen names a reason a ratio would be wrong if published: the book is carried at fair value (no allowance exists), differenced NCO came out negative, the annualized loss rate is outside a plausible range, past due exceeds the book, the allowance ratio is outside a plausible range, or write-offs are tagged as exactly zero on a book that clearly has losses.
WHEN HIGH
Not a level: a screen either fires or does not.
WHEN LOW
Not applicable.
VS PEERS
A filer is compared against its own model (card-retail, personal-installment, auto-indirect, lease-to-own) when enough filers of that model tag the ratio to make a median meaningful; otherwise against all filers. The header of every Filer Read says which basis is in use, and the peer percentile uses the same basis.
OUR LINE
The screens are applied before flags, so a suppressed ratio cannot fire a flag either. The Ratios suppressed screen on the Screens tab lists every filer affected.
LIMITS
A blank cell is a decision, not missing data. The definitions block at the bottom of each Filer Read shows what the filer actually tagged.
Deals: loss against seasoning
CUMULATIVE NET LOSS AND THE BAND
month cnl = running sum of (charged-off principal minus recoveries) / snap.init_balance x 100; pf = active balance / initial pool; band = A.band[age].cnl, the median of deals at the same age in months
MEANS
How much of the original pool has been lost for good, and how much of the pool is left to lose more from. The band is computed at equal seasoning, never by calendar date.
WHEN HIGH
A subprime pool two years in: the published read of SDART-2023-6 had cumulative net loss at 9.56% of a $1.06B initial pool at month 30 with a 31% pool factor (the live tape here has since been backfilled, so its current row differs slightly).
WHEN LOW
Prime paper, or a young pool. A pool with a calendar gap in its tape also reads low, which is why gapped deals are rejected before publication.
VS PEERS
Above the dashed line on the chart is worse than peers at that age; a band exists only where two or more deals reached the age.
OUR LINE
cnl_above_band fires when cnl exceeds 1.1 x the band median (weight 2, 19 now).
LIMITS
No presale expected-loss ranges are loaded, so this is a peer comparison only. A fast pool factor concentrates remaining loss in fewer loans.
REPORTED VS EXTENSION-ADJUSTED 60+
month dq60r = balance 60+ days past due / active balance; dq60a adds back loans current today but extended within the trailing 6 months; gap60 = (dq60a minus dq60r) in basis points
MEANS
The flagship metric. An extension moves a delinquent loan to current without a payment catching up; the adjusted series refuses to count that as a cure for six months.
WHEN HIGH
The servicer is leaning on extensions. SDART-2023-6: 10.16% reported against 21.73% adjusted, an 1,157bp gap. The Philadelphia Fed's April 2026 CFI report found the same understatement in headline auto delinquency.
WHEN LOW
Reported and adjusted agree: the delinquency line is what it looks like. Prime pools sit near zero.
VS PEERS
dq_above_band fires when reported 60+ exceeds 1.1 x the band median (weight 1, 18 now).
OUR LINE
masking_severe fires above 200bp (weight 3, 17 now); masking between 75 and 200bp (weight 2); a WATCH line is written at 75bp or under.
LIMITS
Extensions are detected as a period-over-period rise in each loan's cumulative paymentExtendedNumber; a servicer that does not populate the field would read clean by omission.
EXTENSION STOCK, NEW EXTENSIONS, REDEFAULT
month exts = balance of loans extended in the trailing 6 months / active balance; extn = balance newly extended this month / active balance; redefault = share of a month's extended loans that are 60+ again within 6 months (A.redefault)
MEANS
The stock is how much of the pool is currently being carried by the tool; the flow is how hard the tool is being used this month; redefault is whether it worked.
WHEN HIGH
Stock rising is a servicer under pressure. Redefault of 17-22% within six months, the SDART-2023-6 reading, means roughly one extended loan in five comes straight back.
WHEN LOW
Extensions rare and mostly curing: the tool is being used the way the pooling documents intend.
VS PEERS
The Market tab draws prime and subprime extension stock side by side.
OUR LINE
ext_stock_rising fires when the latest 6-month stock exceeds 1.5 x its value 6 months earlier AND exceeds 5% of balance, with at least 7 months of data (weight 2).
LIMITS
Redefault cohorts need six months of observation, so the newest extensions cannot be judged yet.
RECOVERIES
month rec_pct = cumulative recoveries / cumulative charged-off principal x 100
MEANS
How much of what was charged off came back through repossession sale, deficiency collection or insurance.
WHEN HIGH
Strong collateral values or aggressive deficiency collection. SDART-2023-6 recovered 45% of charged-off principal at month 30.
WHEN LOW
Weak used-car values, slow repossession, or a young pool where recoveries have not yet caught up with charge-offs.
VS PEERS
No band overlay on the Deal Read; compare across the Deals table.
OUR LINE
recovery_weak fires under 33% (weight 1, 12 now).
LIMITS
On a prime pool with under 1% cumulative loss the denominator is tiny and the ratio swings; read the verdict's hedge.
ROLL RATES
roll[].c_to_30 = share of current balance at month t that is 30+ or charged off at t+1; b60_co = share of 60+ balance that charges off; b30_worse, b30_cure, b60_cure likewise; balance-weighted, loans on both consecutive tapes
MEANS
The month-over-month migration between delinquency buckets. Current-to-30+ is the earliest stress signal on any tape, because an extended loan re-enters it the next month.
WHEN HIGH
Borrowers newly failing to pay. A rising current-to-30+ roll with flat reported delinquency is extension masking seen from the other side.
WHEN LOW
A stable book, or one where nearly everyone who could fail already has.
VS PEERS
The Market tab shows the median deal's current-to-30+ roll by tier.
OUR LINE
No flag; read the charts.
LIMITS
Small pools late in life have few current loans left, so the roll gets noisy as the pool factor falls.
NEVER-DELINQUENT SHARE
snap.neverdq.n30, n60 = share of loans never 30+ (60+) across their whole life on tape
MEANS
How many borrowers simply paid. Once a loan crosses 60+, failure odds are severe in every tier; what separates prime from subprime is how many loans ever get there.
WHEN HIGH
Prime paper.
WHEN LOW
Subprime paper, or an old pool where nearly every marginal borrower has had a chance to slip.
VS PEERS
The table on the Cohorts tab lists every deal.
OUR LINE
No flag.
LIMITS
A pool that has amortized to a low factor is dominated by survivors, so the share drifts up with age.
VINTAGE DRIFT
drift[] by origination year: wa_term, gt72 and gt84 (share of origination balance over 72 and 84 months), wa_amount, wa_score; each loan counted once at first appearance, cohorts under 100 loans dropped
MEANS
Whether the sponsor wrote later cohorts longer, larger or weaker than earlier ones. A pool is a selected slice, so this is drift in what was securitized, which usually tracks what was originated.
WHEN HIGH
Term stretching past 72 months and loan size rising with score flat is the classic affordability squeeze: the payment is held down by pushing the term out.
WHEN LOW
Stable underwriting, or a sponsor that tightened.
VS PEERS
The Market tab's drift table shows first against latest cohort for every deal.
OUR LINE
No flag.
LIMITS
Reg AB II carries no dealer identifier, so drift cannot be attributed to a source.
THE FIRST-60 CURVE
first60.byYear: for loans that ever hit 60+, the end state by the year they first crossed (charged off, still active, paid, removed); first60.curves: cumulative share failed by months since first 60+
MEANS
What happens after a borrower first goes seriously delinquent. Red is charge-off, blue still active, green paid, grey removed from the tape.
WHEN HIGH
Recent years read low on failure only because their story is not over: the blue is where the red comes from.
WHEN LOW
Not applicable.
VS PEERS
Cohorts under 50 loans are dropped from the bars, under 200 from the curves.
OUR LINE
No flag.
LIMITS
Removed (zero-balance codes 2 and 3) hides repurchases and substitutions that can flatter a pool.
PRIME VS SUBPRIME MARKET LINES
A.market.prime and A.market.subprime: every loan on every tape in this room, balance-weighted by calendar month; fields dq60r, dq60a, exts, extn, co3_ann, repo_pct, c_to_30_med
MEANS
The desk's own version of the public segment trackers, built from loans rather than remittance summaries, so every line decomposes to the deal and the bucket underneath it.
WHEN HIGH
The gap between the tiers is the level story; the gap between subprime reported and adjusted is the masking story.
WHEN LOW
Not applicable.
VS PEERS
These lines describe the deals on tape, not the whole market; the number of deals behind every point is shown.
OUR LINE
No flag.
LIMITS
Coverage thickens as shelves are added; a month with one deal in a tier is that deal, not the market.
THE 144A PERIMETER
A.registry[].reg: true when the shelf files ABS-EE loan tapes on EDGAR; false for 144A shelves, verified by full-text search on 2026-08-30
MEANS
Reg AB II forces the loan tape into the open only for SEC-registered deals. Registration buys a monthly loan-level file for every deal on the shelf; a 144A deal files nothing, by design.
WHEN HIGH
Not a level.
WHEN LOW
Not applicable.
VS PEERS
Registered and visible: Santander DRIVE, AmeriCredit, Exeter, Carvana, World Omni, Ally, CarMax, GM Financial. Dark: Tricolor (failed September 2025), DriveTime/Bridgecrest, GLS, Flagship, Westlake, CPS.
OUR LINE
No flag; the Perimeter tab lists both sides.
LIMITS
CPSS is SEC-reporting as a company while its collateral is dark, so its Filer Read exists and its deals cannot. The lenders most likely to fail choose 144A for exactly this reason.
Four filers you will meet
THE RESTATED BHPH LENDER

An integrated buy-here-pay-here operator that sells the car and originates the note. Provision runs below net charge-offs for quarters on end, coverage drifts down while the loss rate climbs, then a non-reliance 8-K resets the allowance in one line. The tape shows the mechanics for two years before the filing does.

verdict: a restated book · flags: nonreliance, reserve_bleed_deep, reserve_thin, losses_rising
THE RESERVE BLEEDER

Not restated yet. Provision under 1.00x for two, three, four quarters while the allowance ratio slides and reserve cover falls under three quarters of the loss burn. The warehouse bank reads this before the equity market does; on the Issue 9 timeline every failure was funding, not demand.

verdict: a reserve bleed · flags: reserve_bleed or reserve_bleed_deep, coverage_falling
THE ERODING BALANCE SHEET

Equity share of assets down four points or more in a year, sometimes through zero. Both Chapter 11 filings on this tape ran through here, and the departed cohort's peak scores cluster in this screen. The final filings are often the calmest, which is why the read uses the peak quarter.

verdict: a balance sheet under pressure · flags: equity_eroding, equity_thin, equity_negative
THE STEADY PRIME BOOK

Loss rate under 3%, coverage flat, nothing fires. Its value is as the denominator: the same ratios on the same axes let a subprime filer's numbers be read as distance from normal rather than as absolutes.

verdict: a prime reference or a steady book · flags: none
Four deals you will meet
THE EXTENSION-MASKED SUBPRIME POOL

Reported 60+ under 10%, adjusted 60+ above 20%, a quarter of the pool touched by an extension in six months, one extended loan in five back at 60+ within six months. Cumulative loss above the band and rising as the extensions age out.

verdict: an extension-masked pool · flags: masking_severe, cnl_above_band, dq_above_band
THE POOL LOSING ABOVE THE BAND

Cumulative net loss 10% or more above the median at the same age, with delinquency in line. Either the sponsor's credit box was wider than peers or recoveries are weak; the recovery rate tells you which.

verdict: a pool losing above the band · flags: cnl_above_band
THE PRIME REFERENCE

Cumulative loss under 1% at month 30, reported and adjusted delinquency within a few basis points, extensions near zero, pool factor falling fast on prepayments. The risk here is speed, not credit.

verdict: a pool seasoning as expected · flags: none, or recovery_weak on a tiny loss base
TOO YOUNG TO READ

Under six monthly tapes. Cumulative loss near zero by construction, no band at this age, no redefault cohorts observed yet. The current-to-30+ roll is the only early tell.

verdict: too young to read
What this desk cannot tell you
Dealer identity. Reg AB II carries no dealer identifier, so no loan on any tape can be traced to the store that wrote it, and no filer breaks its book out by source. Servicer practice. The tape records that an extension happened, not why, not whether a payment was demanded, not what the collector said. Anything inside 144A collateral. Tricolor, DriveTime, GLS, Flagship, Westlake and CPS issue 144A; their deals do not exist here, and the desk's prime and subprime lines describe registered paper only. Post-filing events. A quarter that has not been filed and a month whose tape has not landed are blank; a failure between filings is invisible until the next one, and a departed filer's tape ends with its last report. Definitions. Every filer defines its own past due, its own charge-off timing and its own allowance concept, and those definitions travel with the number; the desk normalizes the field names, never the accounting. On the credit union side of the house, purchased vehicle participations reached $13.5B and participation delinquency ran above the overall book in 2025, which is the same story told from the buyer's side; it is not on this desk either.

---

# Every flag

## bank

- liq_ltd: loans exceed deposits
- liq_uninsured: uninsured deposits >50%
- liq_brokered: brokered >10%
- liq_wholesale: wholesale funding >15%
- liq_thin: liquid assets <10%
- liq_runrisk: run vulnerability
- cap_low: leverage <7%
- cap_critical: leverage <5%
- cap_falling: capital falling
- cap_aoci: AOCI drag >20% of equity
- cap_secloss: securities losses >30% of equity
- earn_negative: losing money
- earn_efficiency: expense ratio p90
- earn_nim: NIM <2.5%
- aq_noncurrent: noncurrent p90
- aq_nco: charge-offs p90
- aq_reserve: reserve under noncurrent
- conc_construction: construction >100% equity
- conc_warehouse: loans-to-lenders >50% equity
- conc_auto: auto book souring
- shrink_deposits: deposits shrinking
- shrink_assets: assets shrinking
- flight_uninsured: uninsured deposits leaving

## cu

- cap_low: thin capital
- cap_critical: capital below 7%
- cap_falling: net worth falling
- earn_negative: losing money
- earn_opex: expense trap
- earn_nim_squeeze: margin squeeze
- aq_dq_high: delinquency 2x band
- aq_dq_rising: delinquency rising
- aq_nco_high: charge-offs p90
- aq_repo: repo signal
- shrink_assets: assets shrinking
- shrink_members: members leaving
- shrink_loans: loan book shrinking
- str_ltos: loans>95% of shares
- str_borrowings: leaning on borrowings
- str_thirdparty: 3rd-party paper>100% NW
- str_vehicle: auto monoline

## co

- scissors: Allowance coverage falling while the loss rate rises
- reserve_bleed: Provision below net charge-offs for consecutive quarters
- reserve_bleed_deep: Provision below net charge-offs for four or more quarters
- coverage_falling: Allowance coverage down year over year
- losses_rising: Net charge-off rate up year over year
- growth_thin: Book growing while reserve coverage thins
- nonaccrual_rising: Nonaccrual share climbing
- dq_rising: Past-due share climbing year over year
- dq_vs_reserve: Past due rising while allowance coverage falls
- reserve_thin: Allowance covers under three quarters of the current loss burn
- equity_thin: Equity under a tenth of assets
- equity_negative: Shareholders' equity is negative
- equity_eroding: Equity share of assets falling sharply year over year
- book_disposed: Receivables book no longer reported
- nonreliance: Filed a non-reliance 8-K
- late_filing: Filed a late-filing notice

## deal

- masking_severe: Extension-adjusted 60+ delinquency exceeds reported by more than 200bps
- masking: Extension-adjusted 60+ delinquency exceeds reported by more than 75bps
- ext_stock_rising: Share of the pool touched by an extension rising sharply
- cnl_above_band: Cumulative net loss above the peer median at the same seasoning
- dq_above_band: Reported 60+ delinquency above the peer median at the same seasoning
- recovery_weak: Cumulative recoveries under a third of charged-off principal

# Every SEC filer on the desk

- CRMT · America's Car-Mart, Inc. · auto-bhph · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/CRMT
- CURO · CURO Group Holdings Corp. · personal-installment · subprime · departed · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/CURO
- ATLC · Atlanticus Holdings Corp. · card-retail · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/ATLC
- PRG · PROG Holdings, Inc. · lease-to-own · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/PRG
- WRLD · World Acceptance Corp. · personal-installment · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/WRLD
- SYF · Synchrony Financial · card-bank · near-prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/SYF
- COF · Capital One Financial Corp. · card-bank · mixed · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/COF
- CONN · Conn's, Inc. · retail-credit · subprime · departed · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/CONN
- HAPN · Happen Inc. (formerly LendingClub) · fintech-bank · prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/HAPN
- ALLY · Ally Financial Inc. · auto-bank · prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/ALLY
- BFH · Bread Financial Holdings, Inc. · card-retail · near-prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/BFH
- CPSS · Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. · auto-indirect · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/CPSS
- AFRM · Affirm Holdings, Inc. · bnpl · mixed · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/AFRM
- CACC · Credit Acceptance Corp. · auto-indirect · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/CACC
- CVNA · Carvana Co. · auto-retail · mixed · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/CVNA
- ENVA · Enova International, Inc. · personal-installment · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/ENVA
- KMX · CarMax, Inc. · auto-captive · prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/KMX
- MFIN · Medallion Financial Corp. · consumer-secured · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/MFIN
- NICK · Nicholas Financial / Old Market Capital · auto-indirect · subprime · departed · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/NICK
- OMF · OneMain Holdings, Inc. · personal-installment · near-prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/OMF
- OPFI · OppFi Inc. · personal-installment · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/OPFI
- OPRT · Oportun Financial Corp. · personal-installment · near-prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/OPRT
- RM · Regional Management Corp. · personal-installment · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/RM
- SOFI · SoFi Technologies, Inc. · fintech-bank · prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/SOFI
- UPBD · Upbound Group, Inc. · lease-to-own · subprime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/UPBD
- UPST · Upstart Holdings, Inc. · fintech-marketplace · near-prime · live · https://getbookiq.com/read/co/UPST

# Every deal on the desk

- ALLYA-2022-1 · Ally Bank · prime · 47 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/ALLYA-2022-1
- ALLYA-2023-1 · Ally Bank · prime · 39 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/ALLYA-2023-1
- ALLYA-2024-1 · Ally Bank · prime · 31 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/ALLYA-2024-1
- ALLYA-2025-1 · Ally Bank · prime · 12 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/ALLYA-2025-1
- AMCAR-2021-1 · AmeriCredit / GM Financial · subprime · 53 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/AMCAR-2021-1
- AMCAR-2023-1 · AmeriCredit / GM Financial · subprime · 43 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/AMCAR-2023-1
- AMCAR-2024-1 · AmeriCredit / GM Financial · subprime · 28 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/AMCAR-2024-1
- BLAST-2025-1 · Bridgecrest (DriveTime) · subprime · 20 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/BLAST-2025-1
- CARMX-2021-1 · CarMax · prime · 49 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CARMX-2021-1
- CARMX-2022-1 · CarMax · prime · 51 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CARMX-2022-1
- CARMX-2023-1 · CarMax · prime · 42 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CARMX-2023-1
- CARMX-2024-1 · CarMax · prime · 32 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CARMX-2024-1
- CARMX-2025-1 · CarMax · prime · 20 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CARMX-2025-1
- CRVNA-2021-P1 · Carvana · prime · 61 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CRVNA-2021-P1
- CRVNA-2022-P1 · Carvana · prime · 54 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CRVNA-2022-P1
- CRVNA-2024-P2 · Carvana · prime · 28 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CRVNA-2024-P2
- CRVNA-2025-P1 · Carvana · prime · 18 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/CRVNA-2025-P1
- EART-2022-1 · Exeter Finance · subprime · 55 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/EART-2022-1
- EART-2023-1 · Exeter Finance · subprime · 43 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/EART-2023-1
- EART-2024-1 · Exeter Finance · subprime · 32 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/EART-2024-1
- EART-2025-1 · Exeter Finance · subprime · 20 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/EART-2025-1
- FORDO-2022-A · Ford Credit · prime · 48 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/FORDO-2022-A
- FORDO-2025-A · Ford Credit · prime · 18 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/FORDO-2025-A
- GMCAR-2021-1 · GM Financial prime · prime · 47 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/GMCAR-2021-1
- GMCAR-2024-1 · GM Financial prime · prime · 33 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/GMCAR-2024-1
- GMCAR-2025-1 · GM Financial prime · prime · 21 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/GMCAR-2025-1
- HAROT-2022-1 · American Honda Finance · prime · 44 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/HAROT-2022-1
- HAROT-2025-1 · American Honda Finance · prime · 19 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/HAROT-2025-1
- HART-2022-A · Hyundai Capital America · prime · 51 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/HART-2022-A
- HART-2025-A · Hyundai Capital America · prime · 19 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/HART-2025-A
- NAROT-2022-A · Nissan Motor Acceptance · prime · 53 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/NAROT-2022-A
- NAROT-2025-A · Nissan Motor Acceptance · prime · 16 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/NAROT-2025-A
- SDART-2021-1 · Santander Drive (DRIVE) · subprime · 59 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/SDART-2021-1
- SDART-2022-1 · Santander Drive (DRIVE) · subprime · 45 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/SDART-2022-1
- SDART-2023-6 · Santander Drive (DRIVE) · subprime · 34 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/SDART-2023-6
- SDART-2024-1 · Santander Drive (DRIVE) · subprime · 32 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/SDART-2024-1
- SDART-2025-1 · Santander Drive (DRIVE) · subprime · 20 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/SDART-2025-1
- TAOT-2022-A · Toyota Motor Credit · prime · 52 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/TAOT-2022-A
- TAOT-2025-A · Toyota Motor Credit · prime · 20 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/TAOT-2025-A
- VALET-2025-1 · VW Credit · prime · 18 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/VALET-2025-1
- WOART-2021-A · World Omni (Toyota SET) · prime · 49 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/WOART-2021-A
- WOART-2022-A · World Omni (Toyota SET) · prime · 51 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/WOART-2022-A
- WOART-2024-A · World Omni (Toyota SET) · prime · 32 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/WOART-2024-A
- WOART-2025-A · World Omni (Toyota SET) · prime · 20 months · https://getbookiq.com/read/deal/WOART-2025-A

# Lenders on the curves

- Ally (prime)
- Bridgecrest (subprime)
- CarMax (prime)
- Carvana (prime)
- Exeter (subprime)
- Ford (prime)
- GM Financial (prime)
- GM Financial (AmeriCredit) (subprime)
- Honda (prime)
- Hyundai (prime)
- Nissan (prime)
- Santander (subprime)
- Volkswagen (prime)
- World Omni (prime)

# Screens as saved on the desks

## cu-intel

Each screen is a saved question. Click one and the census opens pre-filtered; refine from there.
RED FLAGS

Composite score 5+, $10M+ assets, clean data. The 5-6 bucket departs at 2x base rate; 7+ at 5x.

343 credit unions
DETERIORATING

Score 5+ AND members leaving (−3% YoY or worse). The compounding pattern the departed cohort showed.

324 credit unions
TARGET COHORT

Vehicle 50%+ of loans, $10M+ vehicle book, ≤40 FTE, under $1B. Auto-driven, no analytics staff: the structural buyer.

551 credit unions
REPO WATCHLIST

Repossessed vehicles above 0.40% of the vehicle book: the leading indicator that catches clean-delinquency books.

190 credit unions
AUTO MONOLINES

Vehicle 60%+ of the loan book. 1,100+ single-product lenders, most under $50M with 4 employees.

1,267 credit unions
THE DE-CAPPED

Third-party auto paper above 100% of net worth: over the line NCUA removed in Aug 2026.

799 credit unions
PARTICIPATION BUYERS

Purchased vehicle participations above 25% of net worth: bought paper, 701.22 due-diligence burden.

269 credit unions
POSTMORTEMS

Every credit union that stopped filing during the window. Open one for the final-18-months reconstruction.

1,936 credit unions

## bank-desk

NATURAL BUYERS · 426
NATURAL SELLERS · 1141
LOANS TO LENDERS · 259
AUTO LENDERS · 206
STRESSED · 136
RUN RISK · 50
All states
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
FM
GA
GU
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PR
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VI
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
All bands
<$300M
$300M-1B
$1-10B
$10-100B
>$100B
Natural buyers · 400 banks · Loans under 70% of deposits, liquid assets over 25%, leverage over 9%, ROA below band median. Cash-rich, yield-starved: the institutions that need assets.
BANK	CITY	ST	BAND	ASSETS	LOANS/DEP	LIQUID %	LEVERAGE	ROA	NIM	DEP YOY	SCORE
DEPOSITORY TRUST CO	NEW YORK	NY	$10-100B	$11.0B	0.0%	98.3%	12.8%	1.2%	0.5%	–	3
EREBOR BANK N A	COLUMBUS	OH	$1-10B	$4.7B	1.9%	97.5%	38.8%	-1.0%	0.7%	–	5
LIBERTY BANK OF NEW JERSEY	VERONA	NJ	<$300M	$107M	5.1%	95.5%	50.5%	-2.5%	2.2%	–	4
FIRST STATE BANK	SOCORRO	NM	<$300M	$188M	6.5%	92.3%	14.3%	1.0%	3.2%	-2.4%	1
COLUMBUS STATE BANK	COLUMBUS	TX	$300M-1B	$326M	7.8%	92.2%	14.5%	0.9%	2.3%	12.0%	1
TEXAS EXCHANGE BANK	CROWLEY	TX	$1-10B	$4.5B	25.9%	80.3%	12.4%	0.4%	1.5%	2.1%	4
BANK OF BROOKFIELD PURDIN NA	BROOKFIELD	MO	<$300M	$117M	20.7%	80.0%	11.2%	0.5%	2.6%	5.7%	1
G W JONES EXCHANGE BANK	MARCELLUS	MI	<$300M	$123M	22.1%	78.8%	10.4%	0.9%	3.2%	12.8%	1
EL DORADO SAVINGS BANK FSB	PLACERVILLE	CA	$1-10B	$2.4B	23.3%	77.7%	13.4%	0.9%	2.7%	-2.4%	0
BATTLE BANK NATIONAL ASSN	UPSALA	MN	<$300M	$181M	11.0%	77.6%	33.3%	-8.1%	3.0%	148.4%	3
FIRST NB OF LAKE JACKSON	LAKE JACKSON	TX	<$300M	$218M	23.4%	76.1%	11.7%	0.3%	1.8%	-5.5%	5
COLONIAL SAVINGS FA	FORT WORTH	TX	$300M-1B	$502M	44.1%	73.6%	46.1%	-2.4%	3.3%	-58.1%	4
PHENIX-GIRARD BANK	PHENIX CITY	AL	$300M-1B	$342M	25.1%	72.8%	11.8%	1.0%	2.8%	4.0%	3
BERKSHIRE BANK	NEW YORK	NY	$300M-1B	$530M	33.9%	72.8%	24.2%	0.5%	3.6%	-9.7%	4
BANK OF COMMERCE&TRUST CO	CROWLEY	LA	$300M-1B	$378M	29.6%	71.3%	11.1%	0.3%	2.3%	3.1%	3
CARMINE STATE BANK	CARMINE	TX	<$300M	$149M	28.7%	71.2%	10.0%	1.0%	2.4%	8.3%	2
CONVERSE COUNTY BANK	DOUGLAS	WY	$1-10B	$1.1B	31.1%	70.9%	9.6%	1.3%	2.0%	5.9%	2
ST LANDRY BANK&TRUST CO	OPELOUSAS	LA	<$300M	$295M	29.9%	70.8%	11.2%	0.3%	2.9%	-1.6%	3
TD BANK USA NATIONAL ASSN	WILMINGTON	DE	$10-100B	$32.1B	28.9%	70.5%	11.6%	0.4%	6.4%	-2.8%	4
SEWICKLEY SAVINGS BANK	SEWICKLEY	PA	$300M-1B	$316M	29.8%	69.8%	23.8%	0.8%	2.5%	3.6%	4
CITIZENS NB OF HILLSBORO	HILLSBORO	TX	<$300M	$224M	30.2%	69.1%	12.5%	1.2%	2.5%	3.8%	1
PEOPLES NB OF KEWANEE	KEWANEE	IL	$300M-1B	$588M	31.2%	69.0%	10.9%	0.8%	2.7%	0.7%	2
FIRST NB OF HEBBRONVILLE	HEBBRONVILLE	TX	<$300M	$102M	28.7%	68.9%	16.5%	1.2%	3.3%	9.3%	0
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK	MILFORD	NE	$1-10B	$1.1B	26.2%	68.9%	10.6%	0.9%	2.3%	7.0%	5
BANK OF CROCKER	WAYNESVILLE	MO	<$300M	$143M	33.6%	68.7%	12.8%	0.8%	3.3%	-0.5%	2
FIRST BANK	KETCHIKAN	AK	$300M-1B	$890M	29.5%	68.7%	10.2%	1.2%	3.4%	2.2%	0
FIRST STATE BANK	ANADARKO	OK	<$300M	$140M	30.6%	68.5%	11.2%	1.1%	2.5%	5.7%	1
CITIZENS BANK	GREENSBORO	AL	<$300M	$129M	32.1%	67.9%	12.2%	1.1%	3.0%	0.6%	2
WARRINGTON BANK	PENSACOLA	FL	<$300M	$174M	37.5%	67.7%	16.7%	0.7%	3.1%	2.8%	0
STREATOR HOME SAVINGS BANK	STREATOR	IL	<$300M	$137M	37.3%	67.5%	22.0%	-18.9%	2.9%	-2.3%	3
COMMUNITY BANK OF THE SOUTH	MERRITT ISLAND	FL	<$300M	$266M	31.9%	67.3%	9.5%	0.8%	3.0%	1.9%	1
DU QUOIN STATE BANK	DU QUOIN	IL	<$300M	$148M	34.2%	66.5%	10.8%	0.9%	3.3%	9.4%	2
BANKMIAMI	CORAL GABLES	FL	$300M-1B	$318M	35.1%	66.5%	11.4%	-0.7%	2.5%	547.3%	4
FIRST BANK OF BOAZ	BOAZ	AL	<$300M	$240M	33.2%	66.3%	19.7%	0.8%	2.7%	1.1%	1
FIRST STATE BANK	COLUMBUS	TX	<$300M	$155M	36.0%	66.2%	16.3%	1.1%	3.2%	8.7%	0
NEW ALBIN SAVINGS BANK	NEW ALBIN	IA	$300M-1B	$351M	39.6%	65.0%	15.5%	1.0%	1.9%	5.0%	1
CITIZENS B&T OF LEBANON INC	LEBANON	KY	<$300M	$173M	34.1%	64.9%	11.3%	0.9%	3.0%	10.2%	2
FARMERS STATE BANK OF HAMEL	HAMEL	MN	<$300M	$198M	34.7%	64.8%	9.5%	0.9%	2.6%	-0.8%	1
FIRST STB OF LIVINGSTON	LIVINGSTON	TX	$300M-1B	$689M	35.9%	64.7%	15.5%	1.1%	3.3%	0.4%	2
B2 BANK NATIONAL ASSN	HOLLADAY	UT	<$300M	$115M	36.9%	64.4%	13.7%	-1.5%	3.4%	71.6%	5
FIRST BANK OF COASTAL GA	PEMBROKE	GA	<$300M	$216M	37.3%	64.2%	9.1%	0.2%	2.6%	-12.2%	6
EDISON NATIONAL BANK	FORT MYERS	FL	$300M-1B	$454M	37.0%	64.0%	9.0%	0.6%	3.0%	12.9%	1
SPRATT SAVINGS BANK	CHESTER	SC	<$300M	$154M	38.5%	63.9%	20.4%	0.2%	3.0%	5.2%	1
NEVADA BANK&TRUST CO	CALIENTE	NV	<$300M	$217M	34.1%	63.5%	13.0%	1.0%	3.9%	6.3%	1
NORTHERN STB THIEF RIVER FAL	THIEF RIVER FALL	MN	$300M-1B	$550M	38.7%	63.4%	9.9%	1.1%	2.6%	21.4%	0
ANAHUAC NATIONAL BANK	ANAHUAC	TX	<$300M	$266M	32.5%	63.4%	10.1%	1.0%	3.6%	-0.4%	1
TEXAS NATIONAL BANK	SWEETWATER	TX	<$300M	$139M	33.1%	63.3%	11.0%	0.4%	3.1%	-1.4%	2
AMERICAN HERITAGE BANK	SAPULPA	OK	$1-10B	$1.5B	42.8%	63.0%	9.6%	0.9%	2.7%	-2.1%	1
EXCHANGE BANK	SKIATOOK	OK	<$300M	$158M	36.5%	62.9%	12.1%	1.1%	3.8%	1.6%	1
PEOPLES BANK	WILLACOOCHEE	GA	<$300M	$109M	39.0%	62.7%	12.4%	0.7%	3.0%	-0.4%	1
FIRST STATE BANK OF MALTA	MALTA	MT	<$300M	$190M	40.6%	62.6%	14.4%	1.0%	2.9%	8.5%	0
PEOPLES BANK OF GRACEVILLE	GRACEVILLE	FL	<$300M	$116M	39.7%	62.5%	10.3%	1.0%	2.5%	3.3%	1
VARO BANK NATIONAL ASSN	DRAPER	UT	$300M-1B	$338M	41.6%	61.9%	18.5%	-25.7%	7.3%	30.2%	5
BANK OF WINONA	WINONA	MS	<$300M	$143M	38.9%	61.6%	13.1%	1.2%	3.3%	1.3%	0
FIRST STATE BANK&TRUST CO	CARTHAGE	TX	$300M-1B	$547M	36.5%	61.2%	14.0%	1.0%	2.7%	10.6%	3
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK	CROCKETT	TX	<$300M	$109M	38.9%	61.1%	12.8%	0.7%	4.1%	18.1%	0
BANK OF ENGLAND	ENGLAND	AR	$300M-1B	$332M	37.6%	60.8%	19.9%	0.3%	3.6%	-0.3%	3
POCAHONTAS STATE BANK	POCAHONTAS	IA	<$300M	$123M	52.7%	60.7%	26.4%	0.5%	2.6%	1.2%	1
BANK OF KAMPSVILLE	KAMPSVILLE	IL	<$300M	$134M	42.3%	60.5%	17.4%	0.9%	3.0%	6.3%	1
COMMERCIAL BANK	HONEA PATH	SC	<$300M	$284M	40.3%	60.0%	12.7%	0.8%	3.0%	5.3%	2
WOODLANDS NATIONAL BANK	HINCKLEY	MN	$300M-1B	$331M	40.1%	59.9%	11.2%	0.6%	3.1%	3.5%	2
ANNA STATE BANK	ANNA	IL	<$300M	$112M	44.6%	59.5%	12.5%	0.8%	2.8%	4.9%	0
FIRST NB OF ASPERMONT	ASPERMONT	TX	<$300M	$134M	38.5%	59.1%	9.1%	1.1%	2.9%	4.5%	1
FIRST TRUST BANK OF ILLINOIS	KANKAKEE	IL	$300M-1B	$406M	44.2%	59.0%	10.3%	1.1%	2.9%	6.6%	1
MCCURTAIN COUNTY NB	BROKEN BOW	OK	$300M-1B	$384M	43.4%	58.8%	15.7%	1.2%	3.6%	4.6%	1
CENLAR FSB	EWING	NJ	$300M-1B	$782M	45.7%	58.5%	16.6%	-1.2%	2.9%	-6.3%	7
MISSION BANK	KINGMAN	AZ	<$300M	$185M	41.1%	58.4%	9.4%	0.5%	3.3%	-3.8%	1
FIRST FEDERAL BANK	LAKE CITY	FL	$1-10B	$4.5B	41.4%	58.1%	10.8%	1.2%	3.3%	7.1%	5
PALMETTO STATE BANK	HAMPTON	SC	$300M-1B	$597M	46.5%	58.0%	14.8%	1.0%	3.2%	-1.4%	1
TANAGER BANK	JACKSON	WY	<$300M	$222M	41.8%	58.0%	14.8%	0.3%	2.7%	-8.3%	5
DEUTSCHE BANK TR CO AMERICAS	NEW YORK	NY	$10-100B	$40.5B	55.0%	57.8%	25.8%	0.9%	2.5%	-7.5%	4
FIRST STATE BANK OF UVALDE	UVALDE	TX	$1-10B	$1.7B	45.2%	57.6%	15.7%	1.2%	2.5%	-10.3%	5
PEOPLES STB OF HALLETTSVILLE	HALLETTSVILLE	TX	$300M-1B	$396M	45.0%	57.4%	10.1%	1.0%	2.3%	6.0%	1
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK OF ND	TOLNA	ND	<$300M	$120M	43.6%	57.1%	11.0%	0.9%	3.3%	1.8%	0
PLAQUEMINE BANK&TRUST CO	PLAQUEMINE	LA	<$300M	$218M	45.2%	57.1%	12.2%	0.8%	3.3%	-2.5%	1
COMMONWEALTH CMTY BANK INC	HARTFORD	KY	<$300M	$158M	40.7%	57.1%	14.7%	0.2%	2.3%	5.3%	2
THREAD BANK	ROGERSVILLE	TN	$1-10B	$1.1B	41.6%	57.0%	9.8%	0.6%	2.9%	40.2%	2
STATE BANK&TRUST OF KENMARE	KENMARE	ND	<$300M	$201M	45.8%	57.0%	9.3%	1.1%	2.7%	9.6%	0
TWIN CITY BANK	LONGVIEW	WA	<$300M	$151M	45.5%	57.0%	9.6%	0.4%	4.0%	111.9%	3
PEOPLES BANK BILOXI MS	BILOXI	MS	$300M-1B	$771M	44.9%	56.9%	15.2%	0.7%	3.1%	-5.3%	2
BANK OF LAFAYETTE GEORGIA	LA FAYETTE	GA	$300M-1B	$447M	44.3%	56.8%	9.3%	0.9%	2.6%	7.2%	2
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN AMBOY	AMBOY	IL	$300M-1B	$325M	49.6%	56.8%	10.7%	1.0%	3.4%	7.6%	0
PERENNIAL BANK	DARWIN	MN	<$300M	$158M	44.6%	56.7%	9.5%	1.0%	3.0%	5.7%	0
SLOVENIAN S&LA OF CANONSBURG	STRABANE	PA	$300M-1B	$627M	50.8%	56.6%	16.6%	0.9%	2.3%	1.5%	3
PINNACLE BANK	JASPER	AL	$300M-1B	$385M	37.8%	56.6%	11.3%	1.1%	3.5%	7.2%	2
ELKTON BANK&TRUST CO	ELKTON	KY	<$300M	$199M	48.0%	56.6%	12.6%	1.0%	3.4%	3.9%	1
LYTLE STB OF LYTLE TEXAS	LYTLE	TX	<$300M	$115M	42.4%	56.6%	14.6%	0.4%	4.0%	7.1%	2
MERCHANTS&CITIZENS BANK	MCRAE	GA	<$300M	$146M	40.5%	56.4%	13.2%	0.8%	3.5%	-2.8%	1
BANK OF BELLE GLADE	BELLE GLADE	FL	<$300M	$160M	46.8%	56.4%	10.2%	1.1%	3.4%	-6.1%	2
FIRST STATE BANK	STUART	IA	<$300M	$130M	47.5%	56.3%	11.9%	1.1%	3.9%	6.0%	0
WESTMORELAND FS&LA	LATROBE	PA	<$300M	$167M	57.2%	56.1%	26.9%	0.0%	2.2%	-0.5%	2
BALDWIN STATE BANK	BALDWIN CITY	KS	<$300M	$116M	46.1%	55.9%	10.1%	1.0%	3.0%	6.0%	1
BANK OF MOUNDVILLE	MOUNDVILLE	AL	<$300M	$145M	45.5%	55.8%	15.1%	0.4%	2.7%	6.2%	4
BANK OF WINNFIELD&TRUST CO	WINNFIELD	LA	<$300M	$156M	41.4%	55.8%	14.4%	0.7%	3.9%	-5.3%	1
CITIZENS SAVINGS BANK	ANAMOSA	IA	<$300M	$166M	45.4%	55.7%	9.5%	1.0%	3.0%	6.4%	0
TEXAS ADVANTAGE CMTY BANK NA	ALVIN	TX	<$300M	$192M	46.8%	55.5%	11.3%	0.4%	3.3%	7.7%	5
FIRST NB OF MOUNT DORA	MOUNT DORA	FL	$300M-1B	$358M	43.3%	55.4%	12.3%	0.7%	3.3%	-5.7%	2
SMBC MANUBANK	LOS ANGELES	CA	$1-10B	$6.6B	48.2%	55.4%	9.6%	-3.6%	0.9%	-0.1%	6
USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK	PHOENIX	AZ	>$100B	$106.2B	48.2%	55.3%	9.3%	0.9%	5.3%	-0.9%	2
FIRST NB OF KANSAS	BURLINGTON	KS	<$300M	$106M	44.9%	55.3%	9.1%	0.8%	3.0%	15.2%	2
BANK OF ERATH	ERATH	LA	<$300M	$105M	47.4%	55.1%	14.4%	0.2%	4.2%	-1.2%	1
GREAT SOUTHERN BANK	MERIDIAN	MS	$300M-1B	$355M	45.8%	55.0%	9.5%	0.7%	3.3%	1.4%	4
PEOPLES BANK	RIPLEY	MS	$300M-1B	$582M	45.2%	55.0%	10.3%	1.0%	2.6%	5.2%	0
RSNB BANK	ROCK SPRINGS	WY	$300M-1B	$381M	42.8%	54.5%	11.8%	1.1%	3.3%	0.1%	3
INTEGRITY BANK FOR BUSINESS	VIRGINIA BEACH	VA	<$300M	$112M	67.4%	54.5%	24.1%	0.3%	3.6%	11.8%	2
COMMUNITY BK PLEASANT HILL	PLEASANT HILL	MO	<$300M	$133M	43.1%	54.4%	10.4%	1.1%	3.3%	-19.2%	4
KARNES CNTY NB OF KARNES CTY	KARNES CITY	TX	$300M-1B	$577M	43.9%	54.3%	10.8%	0.6%	3.3%	16.1%	4
MAYNARD SAVINGS BANK	MAYNARD	IA	<$300M	$108M	53.7%	54.2%	15.1%	1.2%	2.8%	-1.7%	1
BANK OF WIGGINS	WIGGINS	MS	<$300M	$228M	44.7%	54.1%	12.9%	0.6%	2.9%	6.9%	2
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK	LAFAYETTE	AL	$300M-1B	$308M	45.6%	54.0%	11.6%	1.1%	3.2%	4.9%	1
UNITED SAVINGS BANK	PHILADELPHIA	PA	$300M-1B	$461M	52.0%	53.6%	17.4%	0.8%	3.0%	2.0%	0
UNION BANK	JAMESTOWN	TN	<$300M	$247M	44.2%	53.4%	10.7%	0.5%	3.2%	4.1%	1
BAY BANK	GREEN BAY	WI	$300M-1B	$316M	49.6%	53.3%	11.2%	1.1%	4.2%	1.8%	3
DEMOTTE STATE BANK	DEMOTTE	IN	$300M-1B	$622M	49.4%	53.2%	11.8%	1.2%	3.2%	8.8%	3
CITIZENS B&T GRAINGER CNTY	RUTLEDGE	TN	<$300M	$273M	47.1%	52.9%	14.2%	1.1%	3.5%	3.3%	1
LUMBEE GUARANTY BANK	PEMBROKE	NC	$300M-1B	$583M	49.1%	52.7%	10.7%	0.8%	3.0%	5.1%	1
GRANVILLE NATIONAL BANK	GRANVILLE	IL	<$300M	$118M	50.8%	52.7%	11.1%	1.2%	3.4%	3.4%	1
ANNA-JONESBORO NATIONAL BANK	ANNA	IL	<$300M	$234M	50.8%	52.6%	14.6%	1.2%	3.5%	-1.2%	2
FIRST SB OF HEGEWISCH	CHICAGO	IL	$300M-1B	$787M	52.8%	52.5%	14.9%	0.1%	1.8%	-1.9%	3
CITIZENS BANK OF WINFIELD	WINFIELD	AL	$300M-1B	$301M	52.2%	52.4%	17.5%	0.4%	2.8%	7.3%	3
COLFAX BANKING CO	COLFAX	LA	<$300M	$152M	49.5%	52.4%	11.1%	0.8%	3.6%	-1.2%	1
UNION BANK&TRUST CO	MINNEAPOLIS	MN	<$300M	$253M	49.2%	52.3%	10.0%	0.9%	4.0%	28.3%	3
FIRST STATE BANK	BELMOND	IA	<$300M	$142M	52.6%	52.3%	11.2%	0.7%	2.2%	15.8%	1
FIRST NB OF NEVADA MISSOURI	NEVADA	MO	<$300M	$122M	53.2%	51.9%	16.1%	0.8%	3.3%	0.8%	1
COMMUNITY BANK OF MARSHALL	MARSHALL	MO	<$300M	$250M	48.4%	51.8%	10.0%	1.1%	3.3%	4.2%	0
DLP BANK	STARKE	FL	$300M-1B	$301M	48.3%	51.8%	15.3%	0.8%	4.5%	18.8%	0
AUBURN STATE BANK	AUBURN	NE	<$300M	$251M	49.9%	51.6%	15.1%	1.2%	2.8%	-5.7%	3
CASHMERE VALLEY BANK	CASHMERE	WA	$1-10B	$2.3B	52.1%	51.6%	12.5%	1.1%	3.2%	6.7%	2
FIRSTSTATE BANK	LINEVILLE	AL	$300M-1B	$349M	46.6%	51.6%	11.1%	0.8%	3.7%	1.9%	1
CITIZENS SAVINGS BANK	SPILLVILLE	IA	<$300M	$151M	52.1%	51.5%	15.5%	0.7%	2.3%	9.9%	2
BANK OF COUSHATTA	COUSHATTA	LA	$300M-1B	$317M	58.7%	51.5%	9.2%	0.5%	2.7%	3.5%	4
FIRST FEDERAL BANK OF OHIO	GALION	OH	<$300M	$283M	52.0%	51.5%	13.7%	0.3%	3.1%	-3.2%	2
GERBER STATE BANK	ARGENTA	IL	<$300M	$101M	60.2%	51.4%	12.3%	1.1%	3.1%	3.9%	0
STILLMAN BANCCORP N A	STILLMAN VALLEY	IL	$300M-1B	$646M	52.6%	51.4%	9.2%	0.8%	2.8%	4.4%	1
FARMERS STB OF WESTERN IL	ALPHA	IL	<$300M	$167M	51.0%	51.3%	14.1%	1.2%	3.8%	2.4%	0
HIGHLANDS COMMUNITY BANK	COVINGTON	VA	<$300M	$189M	48.6%	51.2%	12.6%	0.4%	3.4%	-2.2%	1
CARVER STATE BANK	SAVANNAH	GA	<$300M	$111M	50.0%	51.1%	15.0%	1.0%	4.4%	2.5%	3
FAYETTE CNTY NB FAYETTEVILLE	FAYETTEVILLE	WV	<$300M	$158M	53.9%	50.9%	9.1%	0.8%	3.0%	-0.6%	2
FIRST NB OF SOUTH CAROLINA	HOLLY HILL	SC	$300M-1B	$310M	52.5%	50.8%	12.4%	1.2%	3.8%	-1.0%	0
NORTHERN INTERSTATE BANK N A	NORWAY	MI	<$300M	$194M	47.4%	50.8%	9.4%	0.9%	3.1%	-2.6%	1
EAGLE BANK&TRUST CO	LITTLE ROCK	AR	$300M-1B	$506M	51.6%	50.6%	16.4%	1.0%	3.7%	4.4%	2
PIBANK NATIONAL ASSN	MIAMI	FL	$1-10B	$2.4B	53.3%	50.4%	9.7%	-0.5%	1.8%	94.1%	4
CITIZENS STB OF ARLINGTON	ARLINGTON	SD	<$300M	$153M	54.1%	50.3%	11.7%	1.1%	2.9%	5.2%	0
BANK OF RICHMONDVILLE	COBLESKILL	NY	<$300M	$186M	50.1%	50.3%	11.5%	0.7%	3.4%	1.6%	1
SECURITY FEDERAL BANK	AIKEN	SC	$1-10B	$1.5B	49.8%	50.2%	10.8%	0.9%	3.3%	-1.7%	0
FIRST STATE BANK	WINCHESTER	OH	$1-10B	$1.2B	51.5%	49.9%	10.5%	1.1%	3.3%	5.0%	1
FIVE POINTS BANK OF HASTINGS	HASTINGS	NE	$300M-1B	$552M	51.4%	49.7%	10.9%	0.8%	2.4%	6.3%	2
CITIZENS B&T CO OF VIVIAN LA	VIVIAN	LA	<$300M	$160M	46.8%	49.7%	10.3%	0.5%	3.5%	5.0%	2
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK	EATONTON	GA	<$300M	$290M	54.4%	49.7%	11.2%	0.6%	2.9%	-10.8%	3
BANK OF HINDMAN	HINDMAN	KY	<$300M	$260M	55.7%	49.4%	9.2%	0.5%	2.1%	-0.8%	2
MILLVILLE SAVINGS BANK	MILLVILLE	NJ	<$300M	$170M	52.4%	49.4%	13.6%	0.3%	3.1%	4.6%	2
MADISON VALLEY BANK	ENNIS	MT	<$300M	$264M	52.8%	49.1%	9.2%	1.0%	3.7%	1.3%	0
GOLDEN VALLEY BANK	CHICO	CA	$300M-1B	$605M	52.6%	49.1%	9.3%	1.0%	3.6%	3.4%	0
BIG HORN FSB	GREYBULL	WY	$300M-1B	$400M	53.4%	49.0%	11.3%	0.9%	3.2%	6.1%	0
JIM THORPE NEIGHBORHOOD BANK	JIM THORPE	PA	<$300M	$265M	51.4%	49.0%	10.1%	1.0%	3.4%	7.0%	1
FARMERS&MERCHANTS NB FAIRVIE	FAIRVIEW	OK	<$300M	$119M	51.5%	49.0%	12.2%	1.1%	3.2%	0.5%	2
GRAND VALLEY BANK	HEBER CITY	UT	$300M-1B	$599M	52.0%	49.0%	11.5%	1.2%	3.8%	4.6%	1
SOUTHERN INDEPENDENT BANK	OPP	AL	$300M-1B	$395M	53.1%	48.9%	13.6%	1.1%	3.3%	3.4%	0
FARMERS STATE BANK OF CALHAN	CALHAN	CO	$300M-1B	$416M	56.5%	48.9%	9.2%	1.1%	3.1%	1.1%	2
NEWPORT FEDERAL BANK	NEWPORT	TN	<$300M	$277M	52.1%	48.8%	10.4%	0.8%	2.8%	-0.2%	1
BANK OF BRIDGER NA	BRIDGER	MT	$300M-1B	$803M	52.6%	48.8%	10.1%	0.9%	3.2%	-1.4%	1
FIRST STB OF THE SOUTH INC	SULLIGENT	AL	<$300M	$131M	51.8%	48.8%	16.4%	1.1%	4.0%	0.5%	0
NAVE BANK	SAN JUAN	PR	$300M-1B	$555M	63.4%	48.7%	13.8%	-0.5%	2.9%	148.9%	4
COMMUNITY PARTNERS SB	SALEM	IL	<$300M	$288M	56.9%	48.5%	11.9%	0.7%	3.5%	0.2%	1
CARROLL CNTY TR CARROLLTON M	CARROLLTON	MO	<$300M	$208M	53.5%	48.5%	9.1%	0.3%	2.5%	-0.8%	1
HOMETOWN NATIONAL BANK	LA SALLE	IL	$300M-1B	$307M	56.9%	48.5%	11.3%	1.1%	3.2%	-6.7%	1
FIRST&PEOPLES BANK&TRUST CO	RUSSELL	KY	<$300M	$207M	45.9%	48.3%	9.1%	-0.5%	3.1%	-3.0%	7
WATERTOWN SAVINGS BANK	WATERTOWN	MA	$1-10B	$1.4B	52.5%	48.1%	12.0%	0.8%	3.1%	-3.7%	0
FIRST NATIONAL BANK	ALAMOGORDO	NM	$300M-1B	$453M	50.7%	48.1%	10.3%	1.1%	4.1%	-2.6%	3
ANDOVER BANK	ANDOVER	OH	$300M-1B	$595M	50.6%	48.0%	9.6%	0.8%	3.1%	2.0%	1
BOONE BANK&TRUST CO	BOONE	IA	<$300M	$157M	54.8%	47.8%	9.7%	0.9%	2.6%	2.0%	1
INVESTMENT SAVINGS BANK	ALTOONA	PA	<$300M	$105M	58.6%	47.8%	21.7%	0.4%	2.8%	0.2%	1
FIRST STATE BANK OF PORTER	PORTER	IN	<$300M	$162M	54.2%	47.8%	16.8%	0.8%	3.5%	1.6%	0
HSBC BANK USA NATIONAL ASSN	TYSONS	VA	>$100B	$173.1B	39.0%	47.7%	10.2%	1.0%	1.6%	0.3%	7
FARMERS STATE BANK&TRUST CO	JACKSONVILLE	IL	<$300M	$210M	52.3%	47.6%	13.8%	0.7%	3.8%	-4.9%	1
FIRST FS&LA	DELTA	OH	<$300M	$246M	55.8%	47.5%	16.5%	1.1%	3.8%	2.1%	0
YAKIMA FS&LA	YAKIMA	WA	$1-10B	$2.0B	66.3%	47.5%	28.1%	0.9%	2.3%	-2.4%	1
VIDALIA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK	VIDALIA	GA	<$300M	$212M	59.1%	47.4%	12.1%	-0.8%	1.3%	-3.8%	5
PEOPLES SAVINGS&LOAN CO	BUCYRUS	OH	<$300M	$157M	57.4%	47.4%	20.3%	0.4%	2.8%	0.2%	1
MT MCKINLEY BANK	FAIRBANKS	AK	$300M-1B	$635M	54.8%	47.1%	18.9%	0.7%	3.7%	0.9%	1
DEWITT SAVINGS BANK	CLINTON	IL	<$300M	$173M	59.1%	47.0%	10.5%	0.6%	2.9%	4.0%	2
BANK OF EASTON	NORTH EASTON	MA	<$300M	$249M	55.2%	47.0%	10.3%	0.7%	2.2%	5.3%	1
BANK OF ALAPAHA	ALAPAHA	GA	<$300M	$251M	53.8%	47.0%	10.2%	0.7%	3.4%	5.1%	1
BANK OF CLOVIS	CLOVIS	NM	$300M-1B	$438M	57.1%	46.9%	10.8%	1.3%	4.5%	10.0%	0
HARRISON COUNTY BANK	LOST CREEK	WV	<$300M	$165M	54.0%	46.8%	10.2%	0.8%	3.5%	8.6%	0
SOUTHWEST CAPITAL BANK	ALBUQUERQUE	NM	$300M-1B	$483M	55.2%	46.8%	10.8%	1.2%	4.1%	-6.4%	2
FIRST NB OF FORT STOCKTON	FORT STOCKTON	TX	<$300M	$153M	52.6%	46.6%	12.2%	1.1%	5.0%	2.6%	0
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN OLNEY	OLNEY	IL	$300M-1B	$469M	54.9%	46.6%	10.8%	1.2%	3.4%	1.9%	1
SECURITY BANK	NEWBERN	TN	<$300M	$224M	54.4%	46.6%	10.5%	0.7%	3.4%	3.8%	0
CITIZENS BANK	CORVALLIS	OR	$300M-1B	$823M	54.5%	46.5%	13.9%	0.2%	3.5%	-3.0%	2
BLISSFIELD STATE BANK	BLISSFIELD	MI	<$300M	$115M	56.3%	46.5%	11.3%	1.2%	3.7%	-0.7%	2
COMMERCIAL BANK OF OZARK	OZARK	AL	<$300M	$115M	50.5%	46.4%	9.1%	0.5%	3.4%	0.0%	2
FAIRFIELD NATIONAL BANK	FAIRFIELD	IL	$300M-1B	$621M	68.9%	46.4%	11.9%	0.7%	2.4%	-5.5%	5
LIBERTY BANK MINNESOTA	SAINT CLOUD	MN	<$300M	$290M	51.7%	46.3%	12.9%	1.0%	3.2%	5.3%	2
MOULTRIE BANK&TRUST	MOULTRIE	GA	<$300M	$151M	56.6%	46.0%	14.1%	1.0%	3.9%	2.5%	1
FIRST NATIONAL BANK TEXAS	KILLEEN	TX	$1-10B	$4.6B	55.1%	46.0%	9.1%	1.2%	3.9%	7.3%	3
MERCHANTS&PLANTERS BANK	NEWPORT	AR	$300M-1B	$379M	52.8%	45.9%	10.2%	0.9%	4.0%	14.6%	1
CITIZENS STATE BANK	HUGOTON	KS	<$300M	$137M	58.8%	45.8%	13.5%	1.1%	3.6%	5.2%	0
MERCHANTS&FARMERS B&T CO	LEESVILLE	LA	$300M-1B	$541M	55.1%	45.8%	11.2%	0.9%	3.7%	1.6%	1
FARMERS STB OF HOFFMAN	HOFFMAN	IL	<$300M	$232M	67.3%	45.6%	11.9%	0.7%	3.4%	1.3%	3
CITIZENS BANK&TRUST CO	CAMPBELLSVILLE	KY	$300M-1B	$383M	60.6%	45.5%	13.1%	1.2%	3.1%	3.8%	0
NORTH SHORE TRUST&SAVINGS	WAUKEGAN	IL	<$300M	$270M	63.5%	45.5%	25.2%	0.9%	2.9%	-4.8%	1
TEXAS TRADITIONS BANK	KATY	TX	$300M-1B	$556M	59.2%	45.4%	9.4%	0.8%	4.6%	74.0%	2
CLARE BANK NATIONAL ASSN	PLATTEVILLE	WI	$300M-1B	$332M	63.9%	45.3%	11.6%	1.0%	2.4%	2.5%	3
NEW HORIZON BANK NA	POWHATAN	VA	$300M-1B	$359M	64.2%	45.0%	10.8%	-0.4%	3.9%	51.8%	4
FARMERS BLDG&SVG BANK	ROCHESTER	PA	<$300M	$123M	61.4%	45.0%	20.5%	0.5%	1.9%	3.7%	3
COMMUNITY BANK	LIBERAL	KS	<$300M	$174M	58.3%	44.9%	12.8%	1.1%	3.8%	3.3%	0
BANKPACIFIC LTD	HAGATNA	GU	<$300M	$192M	56.0%	44.9%	11.9%	0.7%	5.5%	7.2%	3
INTEGRITY BANK SSB	HOUSTON	TX	$300M-1B	$340M	62.8%	44.8%	14.5%	0.5%	4.2%	307.5%	1
HOME BANKING CO	SELMER	TN	<$300M	$124M	55.6%	44.8%	10.1%	0.4%	3.7%	-3.8%	2
FIRST NB OF WAVERLY	WAVERLY	OH	<$300M	$196M	54.4%	44.7%	9.2%	0.7%	3.2%	-7.6%	4
COMMUNITY FSB	WOODHAVEN	NY	$300M-1B	$827M	55.1%	44.7%	9.9%	-0.7%	4.2%	0.4%	4
COMMERCIAL BANK&TRUST OF PA	LATROBE	PA	$300M-1B	$357M	53.8%	44.7%	14.7%	0.6%	4.1%	2.4%	2
SOUTHERN HILLS CMTY BANK	LEESBURG	OH	<$300M	$210M	57.2%	44.7%	13.8%	0.6%	4.3%	4.2%	1
CITIZENS COMMUNITY BANK	MASCOUTAH	IL	$300M-1B	$531M	61.2%	44.7%	9.8%	-0.3%	2.5%	6.8%	7
FIRST PIONEER NATIONAL BANK	WRAY	CO	<$300M	$243M	62.8%	44.5%	12.5%	1.1%	3.2%	2.6%	2
JERSEY STATE BANK	JERSEYVILLE	IL	<$300M	$190M	57.2%	44.5%	13.3%	0.8%	3.1%	5.2%	1
SECURITY STB OF AITKIN	AITKIN	MN	<$300M	$114M	52.5%	44.5%	10.8%	0.9%	4.0%	3.2%	2
UNION STATE BANK	PELL CITY	AL	<$300M	$212M	51.2%	44.5%	9.6%	0.4%	3.6%	-7.4%	4
WELLS FARGO NB WEST	LAS VEGAS	NV	$1-10B	$8.8B	68.2%	44.4%	19.2%	1.0%	1.6%	-6.4%	5
FIRST NB IN PINCKNEYVILLE	PINCKNEYVILLE	IL	<$300M	$138M	55.6%	44.3%	11.8%	1.2%	4.0%	-1.0%	2
STATE BANK OF DOWNS	DOWNS	KS	<$300M	$148M	63.3%	44.3%	12.6%	0.8%	3.4%	5.0%	0
FARMERS&MERCHANTS BANK	PIEDMONT	AL	$300M-1B	$309M	56.3%	44.3%	12.7%	0.8%	4.2%	-5.5%	1
TD BANK NATIONAL ASSN	WILMINGTON	DE	>$100B	$342.8B	58.6%	44.3%	10.3%	0.8%	3.2%	-5.3%	1
SECURITY STB OF WARROAD	WARROAD	MN	<$300M	$138M	56.3%	44.3%	16.4%	0.7%	3.7%	-4.4%	3
BANK OF ABBEVILLE&TRUST CO	ABBEVILLE	LA	<$300M	$245M	59.4%	44.1%	12.9%	1.1%	3.5%	11.2%	1
OZONA BANK	OZONA	TX	$300M-1B	$346M	62.4%	44.0%	12.3%	0.7%	4.2%	4.1%	4
BARABOO STATE BANK	BARABOO	WI	$300M-1B	$570M	60.5%	44.0%	11.7%	1.2%	3.5%	5.6%	0
FIRST BANKERS TRUST CO NA	QUINCY	IL	$1-10B	$1.2B	59.8%	44.0%	10.0%	0.7%	2.9%	2.0%	2
EXCHANGE BANK OF ALABAMA	ALTOONA	AL	$300M-1B	$393M	61.0%	43.9%	15.3%	1.2%	3.9%	0.3%	0
BANK OF PENSACOLA	PENSACOLA	FL	<$300M	$147M	60.6%	43.9%	9.8%	1.0%	3.1%	-3.0%	0
LINCOLN STATE BANK	HANKINSON	ND	<$300M	$125M	58.7%	43.7%	10.0%	1.1%	3.6%	9.3%	1
VALLEY STATE BANK	BELLE PLAINE	KS	<$300M	$201M	62.1%	43.7%	12.2%	0.6%	4.2%	6.5%	2
WISDOM HERITAGE BANK	ALVA	OK	$300M-1B	$601M	59.5%	43.7%	14.2%	1.1%	3.1%	8.2%	0
NEWFIELD NATIONAL BANK	NEWFIELD	NJ	$300M-1B	$889M	58.4%	43.6%	10.1%	0.7%	3.3%	-1.5%	1
INDEPENDENCE BANK	INDEPENDENCE	OH	<$300M	$191M	62.1%	43.6%	14.5%	0.9%	3.2%	4.8%	2
KALAMAZOO COUNTY STATE BANK	SCHOOLCRAFT	MI	<$300M	$118M	57.7%	43.2%	12.1%	0.5%	4.4%	-2.6%	0
IRELAND BANK	MALAD CITY	ID	$300M-1B	$355M	59.3%	43.2%	11.5%	0.8%	4.2%	-3.1%	3
FIRST SOUTHWEST BANK	DURANGO	CO	$300M-1B	$657M	68.6%	43.1%	15.3%	0.6%	3.4%	7.0%	1
HUNTINGTON FSB	HUNTINGTON	WV	$300M-1B	$532M	68.4%	43.0%	15.1%	-0.4%	1.5%	-1.9%	3
HELM BANK USA	MIAMI	FL	$1-10B	$1.2B	61.4%	43.0%	11.2%	1.1%	4.2%	9.7%	3
NEFFS NATIONAL BANK	NEFFS	PA	$300M-1B	$471M	68.8%	43.0%	16.8%	0.5%	2.7%	3.2%	1
NELNET BANK	DRAPER	UT	$1-10B	$3.0B	64.5%	43.0%	15.9%	1.2%	3.0%	63.5%	5
CITIZENS BANK INC	ROBERTSDALE	AL	<$300M	$159M	59.1%	42.9%	11.0%	1.2%	3.8%	-0.2%	0
HOME FEDERAL BANK OF TN	KNOXVILLE	TN	$1-10B	$2.7B	69.8%	42.8%	17.2%	0.3%	2.3%	0.1%	4
LAONA STATE BANK	LAONA	WI	<$300M	$297M	58.6%	42.7%	9.6%	0.3%	3.1%	4.5%	2
DAIRY STATE BANK	RICE LAKE	WI	$300M-1B	$730M	62.4%	42.7%	12.0%	1.0%	3.0%	2.2%	0
PCSB BANK	CLARINDA	IA	$300M-1B	$326M	60.3%	42.6%	11.1%	0.9%	2.9%	1.0%	0
CLEVELAND STATE BANK	CLEVELAND	MS	$300M-1B	$340M	56.6%	42.5%	11.2%	1.0%	3.6%	3.5%	1
NORTHWOODS BANK OF MINNESOTA	PARK RAPIDS	MN	<$300M	$141M	61.3%	42.3%	11.2%	1.1%	4.0%	3.1%	0
FARMERS STB OF WESTMORELAND	WESTMORELAND	KS	<$300M	$258M	62.6%	42.0%	13.9%	1.1%	3.4%	10.6%	2
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS BANK	JOHNSTON CITY	IL	<$300M	$136M	63.6%	42.0%	17.7%	1.1%	3.8%	-11.3%	5
UNION STATE BANK	CLAY CENTER	KS	<$300M	$206M	65.1%	42.0%	10.3%	0.9%	3.3%	4.5%	1
FIRST NATIONAL BANK	CLOVERDALE	IN	$300M-1B	$419M	58.5%	41.8%	9.5%	0.4%	3.1%	-2.1%	2
UNB BANK	MOUNT CARMEL	PA	<$300M	$167M	57.2%	41.8%	9.3%	0.1%	2.7%	-2.3%	2
GREENLEAF BANK	GREENLEAF	WI	<$300M	$159M	65.6%	41.8%	9.6%	1.1%	3.2%	7.3%	0
PERU FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK	PERU	IL	<$300M	$208M	64.5%	41.8%	16.4%	0.8%	3.1%	-1.3%	0
FIRST NB&T CO OF WEATHERFORD	WEATHERFORD	TX	$300M-1B	$968M	56.6%	41.8%	10.4%	0.5%	4.3%	-4.6%	3
STATE SB OF MANISTIQUE	MANISTIQUE	MI	<$300M	$178M	59.8%	41.7%	9.6%	0.8%	3.3%	11.3%	2
CONCORDIA BANK&TRUST CO	VIDALIA	LA	$300M-1B	$667M	60.9%	41.6%	11.1%	1.1%	3.5%	5.3%	2
FIRST NB IN PORT LAVACA	PORT LAVACA	TX	$300M-1B	$361M	68.0%	41.6%	13.0%	0.4%	2.9%	-2.0%	3
VALLEY BANK OF NEVADA	NORTH LAS VEGAS	NV	<$300M	$241M	63.5%	41.5%	10.3%	0.6%	3.5%	0.6%	1
ASTRA BANK	SCANDIA	KS	$300M-1B	$423M	58.4%	41.5%	9.3%	0.6%	3.5%	-0.3%	1
CITIZENS BANK OF KY INC	PAINTSVILLE	KY	$300M-1B	$670M	59.8%	41.3%	13.5%	1.0%	3.6%	-4.6%	0
COMMUNITY STATE BANK	ROYAL CENTER	IN	<$300M	$176M	59.0%	41.3%	10.5%	0.6%	3.1%	1.0%	2
INDUSTRIAL BANK	WASHINGTON	DC	$300M-1B	$774M	66.3%	41.2%	15.2%	0.0%	3.9%	-4.6%	4
INDEPENDENCE BANK OF KY	OWENSBORO	KY	$1-10B	$3.8B	69.8%	41.1%	9.3%	1.1%	2.6%	-4.4%	1
BANK OF ANGUILLA	ANGUILLA	MS	<$300M	$192M	57.9%	41.1%	14.7%	1.1%	4.0%	-1.4%	2
TXN BANK	HONDO	TX	$300M-1B	$669M	54.0%	41.1%	9.7%	1.0%	3.5%	4.5%	1
ZENITH BANK&TRUST	SCOTTSDALE	AZ	<$300M	$133M	69.6%	41.1%	17.9%	0.1%	3.4%	27.4%	2
STATE BANK OF REESEVILLE	REESEVILLE	WI	<$300M	$170M	66.1%	41.0%	9.6%	0.8%	2.5%	12.3%	3
FAIRFAX STATE SAVINGS BANK	FAIRFAX	IA	<$300M	$287M	68.0%	41.0%	9.5%	0.7%	2.7%	-0.1%	3
FNBC BANK&TRUST	LA GRANGE	IL	$300M-1B	$582M	61.8%	40.9%	10.0%	1.2%	3.3%	1.5%	0
SHELBY STATE BANK	SHELBY	MI	$300M-1B	$397M	63.6%	40.9%	9.1%	0.9%	3.8%	3.8%	1
BANK OF WHITTIER NA	WHITTIER	CA	<$300M	$153M	67.3%	40.9%	16.4%	0.7%	2.5%	-15.4%	4
BAKER-BOYER NATIONAL BANK	WALLA WALLA	WA	$300M-1B	$693M	60.4%	40.8%	9.3%	0.6%	3.7%	5.3%	1
FIRST STATE BANK SOUTHWEST	PIPESTONE	MN	$300M-1B	$410M	63.0%	40.8%	9.7%	1.2%	3.3%	5.0%	2
CBBC BANK	MARYVILLE	TN	$300M-1B	$562M	66.1%	40.8%	14.2%	1.2%	3.7%	8.2%	1
THINK MUTUAL BANK	ROCHESTER	MN	$1-10B	$2.2B	64.8%	40.7%	16.3%	0.6%	2.9%	4.7%	1
BANK OF ESTES PARK	ESTES PARK	CO	<$300M	$172M	61.2%	40.6%	10.8%	0.8%	4.4%	11.1%	1
FIRST STATE BANK	GAINESVILLE	TX	$1-10B	$1.9B	56.8%	40.6%	9.6%	0.8%	4.1%	1.2%	0
HOME STATE BANK	LITCHFIELD	MN	<$300M	$219M	62.2%	40.6%	11.8%	1.2%	4.0%	8.7%	1
NATIONAL BANK&TRUST	LA GRANGE	TX	<$300M	$242M	65.2%	40.5%	10.8%	0.4%	2.9%	9.7%	3
ALPINE CAPITAL BANK	NEW YORK	NY	<$300M	$237M	67.5%	40.5%	13.7%	0.7%	4.4%	23.8%	2
LUSITANIA SAVINGS BANK	NEWARK	NJ	$300M-1B	$418M	64.0%	40.5%	15.0%	0.5%	2.4%	6.7%	2
MALVERN NATIONAL BANK	MALVERN	AR	$300M-1B	$728M	59.5%	40.4%	9.4%	1.0%	3.3%	6.9%	0
BRIDGE CITY STATE BANK	BRIDGE CITY	TX	<$300M	$247M	66.8%	40.3%	11.7%	1.1%	3.6%	4.3%	2
VICTORY BANK	LUBBOCK	TX	<$300M	$285M	62.9%	40.2%	12.1%	1.0%	4.4%	24.7%	0
FARMERS STATE BANK	PARKSTON	SD	<$300M	$255M	58.6%	39.9%	10.0%	0.9%	3.4%	2.5%	1
AUBURNBANK	AUBURN	AL	$1-10B	$1.1B	57.9%	39.8%	10.7%	0.9%	3.3%	5.3%	0
STATE BANK OF FARIBAULT	FARIBAULT	MN	$300M-1B	$329M	58.4%	39.8%	9.3%	1.1%	4.1%	3.8%	0
WHITESVILLE STATE BANK	WHITESVILLE	WV	<$300M	$138M	59.8%	39.8%	10.0%	0.5%	4.0%	1.4%	1
UNITED SOUTHERN BANK	UMATILLA	FL	$300M-1B	$843M	59.9%	39.8%	10.8%	1.2%	3.9%	-2.5%	1
FRAZER BANK	ALTUS	OK	$300M-1B	$354M	60.9%	39.8%	11.2%	0.5%	3.3%	1.8%	3
FIRST NB OF BELLEVUE	BELLEVUE	OH	$300M-1B	$310M	60.9%	39.7%	9.4%	0.7%	3.9%	-0.8%	1
FIRST STB SHANNON-POLO	SHANNON	IL	<$300M	$190M	64.6%	39.7%	10.3%	0.9%	3.1%	-0.8%	4
SANGER BANK	SANGER	TX	<$300M	$224M	66.0%	39.7%	16.5%	1.1%	3.9%	6.2%	0
EARLHAM SAVINGS BANK	WEST DES MOINES	IA	$300M-1B	$383M	64.1%	39.6%	9.5%	1.1%	3.8%	1.9%	0
BANK OF MARIN	NOVATO	CA	$1-10B	$3.9B	61.2%	39.5%	9.2%	1.0%	3.5%	3.6%	1
CITIZENS STATE BANK	MONTICELLO	IA	$300M-1B	$594M	60.3%	39.4%	11.5%	1.2%	2.9%	4.3%	2

## intel

Each screen is a saved question. Click one and the scoreboard opens pre-filtered.
THE SCISSORS

Allowance coverage falling while the loss rate climbs. The pattern that preceded the Car-Mart restatement.

0 / 26 filers
RESERVE BLEED

Provision running below net charge-offs for two or more consecutive quarters: the allowance is absorbing losses it is not being refilled for.

4 / 26 filers
SOLVENCY STRAIN

Negative equity, or an equity cushion eroding four points or more year over year. Both Chapter 11 filings on this tape ran through here.

6 / 26 filers
PAST DUE INTO A THINNING RESERVE

Delinquency climbing while coverage falls, for the filers that tag an undimensioned past-due aggregate.

0 / 26 filers
GROWING ON A THINNER CUSHION

Book up more than 10% year over year while allowance coverage falls.

0 / 26 filers
TOLD YOU THEMSELVES

Filed a non-reliance 8-K, verified by reading the document, not by trusting the item code.

3 / 26 filers
DEPARTED

Stopped filing periodic reports: bankruptcy, deregistration, or delisting with no 10-K or 10-Q after it.

3 / 26 filers
RATIOS SUPPRESSED

At least one data-quality screen fired, so some ratios are deliberately blank. Worth knowing before quoting a number.

12 / 26 filers